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I. Introduction: Civil Rights Remedies For Battered Women -
Axiomatic And Ignored
In battering relationships, women are deprived of their per-
sonal liberty and dignity through physical constraint, violence, in-
jury or death. Often, they are deprived of their rights to travel,
work, speak, associate with others, marry or divorce, have and
raise children.
To control these aspects of one's life is essential to the experi-
ence of being an independent person, a "subject" engaged in life
and society. Violent attacks on women impede this experience and
spread the terror of coercive objectification. As targets of rage,
battered women endure the dehumanizing violation of their physi-
cal, mental and spiritual integrity. When attacks derive from a vi-
olent husband, the very possibility of intimacy in a relationship
can be severed forever.
"In violent experiences," Susan Schechter writes, "victims
have their control and dignity stripped from them. Assault makes
people feel helpless, immobilized, and overwhelmed with feelings
of vulnerability. The violation of one's body or physical space is
enraging and depressing. As victims of violence, we suffer multi-
ple losses.",
It is axiomatic that one's bodily, psychological and spiritual
integrity are at the essence of one's protected "rights," yet most
federal civil rights laws do not make coercive violations of battered
women's integrity by private actors legally actionable. Existing
and pending civil rights legislation can serve some battered women
in their efforts to obtain justice and promote a society in which all
women are free from domestic violence.
The pervasiveness of wife abuse requires recognition of the
social, economic, legal and political context of male dominance in
which "private violence" directed at battered women is just one el-
l. SUsAN SCHEcHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VIsIONS AND STRuG-
GLES OF THE BAT=ERED WOMEN's MovEMENT 18 (1982).
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ement. This recognition must lead to the development of strate-
gies to eliminate that violence. Although civil rights strategies
against violent husbands largely have been ignored in battered wo-
men's political and legal work, some battering behavior constitutes
a deprivation of civil rights. Such behavior should be cognizable as
a federal civil rights violation pursuant to Title III of the "Violence
Against Women Act," hereinafter "VAWA," as introduced in the
103rd Congress.2 Civil rights remedies should be available for use
by some battered women against their abusers.
This article explores civil rights remedies for battered wo-
men3 who suffer physically and emotionally from domestic vio-
lence.4 In this article, the interchangeable terms "wife abuse,"
"battered wives," and "battered women" describe the repeated use
of physical force or threats of physical force5 by a man against his
intimate, cohabiting partner,6 regardless of actual legal marital
status.
Part II of this article begins with a discussion of the severity
and pervasiveness of wife abuse and other forms of violence
against women. It sets forth a feminist perspective that wife abuse
occurs in the context of institutional and social structures of gen-
der and power. It adopts the premise that wife abuse in heterosex-
2. See infra § IV.
3. For a thoughtful analysis of the definitions of "battered women," see
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Sep-
aration, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 24-34 (1991) (detailing two definitional approaches -
the "incident" focus and the "power and control" focus - and suggesting that the
struggle for power and control be brought into the definition of battering itself).
The incident approach defines "battered woman" as a woman who "is or has been
in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to
forceful physical and/or psychological abuse" - namely, a woman who has exper-
ienced at least two or more "acute battering incidents." Id. at 28 (quoting LENORE
WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984)). Angela Browne defines "bat-
tered women" as those who have experienced two "physically violent incidents" or
"those who have been struck repeatedly, often experiencing several different kinds
of physically violent actions in one incident, and usually, by the time they are iden-
tified, having experienced a series of such incidents, each consisting of a cluster of
violent acts." ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL 13, 14 (1987).
4. "Violence may qualitatively change the nature of intimate relationships,
even if they were characterized previously by the presence of severe psychological
abuse." Michele Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse - An Introduction,
in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE (Kersti Ylo and Michele Bograd eds.,
1988) [hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVEs].
5. It should be noted that the experience of psychological abuse alone is not
commonly understood to categorize a woman as "battered." See supra note 3. Re-
peated, physical abuse is required. 'Physical abuse" is "any form of a coercive
physical act, with or without resultant injury." Mahoney, supra note 3, at 29 (quot-
ing WALKER, supra note 3, at 202). Such abuse can also be "any physically assault-
ive act by one person against another, with or without evident resultant physical
injury," BROwNE supra note 3, at 13.
6. See Bograd, supra note 4, at 12.
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ual relationships is generated by the intersection of two powerful
and interconnected social forces: 1) the struggle for power and con-
trol that generates all domestic violence; and 2) the societal contin-
uum of violence against women, the domestic manifestation of
which is husband-to-wife violence. It is the continuum of violence
against women within a gendered-power structure, and the availa-
bility of the family as a mediating institution of male dominance
within this structure, that supports elevating some battering to a
legally cognizable violation of civil rights. Other legal strategies
pursued by battered women to stop the violence are not enough.
Civil rights remedies uniquely capture the contextual, social as-
pects of gender-based violence, present a positive, normative prohi-
bition against deprivation of civil rights by violence and provide a
remedy for individual harms. Federal and state civil rights stat-
utes should be used by some battered wives to bring civil claims
against their abusers.
Part III addresses the existing federal civil rights remedies
and demonstrates their limitations in the context of battered wo-
men's lives. Part IV analyzes Title III of the VAWA, which would
create a new federal civil right to be free from gender-motivated
crimes of violence. Part IV also identifies problems with the
VAWA statute and proposes revisions.
The application of civil rights analysis to battering requires a
shattering of the mistaken, yet prominent, notion of the "private"
nature of wife abuse. The civil rights construct illustrates the his-
tory of, and societal complicity in, violence against women. As
such, the use of civil rights remedies on behalf of battered women
promises to serve a transformational role in society by empower-
ing women as a class and as individuals. This civil rights litigation,
however, carries the risk that the concept of "gender" will take on
an essentialized character in disregard of other aspects of identity
such as class, race and sexual orientation. Part V considers the
risks of civil rights litigation and concludes that the battered wo-
men's movement would benefit from careful advocacy and wide-
spread coalition involvement in the articulation of a civil rights
strategy.
H. Battering Deprives Women of Rights That Should Be Protected By
Civil Rights Law
A. The Facts: Battering Disproportionately Affects
Women and Can Be Motivated By Gender.
Violence against women as a group exists in many institu-
tions of American society. The popular image of women as de-
1992]
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graded and subordinated to male power is portrayed in the media,
films, advertisement and pornography.7 Women are subject to vio-
lence in the home, at work, at school and on the street.
Violent attacks by men now top the list of public health dan-
gers to American women.8 The Surgeon General indicates that
battering is "the single largest cause of injury to women in the
United States."9 Estimates are that between 12%1o and 50%11 of
American women experience domestic violence in their lifetimes.
In 1990, 30% of the 4,399 women identified as murder victims in
this country were slain by their boyfriends or husbands.12
Statistics and studies of domestic violence demonstrate that
battering is a pervasive and serious problem that disproportion-
ately impacts women.13 The disproportionate impact of battering
7. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
(1981); CATHARINE MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINSM UNMODIFIED: DIs-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 146-62 (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
8. S. REP. No. 197, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1991) (Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on the Violence Against Women Act of 1991) [hereinafter
VAWA Report 1991].
9. Id. at n.10. Statistics help demonstrate the pervasiveness and severity of
other violence against women. Violent attacks against young women have in-
creased by fifty percent since 1974, in contrast to violence against young men which
has decreased by twelve percent. S. REP. No. 101-545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 n.9
(1990) (Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Violence Against
Women Act of 1990) [hereinafter VAWA Report 1990]. Every six minutes, a woman
is forcibly raped. FBI Uniform Crime Rep. 7 (1988). The rate of rape increased
over four times as fast as the national crime rate during the last ten years. VAWA
Report 1990, supra. Recent studies suggest that 12.1 million women have been the
victims of forcible rape at least once in their life and that 683,000 adult women were
raped in 1990 alone. David Johnston, Survey Shows Number of Rapes Far Higher
Than Official Figures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at 14 (report of the National Wo-
men's Study demonstrating underreporting of rape and comparing Justice Depart-
ment statistics of 130,260 rapes in 1990 with Women's Study findings of 683,000
rapes in same year) [hereinafter Survey]. Fifty-three percent of all women have
experienced sexual harassment at work. BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORK-
PLACE 46 (1985). Because these are only the reported and counted incidents, these
figures seriously underestimate the severity of the problem.
10. MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 36 (1980), cited in Maho-
ney, supra note 3, at 10.
11. WALKER, supra note 3, at 19.
12. FBI Uniform Crime Reports 13 (1990).
13. Wives or girlfriends were victims in 85% of all reported domestic violence
offenses in New Jersey. Gail A. Goolkasian, Confronting Domestic Violence: A
Guide for Criminal Justice Agencies, in U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE REP. (1986), cited in
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 10. In Massachusetts, a study of court records of domes-
tic violence cases found that 91% of the petitioners were women. MAsSACHUSETS
GENDER BIAS COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT SYS-
TEM IN MASSACHUSETTS 82 (1989) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS RE-
PORT].
Some men's rights groups tout contrary studies which indicate that female on
male violence also is prevalent. Tamar Lewin, Battered Men Sounding Equal-
Rights Battle Cry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 12 [hereinafter Battle-Cry] (report
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on women, and the targetting of violence at women because they
are women, eradicate the notion that wife abuse is based simply on
personal animosity.
Many incidents of violence against women target particular,
immediate victims - wives or dates - but the hatred that moti-
vates those attacks often is directed at women as a group. More-
over, the impact of particular attacks frequently reverberate
beyond the individual victim. Most women change their behaviors,
where they work, walk and socialize, as a result of violence against
themselves and other women. Thus, violence against women, in-
cluding wife abuse, serves to intimidate women simply because
they are women.
B. Situating Domestic Violence in a System of 'Gendered
Power Relations'. A Feminist Approach.
A feminist perspective on wife abuse requires more than rec-
ognition of a serious problem, it seeks to "understand why men in
general use physical force against their partners and what func-
tions this serves for a given society in a specific historic context."14
The relationship between gender and power in the family institu-
tion and the role the family plays in defining and enforcing gender
roles in contemporary American society are historically contingent
and changeable. Thus, a feminist approach to legal advocacy re-
quires analysis and promotion of legal remedies that validate wo-
on efforts by Domestic Rights Coalition to open a shelter for "battered men"), quot-
ing Murray Straus of the University of New Hampshire's Family Research Labora-
tory. See also STRAUs, et al., supra note 10.
Such studies do not determine to what extent women's aggression is in self-de-
fense or a reaction to the men's prior violence or threats of violence, nor do they
reflect the greater recurrence, severity and multiplicity of assaults when perpe-
trated by men against women. See Women and Violence: Hearings on Legislation
to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Women and
Violence] (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Medi-
cal School). See also Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse, or Mutual
Combat? A Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TrIVES, supra note 4, at 90, 103-08 (noting lack of consideration of self-defensive ag-
gression); R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Research as Social Action: The
Struggle for Battered Women, in FEMINisT PERSPECTVES, supra note 4, at 51, 60
("there is no systematic evidence showing a pattern of severe, persistent, and intim-
idating violence against husbands that would warrant the use of terms such as
beaten or battered") (emphasis in original). Indeed, as indicated by Dr. Angela
Browne, "[w]omen abused by male partners tend to sustain multiple injuries to
multiple sites of the body, an injury pattern not seen in men assaulted by female
partners." Battle-Cry, supra. Finally, these studies do not reflect the historical, so-
cial, economic and political context in which women have been and continue to be
the victims of gender discrimination and violence.
14. Bograd, supra note 4, at 13.
1992)
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men's experiences, provide liberating opportunities for individual
litigants and serve to undercut the structures of male dominance
and violence that constrain women's enjoyment of their civil
rights.15 It is necessary to adopt an approach designed to achieve
what the mainstream legal doctrine of sex discrimination has been
"utterly ineffective at getting women" - namely "a chance at pro-
ductive lives of reasonable physical security, self-expression, indi-
viduation, and minimal respect and dignity."16
1. Gendered Power
Underlying this analysis of civil rights remedies is the per-
spective that domestic violence is but one practice of male domi-
nance on a continuum with other social practices of discrimination
and violence against women. "Sex," or "gender,"' 7 is not just a
construct of descriptive biological or socialized differences between
males and females, as traditional "difference" feminist theory sug-
gests.1S Nor is sexism an inaccurate or mistaken categorization of
individuals that subverts equality and results in differential treat-
ment, as "equality" feminist theory purports.' 9 Gender is a ques-
tion of power, an ideology of "male supremacy and female
subordination."20 Indeed, our society is structured along gender
15. Compare id at 14.
16. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 133.
17. The terms "gender" and "sex" are used interchangeably throughout this pa-
per and in the case law. This terminology conveys the perspective that "sex" is not
a biological, but a social construct.
18. "Difference" theorists accept that there are biological sex differences which
have resulted in socially constructed gender roles and gender-contoured psychologi-
cal development. See, e.g., Nancy Chodorow, Family Structure and Feminine Per-
sonality, in WOMAN, CuLTuRE, AND SOcIETY 43 (Michelle Rosaldo & Louise
Zimbalist Lamphere eds., 1974). See also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988). Gilligan asks
that we celebrate and learn from sex differences by incorporating the woman's
voice, the "ethic of care," into the traditional psychological discourse and social
structure dominated by the justice ethic and its logical, abstract reason.
19. Traditional equality theorists note the existence of a "patriarchal society"
where "sex" is an organizational category which advantages men; but the ideals of
the theory are primarily assimilationist and hold to an image of a society in which
gender would be no different than eye color. See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, Ra-
cism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment. An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 581, 587, 604 (1977).
Some equality theorists challenge the "assimilationist" impulse and suggest
that we use the full range of feminist critiques to forward the goal of "equality as
acceptance" to require "that social institutions react to gender differences, whether
arising from biological or cultural sources, in such a way as to create equality be-
tween complementary male and female persons, skills, attributes and life patterns."
Christine A. Littleton, Equality and the Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1043,
1052 (1987).
20. MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 40.
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lines. "Men as a class wield power over women.., men have dif-
ferential access to important material and symbolic resources
while women are devalued as secondary and inferior."21
Traditional strands of feminist theory, the "equality" and
"difference" perspectives, have not dealt adequately with issues of
violence against women. The "equality" feminists primarily chal-
lenge "sexism" as a category mistake, an "irrational prejudice," or
as gender oppression that excludes women from some social
roles.22 Violence against women falls outside of this focus. At its
best, "difference" feminist theory rejects the model of possessive
individualism and develops a more humane social order modeled
on an ethic of care.23 At its worst, "difference" feminist theory
merely re-labels as "dignity" the "different voice" of subordinated
women24 without challenging the systemic violence levelled
against women that promotes such a voice. As affirmation of a
false description of subjugated women, "difference" theory risks
perpetuating negative cultural stereotypes about women which are
used affirmatively in opposition to women's emancipatory aspira-
tions.2 5 What is needed to end domestic violence is an approach
that directly addresses the systemic subordination of, and violence
against, women.
Popular definitions and stereotypes of battering reflect the
negative aspects of "difference" theory. These stereotypes stem
largely from oversimplification of Lenore Walker's "learned help-
lessness" description of battered women,2 6 which pathologizes bat-
21. Bograd, supra note 4, at 14. See also MACKNNON, supra note 7, at 42 ("If
gender is an inequality first, constructed as a socially relevant differentiation in or-
der to keep that inequality in place, then sex inequality questions are questions of
systematic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not at all abstract and is any-
thing but a mistake.").
22. As a result of such advocacy, some women gain access to male dominated
institutions which enhance their power, but do not alter the institutions or the
male norms that guide them. See Littleton, supra note 19, at 1045-56.
23. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MiH. L. REV. 797, 811
(1989).
24. See MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 38-39 (noting that women's "different"
moral reason and valuation of care stems from men's dominance and valuation of
women on the basis of the care women give them; women's voices are in fact si-
lenced and these "differences" should not be reified).
25. See Williams, supra note 23, at 813.
26. Popular definitions of domestic violence tend to be incident-focused, with an
emphasis on notions of male "victimization" of women and the battered women's
psychological response. Lenore Walker portrays battered women as victims of
"learned helplessness," a result of early-response reinforcement which cultivates
battered women's passive behavior and acceptance of responsibility for their own
treatment. WALKER, supra note 3, at 42-54. The woman's victimization occurs in
part due to the abuser's unpredictable violence levelled regardless of the woman's
response and her perception that she cannot control this violence; "[r]epeated bat-
1992]
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tered women as helpless, passive victims of abuse caught in a
"cycle of violence"27 from which they have difficulty escaping.
This characterization does not challenge directly the subjugation
of women through wife abuse. Further, it reinforces the male gen-
der role of dominance2S and the negative cultural stereotype of
women as submissive to their strong-willed and dominant hus-
bands, an image cultivated by "millennia of violence, and a sociali-
zation toward passivity."29 Although the description of learned
helplessness is accurate for many women, it fails to contextualize
battering within a larger structure of gendered power relations
and thereby loses much of its explanatory value and accuracy.
The "dominance" approach, in contrast, derives legal strate-
gies from the insight that women are targeted for violence because
of their sex, that the legal system itself imposes male norms and is
complicit in this violence and that women's different capacities and
experiences must be heard and taken seriously in order to bring
justice to women.30 The "dominance" approach highlights sex-dif-
ferentiated violence and abuses of women as a class to demonstrate
that sexuality itself is a dynamic of gender inequality.
[S]exuality [is] a social construct of male power: defined by
men, forced on women, and constitutive of the meaning of gen-
der. Such an approach centers feminism on the perspective of
the subordination of women to men as it identifies sex - that
is, the sexuality of dominance and submission - as crucial, as
terings, like electrical shocks [in animal experiments], diminish the woman's moti-
vation to respond." Id. at 49.
27. The "cycle of violence" includes three general phases of variable duration
which work together to perpetuate the abusive relationship: 1) the tension-building
stage; 2) the acute or explosive battering incident; and, 3) a period of calm, loving
respite. Id. at 55-70. Although the violence experienced by women across a spec-
trum of relationships is not constant, and within relationships the level of violence
differs depending on the stage in the cycle, the tension of violence exists through-
out the first two stages. During these stages, the battered woman seeks signs of
danger and guides her behavior by her assessment of whether it might provoke or
exacerbate the seriousness of the abuser's attack. The period of respite allows for a
build-up of trust after the extremes of violence have exploded. "Battered women
are not constantly being abused, nor is their abuse inflicted at totally random times.
One of the most striking discoveries in the interviews was of a definite battering
cycle that these women experience." Id. at 55.
28. "Accustomed to supremacy, acculturated to expect service and deference
from women, and integrating these expectations into the ego itself, men [are] un-
derstandably disoriented to encounter resistance" to their assertions of entitlement
and are "unskilled at negotiating compromises." LINDA GORDON, "The Powers of
the Weak" Wife-Beating and Battered Women's Resistance, in HEROES OF THEIR
OwN LIVES: THE PoLurics AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960,
286 (1988).
29. Id.
30. "When men's lives, values, and attitudes are taken as the norm, the exper-
iences of women are often defined as inferior, distorted, or are rendered invisible."
Bograd, supra note 4, at 15.
[Vol. 11:1
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a fundamental, as on some level definitive, in that process.3 1
Violence is the most overt and effective means of male social con-
trol of women,3 2 and male violence against women captures the es-
sence of male dominance - female submission. Wife abuse serves
to enforce sexualized subordination of women: "[d]ominance er-
oticized defines the imperatives of its masculinity, submission er-
oticized defines its femininity."3 3 The practice of "rape, battery,
sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, prostitution and por-
nography... taken together express and actualize the distinctive
power of men over women in society; their effective permissibility
confirms and extends it."34 Acts of violence against women indi-
cate a "systematic relegation of an entire group of people to a con-
dition of inferiority and attribute it to their nature,"3 5 and those
acts must be challenged directly.
2. Intersecting Continua of Violence Against Women and
the Struggle for Power and Control
Wife abuse in heterosexual relationships should be under-
stood as a social phenomenon located on two separate, but rein-
forcing and intersecting planes: 1) the continuum of violence
against women; and, 2) the struggle for power and control within
relationships.SS In violent heterosexual relationships, the struggle
for power and control in the family institution replicates and is
supported by struggles of domination and control on the basis of
sex in society at large.37 Battered women's advocates must link
31. CATHERmNE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 128
(1989). MacKinnon also writes that "sexuality can no longer be regarded as unim-
plicated. Nor can the meaning of practices of sexual violence be categorized away
as violence not sex.... The male sexual role... centers on aggressive intrusion on
those with less power." Id. at 127. See also DwORKIN, supra note 7.
32. See Bograd supra note 4, at 14.
33. MACKNNON, supra note 31, at 130.
34. Id. at 127.
35. See MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 41.
36. The widespread existence of domestic violence suggests that wife abuse is
only one version of a dispute mechanism used in a society acculturated to violence
and that wife abuse is not motivated by gender. Such an explanation fails to ac-
count for the dominance of male norms in society and the imposition of these
norms on all disempowered people: women, the elderly, minorities, children, and
the disabled. Studies of battering relations suggest that "[mien learn these violent
techniques, and the appropriate contexts for their use, through a male culture that
condones and encourages violence. In the violent events .... violence was used by
the men [women] lived with to silence them, to 'win' arguments, to express dissatis-
faction, to deter future behavior and to merely demonstrate dominance." Dobash &
Dobash, supra note 13, at 57. Violent dispute resolution is an aspect of gendered
power relations.
37. Although the continua of "gender-motivated" violence and that of the strug-
gle for power and control may reinforce one another in heterosexual spousal rela-
1992]
Law and Inequality
"private" discriminatory actions with the social, legal and eco-
nomic supports required to maintain dominance in relationships.
The institution of the family is a predictable and common site
for abuse against women; the family mediates between intimate
partners and a society characterized by gender dominance and vio-
lence.38 "The reality of domination at the social level is the most
crucial factor contributing to and maintaining wife abuse at the
personal level."39 Batterings teach "a profound lesson about who
controls a relationship and how that control will be exercised."40
[A] wealth of historical and contemporary evidence.. . [points]
to the significance of male dominance in the etiology of vio-
lence .... [V]iolence forms an integral aspect of male domi-
nance ... [S]ystems of power and authority are ultimately
based on the use or threat of force .... [I]t is through taking on
the positiont of wife that women are mostly likely to become
the victims of systematic and severe violence. Although other
forms of male violence against women are shaped by patri-
archy, it is in the family where men's 'rights' and privileges
are given the most free reign.41
The economic, social and legal structures in which heterosex-
ual relationships exist provide the context within which battered
women have difficulty escaping or ending the abuse and without
which the abuser would largely lose his differential of power. For
example, some commentators argue that legal rules serve to pro-
mote a model of female sexuality characterized by monogamy, het-
erosexuality and passivity42 which reinforces wives' dependence on
abusive husbands. Economic inequality serves to limit women's
options and allows men to use tools of economic control.43 The sex
segregation of poverty44 threatens women and serves violent men
tionships, it is possible that these forces do not always act in tandem in other sub-
groups of the population. In particular, this formulation may not resonate with the
experience of lesbian battering or the use of violence in some refugee communities.
Civil rights advocates must consider the consequences of elevating the "gender mo-
tivation" aspects of domestic violence at the expense of other explanations, as I will
do in Section VI. I contend that it is worth pursuing the civil rights remedy for
heterosexual battered women even at the risk of pre-legalizing a remedy for a phe-
nomenon that is not yet fully understood in other sub-groups.
38. See Bograd, supra note 4, at 14.
39. Id.
40. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 17.
41. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 13, at 57.
42. See Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfin-
ished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1992).
43. Id. at 1072. See also, CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979); GuTEK, supra note 9.
44. Fifty-three percent of all poor families and seventy-five percent of poor
black families are woman-headed. See Diana Pearce, Welfare is not for Women:
Why the War on Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty, in WOMEN,
THE STATE, AND WELFARE 265 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990). Women provide all or
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by keeping women dependent on them and the institution of mar-
riage or the state for support.45 And economic vulnerability is just
one element affecting the struggle for power and control in hetero-
sexual battering relationships.4 6
Definitions of battering that address primarily the psycholog-
ical victimization of battered women fail to capture the context of
wife abuse. Definitions must incorporate the batterer's effort to
achieve and maintain power and control over his partner 47 and the
economic, social and legal barriers that constrain a woman from
leaving a violent relationship or stopping the abuse. Descriptions
of battering must reveal how violence reverberates beyond the
couple and works to mold a broader definition of heterosexual re-
lations. "Wife-beating sends 'messages' to all who know about it or
suspect it; it encourages timidity, fatalism, manipulativeness in wo-
men. Men's violence against some women . .. reinforces all wo-
men's subordination and all men's dominance." 48 Finally, these
most of the support for children (only 43% of absent fathers are forced to pay sup-
port), and foster parents receive four times as much as an AFDC recipient per
child; women are disadvantaged in the wage market and make only 66% of men's
wages; women with children need more than a job, but child care and health insur-
ance for children are unavailable from the state or employers. Id. at 268. Notions
of "deserving poor," which correlate with white, unemployed men, and the "unde-
serving poor," which refer to poor, minority, female heads of household, are really
images of gender discrimination at the core of poverty. Id. at 269.
45. See generally Teresa Amott, Black Women and AFDC Making Entitlement
Out of Necessity, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE, supra note 44. The alter-
native is dismal. "Woman battering is also associated with being a major risk factor
for becoming homeless." Women and Violence, supra note 13, at 141 (testimony of
Susan Kelley-Dreiss, Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Do-
mestic Violence). Available and affordable low income housing is virtually non-ex-
istent and between 20% and 40% of the New York homeless population are
battered women. Interview with John Bonifaz, Harvard Law Student, author of
unpublished manuscript on battered women and homelessness, in Cambridge, Mass.
(May 1992).
46. The notion that batterers use multiple tools to achieve control is common in
the battered women's advocacy community. The "power and control wheel," a con-
ceptual chart developed by workers at a renowned battered woman's shelter in Du-
luth, Minn., assists advocates in understanding the techniques batterers use to
establish and maintain control over partners. See Women and Violence, supra note
13, at 98 (testimony of Charlotte Fedders, Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, in-
cluding the Power and Control Wheel) [hereinafter Power Wheel]. Abusers com-
monly use the following tools of intimidation: emotional and physical abuse which
replicates negative social images of women and objectifies them, reducing them to
objects of male sexual desire; sexual abuse and rape as a way to establish sexual
dominance over their wives, as celebrated in pornography and other advertising
images of women; domination of big decisions about money, work and family, con-
sistent with societal notions of male privilege; social isolation - keeping wives from
family and friends, imprisoning them and controlling their movement and car use;
and, where the parties are separated, abuse of visitation privileges to gain regular
access to their wives and make them feel guilty about breaking connections. See id
47. See Mahoney, supra note 3.
48. GORDON, supra note 28, at 288.
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descriptions must demonstrate how battered women are not only
victims of individualized abuse, but also victims of a system of
gendered power relations and agents of resistance to both.
3. Establishing the Civil Rights Claim Supports a Survivor
Theory
Civil rights legal advocacy for battered women provides a sin-
gle forum to address directly the social and historical context of
gendered power relations as implicated in wife abuse and to hold
individual abusers accountable for their actions. Civil rights advo-
cates can move beyond the "victim" characterization of battered
women to stress the great survival techniques and efforts such wo-
men use to overcome violent relationships. This "survivor perspec-
tive" stresses the agency of battered wives and the complicity of
the broader social forces that render their help-seeking efforts in-
effective. 49 It is important to link the single abused wife with the
broader social context of male dominance to establish a civil rights
violation.
Plaintiffs' lawyers need not revert to the "victim" characteri-
zation theories of learned helplessness implicit in efforts to estab-
lish damages in wife abuse civil rights cases. The "survivor"
theory5 o provides an alternative damages theory. The psychologi-
cal symptoms women experience in the abusive relationship often
are temporary manifestations of traumatic shock, experiences of
failure in the "traditional female role of nurturing and domestic-
ity" and an expression of separation anxiety and reasonable fear of
reprisal for leaving.5 1 There is a practical legal risk that character-
izing battered women plaintiffs as "survivors" of a system of male
domination and wife abuse will not invoke the same sympathy of
jurors that the victim characterization promises. However, expo-
sure of the context of abuse and the struggle to survive may pro-
vide greater damage awards because the characterization is
realistic and the effects of the husband's abuse are demonstrably
49. "Survivor" theories stress the coping techniques of women within abusive
relationships, demonstrate battered women's repeated efforts to leave or to get the
violence to stop and address the barriers abuse victims face in a social environment
which fails to support them; the "survivor hypothesis.. . suggests that women re-
spond to abuse with help seeking efforts that are largely unmet." EDWARD W.
GONDOLF & ELLEN E. FISHER, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11 (1988).
50. Survivor theories demonstrate women's extraordinary powers of "self-tran-
scendence," inner strength, and yearning for dignity and life. Such characteriza-
tions problemmatize the "learned helplessness" description of the "battered
woman" as victim to prior conditioning and adverse circumstances. Id. at 20.
51. Id. at 21-22.
[Vol. 11:1
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES
more overwhelming than if the abuse were viewed in terms of the
relationship alone.52
To demonstrate the existence of a civil rights violation, as op-
posed to random violence between two people, advocates should
explore the theory of gendered power relations, the role of wife
abuse in promoting subordination and the way in which violence is
used to stifle battered women's assertions of their rights. It is crit-
ical that plaintiffs are not portrayed as submissive victims. "Wife-
beating arose not just from subordination but also from contesting
it. Had women consistently accepted their subordinate status, and
had men never felt their superior status challenged, there might
have been less marital violence."5 3 Civil rights advocates must ad-
dress the dynamic of power and control in relationships to explain
the empirical evidence that battered women face increased danger
with their assertion of rights and independence from their male
partners.m
When battered women seek a divorce, obtain a restraining or-
der or leave the abusive partner, they face increased danger be-
cause batterers use violence when their dominance is challenged.M
The term "separation violence" has been used to mark the abuser's
desperate, post-separation assertion of power over the domestic
partner who has sought freedom.5 6 As such, separation assault is
prime evidence of wife abuse as a civil rights violation.
Of all the civil legal remedies, civil rights concepts are best
able to capture and marshall the survivor theory and the concept
of "separation assault" for the benefit of battered women. In the
heterosexual context, domestic violence qua control can be seen as
52. Advocates who set forth the history of and social complicity in violence
against women may run the risk of obtaining verdicts against the husband for only
partial liability. However, this risk does not seem great. In civil rights claims
brought by victims of race bias, defendants are held accountable for their behavior.
Racism provides the social context and informs the motivation of, and damages
arising from, the act. In battered women's civil rights litigation, the husband is the
proximate cause of the deprivation of civil rights through violence within the mar-
riage and should be held liable for the damages caused by his actions. The popular
conception that the family is a "private" institution actually may be helpful to wo-
men in this context.
53. GORDON, supra note 28, at 286.
54. It is not surprising, from the perspective of intersecting and reinforcing
planes of male dominance and the struggle for power and control, that "rates of
[wife] abuse increased in those states in which women's status was highest relative
to men's." Kersti Yllo, Political and Methodological Debates in Wife Abuse Re-
search, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 31. These findings indicate that
tension increases with women's agency, that "rapid change toward equality may
bring a violent backlash by husbands." Id.
55. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 6-7.
56. Id. at 6.
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part of the enforcement of gender dominance at home, just as rape
serves that function on the streets57 and sexual harassment serves
it in the workplace.
4. Listening and Challenging: Feminist Legal Theory,
Subjectivity and Social Change
Feminist legal strategies must not only obtain a remedy for
individual women, but should provide a conduit for women to ar-
ticulate their experiences and challenge degrading stereotypes and
the structure of male entitlement. The risk of applying some
traditional civil rights models to violations of civil rights through
wife abuse is that the articulated intent of the abuser may not re-
flect gender motivation. That motivation may be implicit, how-
ever, and the acts may serve the function of promoting male
dominance and female subordination. The VAWA appropriately
sets forth a non-intent based scheme for proof of a prima facie
case.58 The VAWA should be augmented by adoption of alternative
means of proof to fully capture the experience of battered women
and to provide effective avenues to challenge gender-motivated vi-
olence. The adoption of "radical subjectivity," a victim perspective
approach, and the establishment of per se violations of civil rights,
or "radical essentialism," would be alternative mechanisms of
proving a prima facie civil rights violation by battering.
To develop the radical subjectivity approach, one must ac-
knowledge that the struggle for power and control is central to the
concept of battering. A modified version of Martha Mahoney's
definition of battering demonstrates the point: "battering is that
pattern of violent and coercive behavior whereby [one partner]
seeks to control the thoughts, beliefs or conduct of [his] intimate
partner or to punish the intimate for resisting the perpetrator's
control over her."59 This definition focuses on the batterer's moti-
vation to control,60 not the woman's inability to leave.
57. See Wendy Rae Willis, The Violence Against Women Act, 90 GEO. L. J.
2197, 2209 (1992) ("[Ihe act of rape is part of a societal pattern of male dominance.
It is the exaggeration of the current socialization and power relationship between
men and women.").
58. See in-fra § IV.C.
59. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 33 (quoting Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: Our
Examination, in NAnNG THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING
173 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986)). Hart's definition is of lesbian battering.
60. One difficulty with this definition, however, is that it focuses on the ques-
tion "why did the batterer do it?" instead of "what did the batterer do?" As a prac-
tical legal matter, this definition could be understood to require demonstration of
actual intent to control the abused partner - a burden of proof far more difficult
than the demonstration of the batterer's actions which had the effect of controlling
or overpowering the abused partner.
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The nexus between an abuser's use of, or threats to use, phys-
ical violence and the concept of "battering" as a civil rights viola-
tion could be addressed as well from the women's perspective of
the violence; this will be called the "radical subjectivity" approach.
If the assaulted partner becomes fearful of the violator, if she
modifies her behavior in response to the assault or to avoid fu-
ture abuse, or if the victim intentionally maintains a particular
consciousness or behavioral repertoire to avoid violence, de-
spite her preference not to do so, she is battered. 61
As a legal matter, the battered woman's response to abuse could
provide prima facie evidence of a civil rights violation within the
power and control concept of wife abuse.
This "radical subjectivity" approach should be endorsed with
qualifications. The approach could be used against women to focus
judicial attention exclusively on women's response to violence, us-
ing resistance as a measure of coercion as in rape law doctrine,62
without addressing the batterer's inherently invasive, violent ac-
tions. Instead, the battered woman's interest in preserving bodily
integrity, her perspective or estimation of the risk of threatened
violence and her actions to avoid that perceived risk are the appro-
priate guideposts to this theory.
In recognition of the risks of this approach, an additional ap-
proach of "radical essentialism," which requires establishing per se
violations of civil rights by battering, should be recognized. Estab-
61. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 33 (quoting Hart, supra note 59, at 173). Again,
Hart is discussing lesbian battering.
62. The term "force" has been held to be an essential element of the crime of
rape. The prosecution must proffer evidence that the victim resisted the accused
and her resistance was overcome by force, or that she was prevented from resisting
by threats to her safety. See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (1979). The interpre-
tations of "force" and "threat" have been narrowed to include only a male defini-
tion of the concepts - the school-yard fist fight style of conflict - irrespective of
the fact that rape embodies the force of a man against a woman in a sex crime
which treads upon the "explosive ground of sex roles, of male aggression and fe-
male passivity, of our understandings of sexuality - areas where differences be-
tween a male and a female perspective may be most pronounced." Susan Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986).
In lieu of the mens rea requirement, courts interpret the force required in rape
law as more than force "incidental" to the act of intercourse, as the force necessary
to overcome female non-consent. Id. at 1107. The woman's resistance is the deter-
minant of force; if it is not present, courts look to the reasonable woman's will to
resist. Id. at 1107-08.
Yet, when some time elapses between the force and intercourse, when
the force is more of the variety considered "incidental" to sex, or when
the situation is threatening but no explicit threat of harm is communi-
cated, "force" as defined and required by the criminal law may not be
present at all. In such cases, the law fails to recognize, let alone pro-
tect, a woman's interest in bodily integrity.
Id. at 1106.
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lishment of per se violations marks certain behaviors "out of
bounds" and focuses judicial attention on the batterer's behavior.
These proposals are described more in Section IV(C)(2).
Adoption of alternative ways of proving a prima facie civil
rights claim, and definitions of battering that incorporate the
struggle for power and control, reflect the reality facing battered
women and provide the legal context to further their struggle for
freedom. This approach rejects stereotypes of women as weak,
passive and victimized creatures of male control; yet it does not
abandon the notion of the inherent gender motivation of the as-
saults or the connection of those assaults with male dominance. In
the civil rights context, demonstration of the power and control
systems within some heterosexual relationships work in tandem
with the demonstration of gendered power relations in society and
the gender-role enforcement effect of battering behavior itself. Vi-
olence-centered forms of control should be challenged through in-
dividual civil rights claims to forward individual women's goals
and the social change objectives of women as a class.
C. Federal Remedies Are Appropriate to Protect the Civil
Rights of Battered Women
As established, wife abuse is gender-motivated violence sup-
ported and perpetuated by social, economic and legal systems of
male dominance. There is a firm political and philosophical foun-
dation for passage of civil rights legislation to protect battered wo-
men. The historical legal permission to engage in wife abuse and
gender discrimination provides additional support for such a rem-
edy. Existing remedies fail to redress fully the damages arising
from violations of civil rights and fail to promote women's equality
as a class. The civil rights remedy best captures the normative,
positive valuation of women and the social commitment to create
an environment where women will thrive, free from violence.
1. Political/Philosophical Foundations
American civil rights theory derives in part from the 17th
century "social contract" tradition63 which was translated into
63. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (Penguin Classics reprinted
ed. 1985) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Hackett Pub. Co.
ed. 1980) (1690); JOHN-JAcQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE ESSENTIAL
ROUSSEAu (New American Library printed ed. 1983) [hereinafter Social Contract];
and JEAN-JAcQUES RoussEAu, The Discourse On Inequality, in THE ESSENTIAL
ROuSSEAu (New American Library printed ed. 1983) [hereinafter Discourse].
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English common law by William Blackstone64 and found expres-
sion in the U.S. Constitution.65 This tradition suggests that,
through the social contract, citizens give up their right to self-en-
forcement of "natural rights" in exchange for protection from the
state. In reality, rampant battering exists in the private sphere
where government, the enforcing arm of the social contract, effec-
tively does not reach the relations between husbands and wives.
Thus, the philosophical tradition of American liberal government
supports an argument that civil rights of battered women must be
recognized and protected, lest the foundation of democratic gov-
ernment itself, the social contract, lose all legitimacy.
Social contract theories presume all humans enjoy natural
rights, the most basic of which is the right and individual enforce-
ment of self-preservation.6 6 Battered women, regardless of their
legal relationship to their husbands, also possess this right.
Self-preservation is limited and defensive in posture - it
does not allow needless harm to others or the self. Thus, there is a
collateral right to enforce one's preservation if under attack.
Although reason or compassion may limit violence and activities of
self-preservation,6 7 in families where domestic violence exists,
these limits to self interest often fail. If a person attempts to ob-
tain absolute power over others in an offensive manner, as does an
abusive husband in the cycle of control, without consent and by
compulsion of force, he puts himself in a state of war,68 "a state of
enmity and destruction." 69
With the advent of the social contract and entry into a civil
state, the theory proposes citizens agree to relinquish their natural
rights to obtain "civil rights," the rights and obligations of citizens
and subjects under government. 70 The motivation to end the state
64. WILLAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, FIRST
BOOK (Dawsons Of Pall Mall ed. 1966).
65. The United States Constitution, influenced by Madisonian fears that a "tyr-
anny of the majority" might lead to religious sectarian dominance or the masses'
efforts to redistribute and equalize wealth, encapsulated the freedom from depriva-
tion of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends.
V, XIV; THE FEDERALiST No. 10 (James Madison).
66. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 63, at 189; ROUSSEAU, Discourse, supra note 63,
at 140-41.
67. See ROUSSEAU, Discourse, supra note 63, at 140.
68. Without a common power, individuals in the state of nature are "in that
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every
man." In that condition, there is only continual fear and danger of violent death;
the "lsfe of man" is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." HOBBES, supra note
63, at 185-86.
69. LOCKE, supra note 63, at 14.
70. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 63, at 268; ROUSSEAU, Social Contract, supra
note 63, at 28. The establishment of a body politic, a real contract between the peo-
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of nature and form political society, a body politic,71 arises from in-
dividuals' desire to avoid war,72 defend against one another,73 and
preserve property - including the "mutual preservation of their
lives, liberties and estates."74 But where law does not reach, the
natural freedom of individual power remains and with it, the
danger.
The social contract requires government to enforce civil and
inalienable natural rights - or at least to provide legal avenues
through which individuals may enforce their own rights. Agree-
ments and laws join individual rights to duties, direct justice and
give movement and will to the social pact.75 In return for the so-
cial subject's recognition of duties, sovereign laws should be
backed by public force and supreme power to enforce the rights of
the citizens.76
Although battered women have developed support systems,
shelters and services, they, like any other group of citizens, are en-
titled to rely on the state's protection when they are in danger.
Without intercession and arbitration between individuals engaged
in domestic violence, there is no peace.77 The social compact
obliges the government to protect people from deprivation of their
civil rights by other members of society. The government's legiti-
macy could be judged by its success in providing actual protection
of women's civil rights when they are deprived. In this context,
the government ought to enact enforceable civil rights legislation
to codify the implicit rights of women and act to enforce those
rights through its executive power.
A similar position can be reached from a functional analysis
of social relations. When a person "receives the protection of soci-
ety," that person "owes a return for the benefit;" living in society
requires each to be bound to observe a "certain line of conduct to-
wards the rest" which consists of not doing others harm.78 Thus,
ple and the leaders it chooses for itself, where both parties obligate themselves to
observe the laws that are stipulated, theoretically does away with arbitrary power.
See ROUSSEAU, Discourse, supra note 63, at 192.
71. See LOCKE, supra note 63, at 52 (where a majority consent to make one
community or government, they make a body politic). See also ROUSSEAU, Social
Contract, supra note 63, at 17-18.
72. See LOCKE, supra note 63, at 16.
73. See HOBBES, supra note 63, at 268 (the end of the institution of sovereignty
to which people submit is the "peace of the subjects within themselves, and their
Defence against a common Enemy").
74. LOCKE, supra note 63, at 66.
75. ROUSSEAU, Social Contract, supra note 63, at 33.
76. See id. at 30.
77. See HOBBES, supra note 63, at 213.
78. JOHN STUART MML, ON LiBERTY 70 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed. 1975) (1859).
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abusive husbands cannot have it both ways; they should not be al-
lowed the benefits of the public realm of regulation and demo-
cratic government and still experience few restrictions on their
domination through force in the private realm. At a bare mini-
mum, civil liberty is defined in the negative: individual indepen-
dence limited by social control.79 Where there is violence, there
must be intervention to protect individual rights. In the absence of
state protection, civil law does not extinguish all natural rights:
the right of self-preservation is not alienable,80 and battered wo-
men could use force to defend against risk to their lives.
Battered women currently live a dual existence. In the pub-
lic sphere, battered women live in accordance with the so-called
social contract. In the private sphere of the family, they experi-
ence a state of nature, replete with the emotional and physical
dangers of the husband's restless desire to control. The govern-
ment that fails to protect women's lives pursuant to the social con-
tract also works against women who protect themselves, notably as
a result of gender bias in treatment of self-defense claims.81 In ad-
dition, the psychological, economic and social barriers to a wo-
man's escape from an abusive husband result in stymied efforts to
seek help. Thus, the social and legal constructs, combined with
lack of state enforcement of the theoretical social compact, rein-
force and perpetuate the inequalities in the abusive marriage and
fail to allow battered women adequate opportunity to fulfill their
human or civil rights to safety of their person, liberty and life
itself.
Although social contract theory establishes that the husband
has no right to infringe on the person of the wife with violence
that might lead to death, the state's historical "privatization" of
the family has provided the theoretical rationale of non-interven-
tion and non-enforcement of wives' civil rights when deprived by
husbands through domestic violence. In this context, John Stuart
Mill asserts that liberty is often granted where it should be
withheld .82
The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what spe-
cially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control
over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess
79. Id. at 6. Mill suggests that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self protection.. .to prevent harm to others." Id. at 11.
80. See HOBBES, supra note 63, at 192.
81. Elizabeth Schneider, Equal Rights To Trial For Women: Sex Bias In The
Law Of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980). See also infra note
138.
82. MILL, supra note 78, at 96-97.
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over others. This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in
the case of the family relations.83
Recognition of the state's historical role in legitimating and
perpetuating domestic violence by neglecting to enforce battered
women's civil rights justifies contemporary efforts to use state
mechanisms to correct the history of discrimination and to con-
front contemporary problems of wife abuse. It is time that notions
of "civil rights" be brought into the so-called "private" realm of
the family to end the violent state of nature left by non-enforce-
ment of the laws. The state's enforcement structure must work to
protect, not reinforce the infringement of, women's civil rights.
2. Historical Legal Discrimination
Historically, the law placed limits on the recognition of wo-
men's civil rights - especially within marriage. In the "private"
realm of the family, the state's social contract obligation to protect
the civil rights of its female citizens effectively has been sus-
pended. In the past, the common law provided for a man's disci-
pline of his wife. Today, the state effectively permits domestic
violence where there is inadequate law enforcement and restric-
tion of legal avenues for private relief under law. Recognition of a
civil rights cause of action is an appropriate mechanism to address
the current patterns of gender-motivated violence and to assist wo-
men in achieving full social status.
At British common law, the state's obligation to protect the
civil rights of citizens did not reach relations between husband and
wife because entry into a marriage contract constructively trans-
ferred the wife into the property of her husband.8 4 The common
law implication of treating wives as within the private domain of
the husband's control was legal non-intervention in marital rela-
tionships. If abuse remained domestic, the common law permitted
a husband to discipline his wife. Since the husband was "to answer
for her misbehavior," the common law allowed the husband to
"give his wife moderate correction," and intrusted him with the
power of restraining her by "domestic chastisement," in order to
83. Id.
84. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at 430.
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs every
thing;, and is therefore ... under the protection and influence of her
husband, her baron, or lord.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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correct her behavior.8 5
A husband's use of violence, however, was limited at British
common law. Unlike Roman law, where the "marital power of the
husband was absolute, and he could chastise his wife even to the
point of killing her,"86 there was a formal limitation on the hus-
band's right to moderately chastise his wife at British common
law; only blows with a switch no wider than a man's thumb were
allowed.87 This "rule of thumb" created a distinction between sin-
gle blows with large sticks and repeated blows with small sticks ir-
respective of the damage.88
Only when domestic violence extended beyond the wife did
British common law reach it. For an extreme example, when a
pregnant woman was beaten, no crime was committed if she per-
sonally was injured. Only "if any one beat her, whereby the child
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child" would there
be a charge of a heinous misdemeanor.8 9
The rule of thumb and a husband's right to chastise his wife
were recognized in the United States.90 A '"husband may put 'gen-
tle restraints upon her liberty, if her conduct is such to require it'
... provided he did not 'use a switch larger than her thumb,' or did
not 'do serious bodily harm or inflict permanent injury.' "91 The
husband's privilege to chastise his wife stemmed from precedent,
the husband's duty to make his wife behave and the belief that
drawing "a veil over dealings between man and wife" would
"make less noise and scandal than the publicity of a court trial" to
deal with her misbehavior.92
The first American judicial recognition of this right and dis-
cussion of its rationale came in an 1824 Mississippi Supreme Court
opinion in support of a husband's defense on charges for assault
and battery upon his wife.93 The court repeated the rationale that
the husband "is answerable for her misbehavior" and indicated
that the rule of thumb serves to "prevent the deplorable spectacle
of the exhibition" of "family broils and dissention" in the courts of
85. See BLAcKsToNE, supra note 64, at 432.
86. Sohm Inst., § 93; 21 Cyc. 1143, cited in Article, Right of Husband to Chastise
Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241 (1917) [hereinafter Right to Chastise].
87. Right to Chastise, supra note 86, at 241.
88. Id.
89. BLACKsTONE, supra note 64, at 433.
90. See generally, Right to Chastise, supra note 86; GORDON, supra note 28. See
also, Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (1984).
91. Right to Chastise, supra note 86, at 243 (citing Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala.
143, 147 (1871)).
92. Id. at 243 (citing State v. Fulton, 63 S.E. 145 (N.C. 1908) (dissenting
opinion)).
93. Id. (citing Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (Walk.) 156 (1824)).
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justice which would cast "shade over the character of those who
are unfortunately engaged in the controversy."94 The court's Vic-
torian interest in public propriety generated an opinion allowing
wife abuse and preventing women's access to the courts except in
the most extreme circumstances.
To screen from public reproach those who may be thus unhap-
pily situated, let the husband be permitted to exercise the
right of moderate chastisement, in cases of great emergency,
and use salutary restraints in every case of misbehavior, with-
out being subjected to vexatious prosecutions, resulting in the
mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned.95
In an 1864 case in North Carolina, a court similarly repeated the
Blackstonian formulation that
[a] husband is responsible for the acts of his wife, and he is re-
quired to govern his household, and for that purpose the law
permits him to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is
necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave
herself; and unless some permanent injury be inflicted, or
there be excess of violence, or such a degree of cruelty as
shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the
law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the
curtain.96
The Mississippi holding finally was overturned in 1894 as a "revolt-
ing precedent."97 North Carolina, too, overturned the rule of
thumb, noting that "the courts have advanced from that barbarism
until they have reached the position that the husband has no right
to chastise his wife under any circumstances."9 8 In contrast to
Britain, wife beating was less officially accepted in the United
States. It was considered a "disreputable, seemy practice, and was
effectively illegal in most states of the United States by 1870."99
However, earlier admonitions against the public display of fa-
milial strife remained strong. Public discussion of wife beating
was rare, and women in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
94. Id.
95. Id. at 158.
96. State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262, 86 Am. Dec. 436 (1864), cited in Right to Chas-
tise, supra note 86, at 243-44.
97. Harris v. State, 14 So. 266 (Miss. 1894), cited in Right to Chastise, supra note
86, at 243-244.
98. State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, cited in Right to Chastise, supra note 86, at 246.
99. See GORDON, supra note 28, at 255. In 1917, a commentator confirmed that
the
right of the husband to chastise his wife has generally met with disap-
proval in the United States and at this late date is entirely obsolete
even in those states which formerly acquiesced in the practice ... it is
now as unlawful for a husband to beat his wife as for another to do so,
and he is amenable to the criminal law for such offense.
Right to Chastise, supra note 86, at 246 (listing 14 states in which wife beating was
held to be a criminal violation).
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ries "did not seem to believe they had a 'right' to freedom from
physical violence" and "spoke of the inevitability of male vio-
lence."' 0 0 Indeed, in many states they were forbidden from bring-
ing legal claims as a result of interspousal tort immunity and the
marital rape exception to criminal laws.' 0 ' Instead, women re-
sisted by "fighting back, running away, attempting to embarrass
the men before others, calling the police."' 02 Although nine-
teenth-century middle-class reformers were motivated by the no-
tion that "wife-beating was entirely intolerable" and proposed "to
do away with physical violence in marriage altogether," battered
women were caught in the patriarchal system. 03 They had no eco-
nomic support independent from their husbands, no supportive in-
stitutions or defense of absolute rights; thus, battered women used
custom and bargaining 04 to defend against violence.
In contrast to the historical state sanction of wife abuse and
code of silence about it, women's acts of violence against their hus-
bands, in self defense or otherwise, were legally prohibited and
punished in the extreme. At common law, the husband was the
lord of his wife and representative of the state in the family. A
wife who killed her husband threw "off all subjection to the au-
thority of her husband. And therefore the law denominates her
crime a species of treason, and condemns her to the same punish-
ment as if she had killed the king." 05 Although the existence of a
marital relation no longer supports elevating the crime of murder
to treason, continuing gender bias in law and its application to
criminal self-defense theory reveals and perpetuates the gender
discrimination at common law.'06
A state of war continues to exist in thousands of American
homes where domestic violence is met with little social or govern-
mental intervention. There is still a "leftover notion" from the
English jurisprudential system's treatment of women as chattel. 07
In the context of the family, this liberty granted to husbands stems
from the common law history. Such liberty is "altogether mis-
placed" in part due to the pretext that the affairs of the wife are
100. See GORDON, supra note 28, at 256.
101. See infra §§ II.D.3. and 1.
102. GORDON, supra note 28, at 256.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 257.
105. Schneider, supra note 81 at 628-29 (citing 1 WLLIAM BLACKsTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND at 418 n.103 (R. Walsh & Co. ed., 1897)).
106. Id.




the affairs of the husband.10s Husbands' liberty with violence re-
mains strong in part due to legal language and construction which,
in its veneer of neutral non-intervention, allows the terror to
continue.
Basic political and economic rights, gradually attained
through women's struggles, provided the conditions for political
and social action to challenge domestic violence directly. In the
early 1970s, coalitions of feminist shelter workers, academics, law-
yers and participants in consciousness-raising groups declared that
"the private and the social were no longer separable categories."'109
They made legal and extralegal resources available to assaulted
wives.110 The silence was broken. "Since 1975, the ongoing strug-
gle of the battered women's movement has been to name the hid-
den and private violence in women's lives, declare it public, and
provide safe havens and support.""' "Today... any notion of a
husband's prerogative to physically discipline his wife is an 'in-
creasingly outdated misconception.""'12 Yet, abuse continues.
Despite success in advocacy efforts to enforce criminal laws
against abuse and pass legislation allowing for civil restraining or-
ders and improved police policy toward wife abuse, breaking the
silence has not resulted in the universal reversal of the state's
treatment of domestic violence as a "private" matter. As a result,
battered women have brought Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection challenges to police policies and practices that afford less
protection to victims of domestic violence than victims of other
crimes.113 - What should be considered a police department's "af-
firmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal
safety of [women in domestic relationships or other persons] in the
community"114 often is marginalized as a "private" matter not en-
tailing any affirmative duty. Insofar as the "private" reemerges,
the silence returns.
Martha Minow115 exposes the silence of the private in the
context of child abuse and the Supreme Court's opinion in
DeShaney v. Winnebago.116 This case held that Joshua DeShaney
108. See MILL, supra note 78, at 96.
109. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 30-31.
110. Women and Violence, supra note 13 (testimony of Dr. Angela Browne).
111. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 11.
112. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977)).
113. See id; see also infra § III(B).
114. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527.
115. Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language
and Family Violence, 43 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1665 (1990).
116. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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and his mother's Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights were not
violated when the Department of Social Services failed to protect
the child from the violence of his father, despite the Department's
active intervention in his affairs. Minow suggests two assumptions
were at work in denying the claim. "The first" she writes, "is that
violence is private and that the distinction between public and pri-
vate action makes violence, on occasions like this one, beyond pub-
lic control. The second is that the government has to act in order
to invade someone's rights; failing to act is not an invasion."11 7
The categorical distinctions expressed through the words
"private" and "failure to act," Minow suggests, "act as talismans to
ward off the facts of the case." 18 The dissenting Justices noted
the violation by the state and judicial system through inaction and
compared the conduct to "antebellum judges who denied relief to
fugitive slaves" on the basis of formalist legal analysis and "ex-
isting legal doctrine."119 Mlinow suggests that the dissenting Jus-
tices are "on the brink of considering that violence itself is public
as well as private - that law is part of the violence and that law
itself can be violent."l 20
In the context of domestic violence, the public/private dis-
tinction continues to seek a separation of law from violence.121
Law and legal actors are not only complicit in their "omissions,"
often they act violently.12 2 As a consequence, the silence is not
truly broken about wife abuse and often women's experiences are
not accepted as authentic or deserving of judicial action. "Redefin-
ing as unacceptable that which previously has been acceptable will
remain difficult unless society can acquire a different language, a
language that reflects the experiences of those abused by domestic
violence."123 The language required to litigate civil rights claims
not only incorporates women's experiences, but directly challenges
the public/private distinction which continues to silence women's
voices.
D. Existing Remedies Are Not Enough
Non-civil rights remedies have been developed to serve many
117. Minow, supra note 115, at 1668.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1670 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
120. Minow, supra note 115, at 1671.
121. See id.
122. Violence occurs when police refuse to respond to domestic violence, clerks
harass women appearing for restraining orders, or judges "blame the victim, trivial-
ize the cases or deny the victim's experiences." Id. at 1671-72.
123. Id. at 1672.
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of the needs of battered women. No single piece of legislation can
serve all purposes, so developing a multiplicity of tools available to
battered women for social and legal redress increases the likeli-
hood that one remedy will be appropriate for a particular woman
and that, in combination, litigants will make a political impact by
simultaneously chipping away at the pillars of the male dominated
power structure. Yet, some remedies may serve to reinforce that
power structure if their impact is limited or if they promote ste-
reotypes of women that cut against the emancipatory ideal and fail
to translate descriptions of victimization into an account of the
agency of women1 24 engaged in struggles for equality, freedom and
safety. An examination of criminal sanctions, restraining orders
and tort remedies further reveals that a civil rights remedy is
necessary.
Legal remedies for battered women can be evaluated on the
basis of their social change value for liberating women1 2 5 and for
their ability to make relationships safer for women.126 The goal of
creating "safe connection" can be accomplished in four ways: 1)
"change the batterer" so that he fits within cooperative and non-
violent models of community;127 2) decrease the cost of "rupture"
to battered women,128 the total disruption of home, work and com-
munity resulting from fleeing a violent spouse; 3) "increase the
costs of battering" to the batterer;129 and 4) "expand the options
for community" so that women are not limited to heterosexual re-
lationships alone.130
Most existing remedies for battered women focus on increas-
ing the costs of battering to the batterer. Direct efforts to "change
the batterer" through therapy are discouragingly limited.' 31 Ulti-
mately, battered women's advocacy may succeed in reversing cul-
124. See generally Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's
Sef-Defense Work and the Problem of Ex'pert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986).
125. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 93 ("The challenge is to identify legal and social
strategies that will allow us to change law and culture simultaneously, by illuminat-
ing the context of power and control within which a woman lives and acts.").
126. Christine Littleton suggests that the legal system should aim to make possi-
ble real women's desires for "safe connection," for women to be "safer in relation-
ships." Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 89 U CHi. LEGAL F. 23, 52 (1989) ("if
battered women seek to maintain connection in the face of enormous danger, per-
haps the key to accessing the legal system on their behalf lies in taking seriously
both the connection they seek and the danger they face in that quest").
127. Id. at 52-53.
128. Id. at 53-54.
129. Id. at 55.
130. Id. at 55-56.
131. Id. at 53.
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tural acceptance of violence against women which, in turn, may
serve to "change the batterer." Thus far, however, the prevalence
of wife abuse suggests that there has been no such shift in the be-
havior of individual batterers.
The civil rights remedy promises to serve a direct social
change function not currently achieved by other remedies. None
of the other approaches establishes directly women's right to be
free from violence, characterizes domestic violence as a public
harm and simultaneously allows recovery of individual damages.
Civil rights remedies increase the cost of battering to the batterer,
while promoting a social vision that freedom from gender-moti-
vated violence is a protected civil right for all.
1. State Criminal Law
Since the 1970s, battered women's coalitions have sought to
use state criminal law to protect battered women and to increase
the costs of battering to batterers. Criminal law, against assault
and battery,132 kidnapping, 33 homicide134 and rape, 3 5 among
other crimes, technically prohibits many types of behavior associ-
ated with wife abuse. Arrest reduces recidivism; it "substantially
reduces the number of domestic assaults and murders."136 As
compared to other interventions, such as mediation or the securing
of restraining orders, arrest of batterers best serves the goal of
"changing the batterer." The social change value of addressing
battering through criminal law is also valuable because violations
132. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36 (1992). Assault covers three types of acts
- attempts to commit battery, intentionally causing fear of battery and actual bat-
tery. The degree of assault varies with the intent of the actor, the means used and
the harm to the victim.
133. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.020 (1992). Kidnapping in the first de-
gree requires proof of abduction - restraint of a person by secreting her away to a
place she is not likely to be found or using or threatening to use deadly force -
with intent to inflict bodily injury or inflict extreme mental distress on her or a
third person.
134. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.32.010 (1992).
135. Marital rape was barred or accorded a lower level of criminality in many
states. S. Rep. 102-197 § III (C)(2)(b) at 45. The common law definition of rape was
the "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, not a spouse, forcibly and against her
will." Commonwealth v. Milnarich, 498 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (empha-
sis supplied), cited in LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS, FAM-
iLY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND SEXUAL ABUSE 37 (1989). By 1987, approximately
60% "of the states had removed that marital exemption" and opened the route for
women to prosecute their violent husbands for rape. See KARP & KARP, supra, at
37 (citing Patricia Searles & Ronald Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform
Litigation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS L. REP. 25, 33 (1987)
(table 5)).
136. Sarah Buel, Mandatory Arrest For Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 213, 215 (1988).
1992]
Law and Inequality
are characterized as crimes against the state, not as isolated private
incidents.
However, gender bias in the criminal justice system,' 3 7 for
example, the imposition of so-called "objective" legal standards in
circumstances particular to battered women,13 8 has required bat-
tered women's groups to struggle to get state prosecutors and po-
lice to tend to the problems of domestic violence.139 Despite the
evidence that domestic violence was widespread,140 early studies
revealed that the police normally did not respond to battered wo-
men's calls.141 Studies of criminal prosecution demonstrated that
"battered women's experiences were trivialized as 'non-crime' by
137. "Study after study commissioned by the highest courts of the states has con-
cluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seri-
ously than comparable crimes against men." VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 43.
138. This gender bias can be seen in battered women's self-defense claims. "Self-
defense ... to an intentional homicide rests on the view that a person may take
reasonable steps to defend himself or herself from physical harm." Schneider,
supra note 81, at 630. Gender bias in self-defense claims arises in part from stereo-
types about battered women which "often bind the trier of fact to the reasonable-
ness of a battered woman's use of defensive force." Id. at 629. Further, the
imposition of the "equal force" and "imminent danger" rules, judged by the so-
called "objective" reasonableness standard, are sex-biased, see Schneider, supra
note 124, at 201, and serve to reinforce male norms in the law. The impact of sex
bias in self-defense is two-fold:
First, sex-stereotyped attitudes and the sex bias inherent in the legal
rules of self-defense often cause the judge to exclude evidence of an
individual woman's circumstances and perceptions. The woman is
thus unable to present her case fully and is denied a fair trial. Second,
sex-stereotyped attitudes make it more likely that the trier of fact will
excuse the woman on the grounds of incapacity rather than declare
her act of self-defense justified.
Id.
139. Police failure to respond to complaints of domestic violence has been chal-
lenged by battered women as abuse of discretion and as a violation of equal protec-
tion guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Women's groups put pressure on
police to increase their awareness of domestic violence, created committees, and de-
veloped training programs to turn the force of police into allies against domestic
violence. The passage of abuse prevention statutes substantially aided these efforts
by allowing women to obtain civil orders for protection and by setting forth arrest
guidelines, including mandatory arrest policies, to guide police response and to send
a clear message that society values women and penalizes violence against them.
See, Buel, supra note 136 at 215; but see Coalition For Criminal Justice Reform For
Battered Women, Criminal Justice Proposals For Battered Women (July 1989)
(New York City advocacy group finds that policy of mandatory arrest procedures in
response to misdemeanor family offenses in New York City would not be feasi-
ble)[hereinafter Criminal Justice Proposals].
140. In 1982, "forty-one percent of all assault and weapon-related calls to the San
Francisco Police Department involved family violence," and in 1984, "forty-five per-
cent of all female homicide victims in California were killed by a boyfriend, spouse,
or other family member." Esta Soler, Improving the Criminal Justice System's Re-
sponse to Domestic Violence, 11 NOVA NEWSLETTER No. 4, Apr. 1987, at 1.




After lawsuits challenged discriminatory prosecution,143 and
women's task forces called for major changes in prosecution of do-
mestic violence claims, some District Attorney's offices have
adopted concrete strategies to reduce the discretion that works
against women 44 and legislatures have passed criminal laws spe-
cifically addressing domestic violence.145 However, despite these
new policies promoting vigorous prosecution, some prosecutors' of-
fices have not followed suit, and all have limited resources with
which to bring such claims.
In practice, criminal prosecution of batterers also proves to be
a mixed blessing. The largest benefit provided by a criminal ap-
proach is stopping violence through state interference with the cy-
cle of abuse. Prosecution sends the message that a batterer's
controlling and violent behavior is not just an element of his pri-
vate relationships with his wife, but is a crime against the state.
Reinforcement of this message through publicity about the prose-
cution of men for assault and battery against their domestic part-
ners is vital to confronting the attitude of insularity and private
entitlement that perpetuates battering behavior. The advantage of
criminal prosecution over civil legal action also may be considera-
ble in particular cases.146
142. See generally Elizabeth Stanko, Would You Believe This Woman?
Prosecutorial Screening for "Credible" Witnesses and a Problem of Justice, in
JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF (Nicole Hahn Rafter & Elizabeth Anna Stanko eds.,
1982); ELIzABETH STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF MALE
VIOLENCE (1985).
143. See, e.g., supra note 139; Raquz v. Chandler, No. C74-1064 (N.D. Ohio 1974),
cited in GOVERNOR'S BATTERED WOMEN'S WORKING GROUP, VIOLENT CRIME IN THE
FAMILY: ENFORCEMENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ABUSE PREVENTION LAW 8 (1985)
[hereinafter GOVFRNoR's WORKING GROUP]; Doe v. Bellelle, Civ. Mo. 81-5256 (S.D.
Ill. 1981), cited in GOVERNORS WORKING GROUP, supra, at 8.
144. See supra notes 139 and 140. There are many examples of such strategies -
for instance, requiring consultation with community groups, adopting written poli-
cies and procedures on domestic violence cases, and providing assurance that wo-
men who drop their cases may re-contact the District Attorney's office.
145. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 10.99 (1992) (official response to domestic vio-
lence including restriction upon and duties of court).
146. First, there is no risk to the battered woman of attorneys fees or other costs
of civil litigation. Second, some civil lawyers may prefer that criminal charges be
brought and adjudicated before civil rights or tort claims are filed. This may be a
way to develop the evidence and test the available witnesses. Third, the rules of
criminal procedure differ dramatically from that of civil procedure - victims will
be protected from having to undergo discovery and depositions, tools of civil proce-
dure which can be misused by a batterer to harass and damage the victim. Batter-
ers often continue their controlling behavior through the legal system when they
no longer can do it directly. Finally, criminal claims are constitutionally required
to be tried with speed, while civil litigants currently face backlogs which can last
years in many jurisdictions.
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On the other hand, the disadvantages of criminal prosecution
of domestic violence cases may, at times, outweigh the benefits.
The power and control of the state replaces that of the batterer in
a criminal prosecution and may perpetuate battered women's ex-
perience of victimization. The psychological trauma and dis-
empowerment experienced by crime victims may be exacerbated
by their inability to prevent dismissal of charges, participate in de-
veloping a prosecution strategy or even testify against the abuser.
The criminal system's remedies and the battered women's needs
may not correspond.147 Further, criminal prosecution alone does
not provide recovery for the damages incurred as a result of the
abuse even where restitution is a possibility. Although state crimi-
nal remedies are an essential aspect of battered women's efforts to
find safety in relationship and to label domestic assaults as a crime
against the state, because of their disadvantages, individual liti-
gants may choose not to use criminal prosecution as a legal tool to
obtain justice or may seek to augment it with civil claims.
2. Abuse Prevention Orders
Abuse prevention legislation, adopted in at least 48 states and
the District of Columbia,148 provides a remedy designed to em-
power battered women 49 through the courts and to secure their
safety by increasing the costs of violent behavior to the batterer.
Abuse prevention legislation allows battered women to obtain civil
protection orders, or temporary restraining orders (TROs), to en-
join batterers from further violence.150 Women can obtain tempo-
rary orders directly without counsel,151 on an emergency and ex
parte basis.152 The legal standard to obtain a civil protection order
is generally a "preponderance of the evidence," which is more eas-
ily demonstrated than a criminal, "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt"
standard.153 As compared to extensive civil litigation, this remedy
147. The successful end of arrest and criminal prosecution is imprisonment. A
woman may fear retaliation, require the financial support the batterer provides or
seek to maintain the father's relationship with the children of the marriage. See
Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Or-
ders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L. Q. 43, 44 (1989).
148. Id. at 43.
149. Victims of attempted abuse can obtain protective orders in 39 states and the
District of Columbia. Forty-two states permit protective orders if a woman is
threatened with physical violence and is in fear of imminent bodily harm. Id. at 48.
150. Id. at 46.
151. Id. at 49.
152. The husband is entitled to contest the order in a hearing scheduled ten or
fourteen days after the issuance of the ex parte order. Id. at 52. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 209A (1992).
153. Finn, supra note 147, at 49.
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is quick, easy and accessible to a great number of women in dan-
ger. Protective orders provide "the only remedy for abuse that is
not yet criminal (e.g., intimidation or harassment) and for behav-
ior that is misdemeanor crime with insufficient evidence for charg-
ing or conviction (e.g., threats or shoving)."154
Temporary restraining orders can separate the parties to
keep battered women safe from abuse 155 and decrease the costs of
rupture to women by removing the batterer, forbidding contact
and granting custody and child support.156 Unlike criminal prose-
cution, civil restraining orders address the specific dynamics of do-
mestic violence where an "offender is motivated to retaliate
against a specific victim" and where cohabitation allows him to
continue abuse and draw on sympathy.157 Local police, in posses-
sion of copies of the restraining orders, are on notice if calls of dis-
tress come from protected women. A violation of a civil
restraining order "constitutes civil contempt in thirty one states,
criminal contempt in twenty five states and the District of Colum-
bia, and civil and criminal contempt in eleven states."15 8 When
there is adequate police enforcement and criminal prosecution, re-
straining orders substantially increase the costs of abuse to the
batterer.
Still, women seeking TROs face serious difficulties'59 and,
unlike victims of many other crimes, are often targeted for re-
peated assaults. Some women are unable to use restraining order
provisions at all due to their immigration status or sexual orienta-
tion.1 60 For those who can obtain orders, the obvious and "most
serious limitation of civil protection orders is widespread lack of
enforcement."' 6 ' Because police are not usually present when the
violation occurs, women in some states must file a complaint to ini-
tiate enforcement - issuance of a warrant or a contempt hear-
154. Id. at 44.
155. I&
156. See, eg., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A (1992).
157. Finn, supra note 147, at 44.
158. Id. at 55.
159. Clerks may bar or discourage access to judicial remedies, judges may have
incorrect understandings of the law or widely divergent interpretations and bias
may block proper functioning of the law. See GOVERNOR'S WORKING GROUP, supra
note 143.
160. Civil restraining order provisions are practically unavailable to immigrants
who lack the legal status to remain in the country, are afraid of deportation and
whose language skills and lack of court interpretors prevents them from communi-
cating sufficiently to obtain relief. In many states, gays and lesbians are not cov-
ered by the statutes because of gender specific language which limits the remedy or
a lack of provision for "unrelated household members."
161. Finn, supra note 147, at 45. See also GovERNOR's WORKING GROUP, supra
note 143, at 2-3.
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ing.162 In other cases, even where police have a mandatory duty to
arrest,163 if the abuser is not present when the police arrive, the
police may have no duty to go after him and investigate. 164 There-
fore, some women face repeated risks from their abusers.
When TROs are enforced, state interference in systems of vi-
olence challenges the relative power of family members and indi-
rectly works to break down the public/private distinction. In
tension with that function, abuse-prevention orders also perpetu-
ate the "private harm" characterization of domestic violence. Each
TRO focuses on one husband's abuse of his wife and provides an
order designed to protect her. Thus, the TRO remedy is not a gen-
eral panacea for wife abuse, but a necessary element of a broader
safety plan for women who seek an exit from abusive
relationships.
3. State Tort Law
Battered women who have damages arising from abuse may
have options for recovering against their abusers pursuant to state
tort law. Although the common law rule of interspousal tort im-
munity still exists in some states, 165 it has been eroded or abro-
gated by other jurisdictions. 166 The possible legal causes of action
in tort include: assault and battery;16 7 wrongful death;168 inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, or the tort of outrage;169
162. Finn, supra note 147, at 45. To address this problem, 24 states have passed
statutes allowing police to "arrest without a warrant when they have probable
cause to believe that the respondent has violated an order" and 13 states have initi-
ated mandatory arrest policies for violations. Id. at 55.
163. Roy v. Everett, 823 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1992).
164. Donaldson v. Seattle, 829 P.2d 1125 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
165. Where the interspousal tort immunity still exists, the following exceptions
to the rule, among others, allow causes of action where there has been: 1) the death
of one spouse; 2) a divorce or separation; 3) a willful, wanton or intentional tort; or,
4) premarital torts. See KARP & KARP, supra note 135, at 36.
166. Id. See Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972) (interspousal tort im-
munity totally abandoned in state of Washington).
167. See KARP & KARP, supra note 135, at 38-41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 13 (1965)). The following elements are required for a civil battery cause
of action: 1) a harmful or offensive contact with a person; 2) resulting from an act
intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer such a contact; and, 3) apprehension. Id.
Civil assault to the person requires an act by the defendant creating a reasonable
apprehension in plaintiff of immediate harm, intent to cause such apprehension in
the plaintiff and causation of that apprehension. Id.
168. Id. at 42 (wrongful death includes any "wrongful act, neglect, or default
that causes death" including "intentional as well as negligent torts").
169. See, e.g., Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 666 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1983) (de-
fendant's act must amount to extreme and outrageous conduct, with intent to cause
the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress or with recklessness as to such con-
sequences; plaintiff may be the object of defendant's actions or an immediate family
member present at the time of the conduct). Conduct is actionable if it "is so outra-
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negligent infliction of emotional distress; 7 o and false arrest, or
false imprisonment.17' State tort law may also be used by battered
women against third parties, such as the police172 or landlords'1 3
for damages arising from their negligence in law enforcement or
failure to provide reasonable security.
With potential awards for pain and suffering, general and
specific damages and punitive damages in some states, tort relief is
broader than that available through restraining orders. However,
the damages must be significant and the defendant's assets and in-
come must be recoverable to make filing such a claim worthwhile.
Such limitations make civil law recovery for tortious misconduct
an applicable remedy only in some battering relationships. Where
possible, tort claims are an effective way to increase the cost of
battering to the batterer. Publicity deriving from the claims may
promote a social change agenda as well. If rich batterers are risk-
averse, behavior might change as financial risk escalates. This be-
havior switch is unlikely, however, unless there are significant
claims brought and won by battered women.
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965), cited in KARP & KARP,
supra note 135, at 43.
170. See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1976); Carney v. Knollwood
Cemetery Assn., 514 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (hearing that ancestors re-
mains had been disinterred and thrown on refuse heap was sufficient to support ac-
tion for negligent infliction of emotional distress). See generally KARP & KARP,
supra note 135, at 49 (action where negligence causes mental disturbances as well
as physical consequence or illness). Sometimes mental distress alone is enough to
be actionable if it is serious or severe and if the distress is foreseeable. Id.
171. The tort of false imprisonment "protects the personal interest in freedom
from restraint of movement" and requires that the restraint be total, though it may
be brief.
172. KARP & KARP, supra note 135, at 46. State tort law is statutory, therefore
governmental tort immunity accorded to government actors at common law has an
exception where a "special relationship" exists between the plaintiff and the third
party, the police. The failure of police to act with reasonable care to protect mem-
bers of the general public has given rise to municipal liability. Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984), cited in GOVERNOR'S WORKING GROUP, supra
note 143, at 9. Cf. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process
Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280 (1990)
(arguing that the existence of a restraining order is a form of state custody, one of
the limited conditions under which the state assumes an affirmative duty to pro-
tect). The police are responsible by statute and judicial restraining order to protect
the battered woman against her abuser. Where the police have notice of the danger
and fail to act, they may be held partially liable for the damages that occur.
173. For example, a landlord who has been given notice of faulty outside locks
on the door, in violation of a Housing Code, and who fails to remedy the problem
despite her duty of reasonable care may be held contributorily liable for injury to a
tenant who has a restraining order against her estranged husband and is harmed
when he bashes through the door.
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Probably the greatest advantage of a civil claim is that plain-
tiffs, in cooperation with their lawyers, are able to control the pace
and content of their case. Yet, use of state tort law, like civil re-
straining orders, risks perpetuation of the notion of domestic vio-
lence as a "private harm" and fails to recognize the broader
societal implications of blows sent by an abusive husband to his
wife. In contrast, "a civil rights claim redresses an assault on a
commonly shared ideal of equality."174
4. State Civil Rights Statutes
Some state statutes or constitutions may provide civil rights
avenues for battered women. Many state codes include "hate
crime" or malicious harassment provisions that recognize gender
bias in their criminal laws.175 Although some hate crime statutes
are constitutionally invalid in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in RA.V. v. St. Paul,176 and others that impose enhanced
sentences for gender-motivated crimes are suspect,177 carefully
drafted malicious harassment laws'78 provide an important tool to
fully address the bias element that motivates some crimes and the
civil rights harm that results from them. Few states, however,
have civil law remedies for acts of violence motivated by gender.
174. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 49.
175. See CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN As
BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME: DEFINING THE ISSUES (1991) [hereinafter BIAS MOTI-
VATED HATE CRIME]. Minnesota's intimidation/harassment law creates increased
fines and imprisonment for fourth degree assaults motivated by bias, including
"[w]hoever assaults another because of the victim's or another's actual or perceived
... sex." MINN. STAT. § 606.2231 (1989), cited in BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME,
supra, at 16-17; See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.14T (West Supp. 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 (1992) as amended by Ch. 127 of the laws of 1993.
New Hampshire, Vermont and West Virginia also include gender-motivated crimes
in their criminal enhancement provision for hate crimes. BIAS MOTIVATED HATE
CRIME, supra, at 17-18.
176. - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992). The Supreme Court held the St. Paul ordi-
nance facially unconstitutional for moving into viewpoint restrictions on speech.
Id. at 2550. That ordinance created a misdemeanor for placing symbols on private
property "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der...." Id. at 2541.
177. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled its state sentencing enhancement pro-
vision unconstitutional in light of the RAV decision. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485
N.W.2d 807 (1992), cert granted, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 810 (1992). Hopefully, the
U.S. Supreme Court will clarify the parameters of malicious harassment jurispru-
dence in this case.
178. Malicious harassment statutes may be constitutional if they proscribe fight-
ing words directed at persons or groups that communicate ideas in a threatening
manner and serve to protect individuals from the "fear of violence, from the disrup-
tion that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur." RA. V., 120 L.Ed.2d at 321.
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This section describes three state statutes that provide civil
law causes of action for gender-motivated violence. The California
and Vermont civil statutes are based on a hate crime model. The
Massachusetts provision is a more general civil rights statute based
on existing federal civil rights law. All provide potential remedies
for battered women.
California recognizes a right to be free from gender-moti-
vated violence. "All persons ... have the right to be free from any
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against
their persons or property because of their... sex."'1 79 A civil cause
of action enforces this right: "[w]hoever denies the right provided
by § 51.7, or aids, incites, or conspires in that denial, is liable for
each and every offense for the actual damages suffered by any per-
son denied that right and, in addition .... exemplary damages ....
a civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be
awarded to the person denied the right" and attorney fees. 8 0 Ac-
tual damages include general and special damages.'18 Complaints
pursuant to this section can be brought by the state attorney gen-
eral, district or city attorneys or any person aggrieved by the
conduct.18 2
In Vermont, a "person who commits, causes to be committed
or attempts to commit any crime and whose conduct is maliciously
motivated by the victim's actual or perceived.., sex" is subject to
enhanced criminal penalties 8 3 and civil liability. "Independent of
any criminal prosecution or the result thereof, any person suffer-
ing damage, loss or injury as a result of conduct prohibited by sec-
tion 1455... of this title may bring an action for injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, costs and reasonable attor-
neys fees, and other appropriate relief."84 This statute's criminal
enhancement provision may be unconstitutional in light of RAV v.
St Paul.8 5
These statutes provide rights and remedies for some battered
women. No state action is required and plaintiffs need not demon-
strate deprivation of any independent underlying right. Reported
decisions do not reflect use of these statutes by battered women to
bring claims for deprivation of their civil rights because of sex.
179. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51.7 (1992), cited in BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME, Supm
note 175, at 15-16.
180. Id. at § 52(b).
181. Id. at § 52(h).
182. Id. at § 52(c).
183. 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1455 (1991), cited in BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME,
supra note 175, at 17.
184. Id. at § 1457, cited in BIAS MOTIvATED HATE CRIME, supra note 175, at 18.
185. See supra notes 176-178.
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However, the language of the California statute, which declares
that people should be free from "violence ... committed ... be-
cause of... sex," has broad applicability in practice, These stat-
utes provide excellent tools that battered women may use to gain
justice through the civil court system.
Massachusetts' primary civil rights statute available to bat-
tered women is the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act of 1979 [herein-
after Massachusetts Civil Rights Act].' 8 6 Another, the Act
Relative to Equal Rights Under Law, passed in 1989 [hereinafter
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act],' 8 7 providing substantive protec-
tion against discrimination in the areas of contracts and real prop-
erty, is modelled on the federal civil rights provisions codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 and provides a basic right to sex equality
in these areas.
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Actl88 includes a civil cause
of action to be brought by the state Attorney General' 89 or an ag-
grieved person' 90 for actions committed by a private person,
whether or not acting under color of law.191 The procedure for lit-
igating the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims breaks down
into two stages: 1) the securing of injunctive relief through the is-
suance of a temporary restraining order; and, 2) prosecution for vi-
olation of that order.192 The consequences for violation of a civil
186. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 93, § 102 (1992).
187. In 1989, the Massachusetts Legislature passed this broad equal protection
law which provides that "all persons within the commonwealth, regardless of sex,
race, color, creed or national origin, shall have... the same rights enjoyed by white
male citizens, to make and enforce contracts, to inherit, purchase, to lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." Id. at § 102(a) (emphasis
supplied).
188. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act is made up of different parts. MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 12, §§ 11H, l1L and MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 37. This legislation was
approved in 1979 by St. 1979, c. 801, §§ 1 and 2. Other civil rights statutes in Massa-
chusetts, added subsequent to the initial civil rights laws, are typically known as
"hate crime" legislation. They fail to include gender or sex in their classifications
thereby precluding utilization for rights seekers complaining of gender bias.
189. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 11H (1992).
190. See id. at § ll.
191. The legislative intent in adopting General Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H and I, the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, was to provide a state remedy for deprivation of
civil rights, coextensive with federal remedies, which, by not requiring state action,
incorporates private action within its clear language and its bounds. See Batchelder
v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128 (Mass. 1985). See also Bell v. Mazza, 474
N.E.2d 1111 (Mass. 1985) (plaintiff need not allege state action to plead cause of ac-
tion under this section).
192. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 1lJ (1992). The party or the attorney general ob-
tains a temporary injunction or restraining order to make the defendant refrain
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rights restraining order are more severe and typically are pursued
more seriously than violations of abuse prevention orders.193 Pre-
vailing parties are entitled to receive reasonable costs and attor-
neys fees, including student lawyer fees,194  under the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.195
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires proof of inter-
ference, or attempts at interference, "by threats, intimidation or
coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any person or per-
sons" of rights secured by federal or Commonwealth law' 96 and its
terms are to be construed liberally.197 Thus, there are three ele-
ments of the plaintiff's prima facie case: 1) identification of a right
or rights secured by federal or Commonwealth law; 2) the exercise
or enjoyment of which has been, or has been attempted to be, in-
terfered with; 3) by defendant's threats, intimidation or coercion.
Specific intent to deprive the individual of her rights is not
required for a claim to prevail pursuant to this section.198 There is
from certain conduct or activities. Violation of the order is a criminal offense and
language to that effect must be contained in the served order. The statute provides
law enforcement officers with the authority to arrest the defendant upon probable
cause to believe that the defendant has violated the order.
193. Telephone interview with Judy Beals, Public Protection Bureau, Massachu-
setts Attorney General's Office, Boston (May 1, 1991). The injunctive relief ele-
ment of the civil rights action duplicates the relief available pursuant to the abuse
prevention statute at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A and effects the same purpose to pro-
tect women from immediate danger. The statutorily required language for the civil
restraining order is identical to other abuse prevention orders and requires the
same notice to the defendant and law enforcement officers. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A
(1992). The immediate relief available from stage one of the Mass. Civil Rights Act
fundamentally parallels that of any temporary restraining order obtained pursuant
to abuse prevention actions. The consequences for violation are much more severe.
Violations of civil rights restraining orders are prosecuted in different courts and
are taken more seriously - violators go to jail.
Obtaining equitable relief for violation of the civil rights statute is easier than
obtaining relief pursuant to a standard TRO which establishes a criminal violation.
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires a preponderance of the evidence, not
reasonable doubt, to prove violation of an order. See Commonwealth v. Guilfoyle,
521 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. 1988). The defendant's violation "shall be punishable" by a
maximum fine of five thousand dollars and/or by imprisonment for not more than
two and one-half years. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 11J (1992). If bodily injury results
from the violation, "the maximum fine jumps to ten thousand dollars and/or im-
prisonment for up to ten years. Id.
194. See Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction, 480 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1985)
(the value of law student services may be compensable, since fee awards are au-
thorized by statute, provided the students were supervised by an attorney).
195. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 11I (1992). This provision parallels the cost and fees
provision for prevailing parties in federal civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. For application in Massachusetts, see, e.g., Draper v. Greenfield, 425 N.E.2d
333 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 (1982).
196. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 11H and I (by reference to H) (1992).
197. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d 1128.
198. See Elwood v. Pina, 815 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1987) (public employees need not
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a possibility that negligence, under some circumstances, could
amount to coercion.199 Thus, the characterization of the batterer's
motivation is inapposite insofar as the court has "interpreted the
statute not to require a showing of hostile, discriminatory ani-
mus." 200 An evidentiary showing of direct and circumstantial evi-
dence of actual violations of secured rights by threats, intimidation
or coercion is sufficient to state a claim.201
In many of the cases tried under this section, the required
proof of interference by threat, intimidation or coercion proved
difficult to establish.202 For battered women, however, this partic-
ular hurdle does not appear to be similarly problematic. Where
witnesses can support the occurrence of physically violent inci-
dents or if the victim is able to document an injury resulting from
such incidents, the existence of physical coercion will be hard to
dispute. Further, evidence of patterns of battering and expert tes-
timony on the battering cycle could demonstrate that physical
abuse, threats and intimidation are cyclical but that coercion is al-
ways present in a battering relationship. Battering in a marital re-
lationship also provides an opportunity for the extension of an
economic coercion theory.203 Some battered women will be able to
establish, through evidence of injury, testimony about violence and
threats and expert testimony on batterers' coercive and intimida-
show specific intent that their discharge arose from not supporting their employer's
reelection campaign and from supporting his opponents).
199. Cf. Deas v. Dempsey, 530 N.E.2d 1239 (Mass. 1988) (declining to find coer-
cion through negligence).
200. O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 354 (Mass. 1987).
201. However, circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of sex discrimi-
nation and a discriminatory employment environment is admissible pursuant to
this section, as it adds "color" to the employer's decision-making process and the
influence behind the particular actions he took regarding the employee. See Con-
way v. Electro Switch Corp. 825 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1987), certified question an-
swered, 523 N.E.2d 255 (Mass. 1988).
202. See e.g., Bally v. Northeastern University, 532 N.E.2d 49, 51-53 (Mass. 1989)
(no threats, intimidation or coercion in urinalysis for athletes, so no violation of the
Act); Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 535 N.E.2d 588, 593 (Mass. 1989) (no
coercion within meaning of the statute).
203. Threats by a husband that he will "leave" his wife and children, "commit
suicide," or "quit his job" to secure her obedience, or on the other extreme, the ag-
gressive acts of a husband in forcing his wife to work against her will, which may
amount to involuntary servitude, may constitute economic coercion actionable pur-
suant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. Support for the economic coercion
theory in the case law can be found in an employment case where a University pro-
fessor alleged that the denial of her tenure was due to her political expression. The
District Court held that the cancellation of future economic relationship was suffi-
cient to constitute coercion within the meaning of "threats, intimidation and coer-
cion" under this section. Karetnikova v. Trustees of Emerson College, 725 F. Supp.
73 (D. Mass. 1989).
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tion techniques, that their rights were deprived by threat, intimi-
dation and coercion.
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not create independ-
ent substantive rights,204 so battered women must identify sepa-
rate rights secured by the federal or Commonwealth law that were
deprived by battering. Many rights deprived through wife abuse
would provide a basis for a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
claim. 205
Some federal constitutional rights cannot be used to establish
actionable private deprivations by threat, intimidation or coercion.
First Amendment protection of speech and Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendment rights of due process and equal protection are secured
against state action only.206 However, the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits involuntary servitude and does not require proof of state
action.207 Although this amendment was passed to eradicate slav-
ery of African-Americans, battered women sometimes find them-
selves in relationships in which they have lost all freedom of
movement and integrity of body and mind to the control and coer-
cion of their husbands. Such a system of "private" involuntary ser-
vitude today has its cultural origins in "public" laws which treated
women as the property of their husbands, allowed husbands to dis-
cipline their wives through violence and prevented women from
participating in the democratic process. Deprivation of Thirteenth
Amendment protection could be alleged as general support for a
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim.
Rights inherent in national citizenship, such as interstate
travel 208 or voting,209 do not require proof of state action. Where
the federal Constitution has been interpreted to require proof of
state action, some state constitutions that include rights to due
process and equal protection, may not require state action. The
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, article one, as amended by
article 106 of the amendments, also may provide a basis for a Mas-
204. Cf. Mouradian v. General Electric Co., 503 N.E.2d 1318 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987), rev. denied, 507 N.E.2d 1056 (Mass. 1987) (when employee's only claim of age
discrimination in employment discharge could have been enforced under statutory
procedures, employee could not make a claim under MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 111).
205. The following section is a preliminary list of protected rights. They are not
well developed, but are meant to provoke creative advocacy. Each fact situation
will raise its own possibilities.
206. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 831
(1983).
207. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988); Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
208. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105.
209. See, e.g., Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied,
424 U.S. 958 (1976).
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sachusetts Civil Rights Act claim. Pursuant to that declaration, all
people have "the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties... seeking and obtaining safety and happiness," an equal-
ity which shall not be denied "under the law . . . because of
sex."210 Article one of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
also "provides that all people have the right to be safe and secure
and to use their property peacefully."2 11
Case law provides support for the utilization of this amend-
ment where private acts deprive women of their safety. In
O'Connell v. Chasdi,212 the plaintiff alleged assault and battery, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of her civil
rights pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, arising from
a co-worker's series of sexual advances throughout a business
trip.213 The Supreme Judicial Court found that "[s]exual harass-
ment by a person not acting under the color of law may violate se-
cured rights within the meaning of the Massachusetts Civil Rights
Act... Sexual harassment accomplished by threats, intimidation,
or coercion constitutes precisely the kind of conduct proscribed by
the act, and is similarly directed toward a class explicitly protected
by article 1" of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, including
its Equal Rights Amendment.214 Thus, acts of violence by a man
against a woman in the domestic context may also qualify as coer-
cion on the basis of sex.
Federal and state statutes, as well as recognized common law
rights, may serve as the underlying deprivations required to state a
claim pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. For in-
stance, women are protected from discrimination in contract and
property pursuant to the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act 215 and
federal fair housing laws. Deprivation of these rights could be
shown in a context where a battered woman is kept out of her
house as punishment and to humiliate her. State tort law com-
monly prohibits intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful death. In addition, state criminal laws against assault
and battery, and in the extreme, murder or manslaughter, prohibit
210. MAss. DEC. OF RTs., art. 1.
211. Id.
212. 511 N.E.2d 349.
213. The plaintiff complained of repeated requests to share a hotel room, physi-
cal touching of her (including stroking her thighs while the plaintiff lay ill in her
hotel room) and unconsented entry to her room while she slept. Her denial of his
advances were met by comments that she was "rigid and Catholic," "very unsophis-
ticated" and that she was inappropriate for the job she was currently holding. Id. at
350.
214. Id at 353. But see id. at 354-56 (Lynch, J. dissenting).
215. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 93, § 102(a) (1992).
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interferences with the physical sanctity of a person. Other crimes,
such as kidnapping, may be applicable in some situations where
women are trapped in the home or prevented by force from leav-
ing, if even for relatively short periods of time.
State civil law remedies for deprivation of civil rights moti-
vated by gender are valuable tools for battered women. In some
instances, litigants may choose state court mechanisms to enforce
their federal and state civil rights. Some state constitutions in-
clude rights not covered by the U.S. Constitution, such as victim's
rights and rights to individual dignity.216 Furthermore, some state
courts enforce a broader notion of rights than the federal judici-
ary.217 Yet, a federal civil rights remedy is still needed. Civil
rights options are not available in all states. And in some, the lack
of enforcement of criminal laws against domestic violence and gen-
der bias in the courts may dissuade battered women from seeking
justice altogether.218
E. Civil Rights Remedies - Appropriate and Helpful
Civil rights law provides an ideal legal mechanism through
which some battered women can generate state intervention in,
and recovery for, violations of their civil rights by gender-moti-
vated violence. Where other social and economic support mecha-
nisms fail to provide alternatives to violent marriages, judicial
accountability for batterers is particularly important. Civil rights
laws may provide this accountability, as well as expand the range
of remedies tailored to litigants' needs and the needs of the bat-
tered women's movement.
Civil rights remedies, like tort and restraining order reme-
dies, increase the cost of abuse to the batterer. Unlike restraining
orders, which potentially promote intervention during marriage,
civil rights lawsuits will be filed after separation of the parties. As
216. See Laura S. Harper, Battered Women Suing Police For Failure to Inter-
vene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990).
217. See John Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions, 61 J. ST. Gov'T 163, 164 (1988), cited in Harper, supra note 216, at
1425 ("Since 1970, state high courts have issued more than 100 rulings in which
they have either granted broader rights protections under state constitutions than
the U.S. Supreme Court has granted under the U.S. Constitution, or based their
rights protections decisions entirely on state constitutional grounds.").
218. A critical aspect of the philosophy behind Congressional enactment of early
federal civil rights laws to provide a remedy in federal courts was that "by reason
of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced and the claim of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by state agencies."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims).
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such, civil rights lawsuits do not provide a mechanism for increas-
ing a woman's safety within the marriage, nor do they necessarily
work to make an abusive husband stop his violence. Instead, they
provide an opportunity for a survivor of abuse to demand she be
compensated fully for the damages incurred during, and the
ramifications of the violent attacks. Successful litigation and pub-
licity may change societal norms of behavior by demonstrating
that the violent deprivation of battered women's civil rights is an
attack on all and that violators of women's integrity will be held
accountable.
The distinct advantage to civil rights causes of actions, like
criminal prosecutions, is that violations constitute attacks on so-
cially held norms of human decency, not individual or "private"
harms. Civil rights actions against abusers make explicit the
linkage between the violation of a single woman's bodily and spiri-
tual integrity and the violation of all women's integrity and sense
of self-worth. By drawing the context for power and control into
the definition of battering itself, and by challenging the social, eco-
nomic and legal context in which individual battering relationships
are situated, civil rights claims constitute a direct confrontation of
gender dominance.
Creation of federal civil rights causes of action for battered
women is appropriate. Existing federal civil rights laws were
passed to provide judicial mechanisms to intervene and stop perva-
sive and systematic private discrimination on the basis of race.
The history of slavery constituted sufficient legal support of segre-
gation and discrimination to make legal remedial provisions neces-
sary. Likewise, discrimination against women and the tolerance of
wife abuse throughout American history is tied to the law and the
State's action of supporting male violence. Enactment of effective
civil rights legislation is necessary to promote women's equality
and freedom from violence and to assist in the elevation of wo-
men's agency over victimization.
H0I. Existing Federal Civil Rights Remedies Fail to Protect the Rights
of Battered Women
Existing federal statutes fail to provide battered women with
a legal remedy for the deprivation of their civil rights.219 Some
219. "While this society has announced, and upheld, a national commitment
against violent discrimination for 120 years, that commitment has never adequately
protected victims of gender-motivated violence. It is the fundamental purpose of
title III of the Violence Against Women Act to correct that, on balance, providing
these victims with an effective antidiscrimination remedy for violently expressed
prejudice." VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 42.
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provide legal avenues for women who suffer discrimination on the
basis of sex in isolated contexts, such as in employment decisions
or police protection, but no existing federal civil rights cause of ac-
tion allows women to bring claims against their abusers. The fol-
lowing sections canvas the existing federal civil rights statutes to
demonstrate their value and limitations as applied to battered
women.
A. 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1982
The civil rights statutes at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 prohibit
private acts of race discrimination in making and enforcing con-
tracts220 and owning and selling property.221 These provisions
were enacted by Congress after ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment222 in response to pervasive racial discrimination re-
maining after the abolition of slavery.2 23 Private acts of race dis-
crimination, as well as government conduct in deprivation of civil
rights on the basis of race, are actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981224 and 1982.225 Because of their origin and legislative his-
tory, these statutes only afford a legal remedy for race discrimina-
tion,226 not gender discrimination.2 27 Therefore, battered women
220. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, provides a guaran-
tee to "all persons... the same right... to make and enforce contracts... and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." With the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§ 1981 protections extend to the performance and modification of contracts.
221. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1992).
222. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); General Building
Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
223. For a discussion of the history and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1886,
see Case Comment, Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982:
Shifting the Focus From Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 823, 826-
829 (1987) [hereinafter Beyond Black and White].
224. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (congressional source of
§ 1981 and its constitutional authority derive in part from the Thirteenth Amend-
ment; a § 1981 claim thus may reach purely private acts of discrimination without a
requirement of state action). The Runyon holding applying § 1981 to private acts of
discrimination was upheld unanimously in the Supreme Court's decision in Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
225. See Jones, 392 U.S. 409. In Jones, the Court held that § 1982, derived from
the 1886 Civil Rights Act, bars "all racial discrimination, private as well as public,
in the sale or rental of property and that the statute, thus construed, a valid exer-
cise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." Id. at 413
(emphasis in original).
226. The Supreme Court has included discrimination on the basis of ancestry or
ethnic characteristics in the definition of "racial" discrimination forbidden by
§ 1982. For a critical assessment of the definition of "race," see Beyond Black and
White, supra note 223.
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may not seek relief for gender-motivated deprivations of civil
rights pursuant to these statutes.
Nor should battered women seek to replicate the require-
ments necessary to obtain recovery afforded by these statutes.
Race discrimination claims arising under §§ 1981 and 1982 require
proof of intent to discriminate,228 a controversial standard.229 The
intent standard should not be re-created in civil rights claims
brought by battered women. 23 0 The intentionality requirement
largely misses the subtle, pervasive and devastating forms of dis-
crimination against women and minorities in contemporary soci-
ety. Indeed, the intent standard has the practical effect of
perpetuating discriminatory behavior23l and should not be in-
cluded in new legislation seeking to stem the tide of gender-moti-
vated civil rights deprivations.
227. The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of § 198's "white citi-
zens," and held that this section defines the nature of the rights protected, and
thereby affords a remedy to white employees who are victims of racially discrimi-
natory treatment in private employment. McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation,
427 U.S. 273, 291-93 (1976). In so doing, the Court noted that the amendment incor-
porating this clause was adopted because "it was thought by some persons that un-
less these qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights might be
extended to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors." Id. at 293 (ci-
tations omitted). Executive Orders, set forth in the spirit of § 1982's prohibition
against racial discrimination in the exercise of property rights, have been amended
to include a prohibition against sex discrimination in the sale, leasing and financing
of property. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527, as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,259 1980, 46 Fed. Reg. 1,253. The Executive Order, originally written
to protect racial minorities, was amended in 1980 to include sex discrimination
within its provisions. No such amendment has been made to the primary statutes,
§§ 1981 and 1982.
228. General Building Contractors, 458 U.S. at 391.
229. See Note, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially Neutral Practices -
What Approach Under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982?, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1267.
230. The proposed federal statute that would provide for such civil rights claims
arises a century after the Fourteenth Amendment and, as a consequence, should
not be hampered by its judicial construction. Further, recognition of the subtlety
and disguise of racial discrimination in modern society has led many commentators
to argue for another standard for civil rights claims based on race discrimination
and abandonment of the requirement to prove intent. See Charles R. Lawrence,
llI, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of motive,
and equal protection scrutiny should be extended to all situations where govern-
ment action is race-dependent, even where it is unconscious rather than pur-
poseful); see also Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection. The
Jurisprudence of Denial And Evasion, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 1307, 1323 n.73 (1991).
Congress already has recognized the subtlety of race and sex discrimination in its
Title VII legislation, and the Supreme Court followed suit in upholding disparate
impact claims arising from systems of discrimination and not simple discriminatory
wrongs. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 475 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982), cited in Lively &
Plass, supra, at 1323 n.73.
231. Cf. Lively & Plass, supra note 230, at 1323 (the standard devitalizes tradi-
tional equal protection and invalidates remediation of racial discrimination).
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Instead, the key principle and spirit embodied in §§ 1981 and
1982 should be applied to the situation of violence against women:
remedial action and intervention in private relations sometimes is
necessary to correct a history of discrimination. After an era of
state action which perpetuated physical abuse of women, legisla-
tion is necessary to correct dangerous social, economic and legal
inequalities.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Enacted in 1871,232 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is broader in scope than
§§ 1981 and 1982. It provides a private civil rights cause of action
for individuals deprived, "under color of" law, of "any rights, priv-
ileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." To
sustain a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that:
1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting
under color of law;23 3 and, 2) this conduct deprived the complain-
ant of a constitutional right2 or a right under other law. This
remedy is available to all people, including women and racial mi-
norities, whose constitutional rights are violated.
The central limitation of the § 1983 remedy for battered wo-
men is that only those acting "under color of" law can be held ac-
countable for the deprivation caused to the victim. Pursuant to
§ 1983, an individual woman cannot sue her husband or spouse for
beating her unless this action can be construed as "under color of"
law. Some states, however, have broader civil rights statutes
modeled after § 1983 which provide a parallel cause of action but
do not require state action.23 5 A further limitation of § 1983 is that
it is only a procedural mechanism to protect independent, underly-
ing rights. Therefore, where the underlying rights are secured by
232. Section 1983 was originally Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and
was enacted, in part, to address some state officials' inability or unwillingness to en-
force ex-slaves' rights under state and federal law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167.
233. The phrase "under color of" law was defined in United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941), in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 242, as "[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law." See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 111 (1945) ("acts of police officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are
plainly excluded"); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167.
234. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). For deprivation of constitutional
rights in the context of a battered woman's claim, see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and superseded, 901 F.2d 696
(9th Cir. 1990).
235. See, e.g., Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, MAss. GEN. L. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 131,
and MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 37 (1992).
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the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, proof of
intentional race or gender discrimination is required just as it
would be for §§ 1981 and 1982 claims.2 3
When battered women are victims of third parties acting
under color of law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be useful. Battered wo-
men have invoked this section against municipalities and police de-
partments2 3 7 for failure to protect their constitutional rights in
violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The recent Supreme Court holding in
DeShaney,23s that the department owed no affirmative duty to
protect a victim of child abuse pursuant to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, highlights the difficulty of bring-
ing § 1983 claims to increase state intervention on behalf of bat-
tered women.23 9 Battered women who have abuse prevention
orders, as distinguished from the DeShaney situation, arguably are
owed a special duty of care because the state has involved itself in
the relations between husband and wife, and the police are di-
rected to enforce the order.2 40 However, § 1983 cannot be used by
most battered women to gain justice for their husbands' abuse.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
Section 1985(3) of chapter 42 of the United States Code pro-
vides a cause of action against private individuals who conspire
"for the purpose of depriving... any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immu-
nities under the laws."241 This section was passed as part of the
236. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264-54 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ("even if a neutral law
has a disproportionately adverse impact upon a racial minority, it is unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause only if that impact can be traced to a dis-
criminatory purpose").
237. See, e.g., Balistreri, 855 F.2d 1421 (original opinion); Hynson v. City of
Chester, Legal Dep't., 864 F.2d 1026, 1027, 1030 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Watson v. City
of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988)); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F.
Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1987), reh' denied sub nom., Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944
(E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated & rem'd, Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 917 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, Dudosh v. Warg, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reh'g granted in part,
Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Thurman, 595 F.
Supp. 1521.
238. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
239. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not at issue in
DeShaney, remains a viable avenue for women's challenges. For a detailed discus-
sion of this and other equal protection claims, see Harper, supra note 216.
240. See Borgmann, supra note 172.
241. The "equal protection of the laws" clause was inserted to distinguish the
legislation from a criminal version of the bill which, it was feared, would be uncon-
stitutionally broad. The criminal statute would have punished "any [conspiratorial]
act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person, which...
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Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and makes private harms actionable
where "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action '24 2 and
the conspiracy aimed at depriving underlying rights protected
against private encroachment. 243
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health C inic,24 4 the U.S.
Supreme Court narrowed the application of this statute by holding
that interference with the claimant's underlying right must be a
conscious, intentional objective of the enterprise, and that the con-
spirators must "act at least, in part, for the purpose of producing"
deprivation of it.245 By finding that abortion protestors did not in-
fringe upon or intend to infringe upon the right of interstate
travel, and that the right to abortion is not protected against pri-
vate infringement, the U.S. Supreme Court largely eradicated this
provision because virtually every conspiracy could articulate a pur-
pose that would exclude application of § 1985(3).
Further, the majority of the Supreme Court has not estab-
lished that gender-based animus is covered by § 1985(3),246
although gender may be recognized as a protected category. In
United Board of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott,2 4 7 the Supreme
Court stated that "it is a close question whether Section 1985(3)
was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus
against Negroes and those who championed their cause."2 48
Many lower courts consider "gender" to be a class covered by
would... constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery,
assault and battery, perjury .... ." CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68
(1871), cited in Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement. of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3):
A Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 88, 88 n.3 (1985) thereinafter
Limiting Strategy Gone Awry].
242. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971) (because the statute re-
quires demonstration of intent to deprive a person of "equal protection" of the
laws, "there must be some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously dis-
criminatory animus behind the conspirator's action."). The Court in GrWin ap-
plied an intent analysis to these claims which resembles that applied to claims
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
243. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1983).
244. -U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 753, 61 U.S.L.W. 4080 (1993).
245. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4083.
246. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4081. But see Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366 (1979), where Justice White indicated in his dissent that "sex discrimi-
nation may be sufficiently invidious to come within the prohibition of Section
1985(3)." 44 U.S. at 389 n.6 (White, J., dissenting).
247. 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (holding that a conspiracy against workers who refused
to join a union was not covered by § 1985(3) because Congress did not intend to
reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic
views, status or activities).
248. Id. at 836.
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§ 1983(5).249 In Bray, without recognizing that gender is reached
by § 1985(3), the Supreme Court narrowed the potential future ap-
plication of § 1985(3) claims based on gender animus. The Court
rejected the argument that opposition to abortion is a purpose fo-
cused on women by reason of their sex,25 0 despite the fact that the
protesters in that case targeted women "because of their capacity
to become pregnant and to have an abortion."25 1
In addition to the difficulties of proving intent to deprive one
of specific underlying rights, and gaining recognition of § 1985(3)
coverage of gender animus, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
private defendant acted in conspiracy with another 25 2 - not the
common experience of women abused by their domestic partners.
It is unlikely, after Bray, that many battered women could use the
§ 1985(3) cause of action to challenge private conspiracies with
gender-based animus to deprive them of substantive rights that are
protected against private deprivation. The original spirit of
§ 1985(3), that Congress constitutionally can remedy some private
acts of discrimination on the basis of race and other class designa-
tions, should be extended in support of new federal civil rights leg-
islation designed to end discrimination and violence against
women.253
D. Title VII-42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Title VII provides a mechanism to eradicate discrimination
249. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d.
Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), on remand 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 440 (W.D. Pa 1980); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th
Cir. 1988) (conspiracies discriminating against persons on the basis of sex covered
by § 1985(3)); Stathos v. Bowen, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (discrimination on the
basis of sex is sufficient to bring a § 1985(3) action), cert denied, 459 U.S. 907
(1982); Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1982) (§ 1985(3) can be used
against conspiracies against classes defined by sex).
250. Bray, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4082.
251. Id. at 4096 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. By the explicit terms of the statute, § 1985(3) claims may be brought against
conspiracies, "two or more persons," and not individual defendants. Plaintiffs must
show injury resulting from an overt act resulting from a conspiratorial agreement,
"a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [was] known to each
person who is to be held responsible for its consequences." Hampton v. Harahan,
600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 447 U.S. 754
(1980), cited in 2 STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILrrY REPORTER
4 (1991)[hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS REPORTER]. Although proof of a conspiracy is ex-
ceedingly difficult, circumstantial evidence can be relied upon to establish the exist-
ence of an agreement, a "meeting of the minds," to achieve the conspiracy's
objectives. Id.
253. See infra § IV.
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against women and minorities in employment.254 It prohibits pri-
vate employment decisions, and their consequences, that discrimi-
nate against a person or class of persons "because of... sex."' 55
Thus, Title VII provides a valuable tool that reaches private actors
in their acts of sex discrimination. However, the statutory applica-
tion of Title VII to employment prohibits most battered women
from using it to remedy abusive acts of their domestic partners.
Because of the similarities of the contexts, however, Title VII has
been designated as the model for the VAWA's proposed cause of ac-
tion for women to be free from gender-motivated violence.25
Title VII's statutory prohibition against employment discrimi-
nation because of sex has evolved into discrete jurisprudential the-
ories.257 "Disparate treatment" addresses employment decisions
that, on their face, demonstrate denial of employment opportuni-
ties on the basis of gender. "Disparate impact" deals with situa-
tions where facially neutral decisions or standards adversely effect
women, members of a protected group. Finally, "hostile environ-
ment" and sexual harassment claims have evolved in the Title VII
jurisprudence.258
A meaningful expansion of the original Title VII remedies25 9
renders Title VII an effective tool for women seeking broad re-
dress and elimination of sex discrimination in employment. Puni-
tive and compensatory damages are available for Title VII
plaintiffs who can prove claims for unlawful, intentionally discrim-
inatory practices. 260 These provisions are accompanied by others
254. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701 et seq., 78 Stat. 253 (1964) was codified, as
amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1992).
255. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individuals' race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
256. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50.
257. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate
Treatment Analysis On Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 734, 734
(1987).
258. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
259. The relief afforded victims of private employment discrimination under Ti-
tle VII was primarily remedial prior to the recent amendments to Title VII in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1992).
260. Punitive damages are awarded to complaining parties who can demonstrate
that the "respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory prac-
tices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of
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which impose a severe and controversial cap on damages, generous
attorneys fees and allowance for jury trials.26 1 Title VII relief is
designed to "remedy the harm done to the individual plaintiff, and
also to deter future acts of discrimination by the defendant and
other employers." 262 Similarly, VAWA relief should remedy the
harms done to individuals and deter future acts of gender-moti-
vated violence outside of employment.
E. Federal Hate Crime Statistics and Reporting Act
The federal Hate Crime Statistics and Reporting Act263 pro-
vides for the acquisition and publication of data about crimes that
manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual ori-
entation or ethnicity. 26 4 It explicitly does not create a cause of ac-
tion or a right to bring an action for discrimination.26 5 Despite the
testimony of women's advocacy groups such as the National Or-
ganization of Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, major
proponents of the federal Hate Crimes Statistics and Reporting
Act chose not to lobby for inclusion of crimes against women in
the provisions of the statute. They were concerned that crimes
against women would overwhelm the other statistics, bury crimes
against Blacks, Jews, homosexuals and other minorities into insig-
nificance, and not serve women with the special attention rape,
sexual assault and domestic violence need and deserve. 26 6 Under
an expanded definition which includes crimes of gender bias, more
than half of the population theoretically might qualify as victims
of hate crimes although the crimes themselves would be charged
under more specific laws.
The choice to exclude women, however, may also have been
due to a perception that an individual animus truly underlies do-
an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981a(b)(1) (1993). Punitive and compensa-
tory damages, however, are not available for those who succeed in disparate impact
claims. Id. at § (a)(1).
261. Pursuant to the new act, a jury trial is now electable by any party if the
complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages. Id. at § (c)(1).
262. Dale Carpenter, Bumping the Status Quo: Actual Relief for Actual Victims
Under Title VII, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1991) (citing Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
263. The Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, codified at 28
U.S.C. § 534 (1992). See generally Bringing Hate Crimes Into Focus, 26 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 261 (1991).
264. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1992).
265. Id. at § (b)(3).
266. Telephone interview with Stave Freeman, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith in New York (Apr. 1991). See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH,
HATE CRIMES STATUTEs: A RESPONSE TO ANTI-SEMITISM, VANDALISM, AND VIOLENT
BIGOTRY, Appendix A (Supp. 1990) (excluding sex or gender-motivated intimidation
from their model legislation) [hereinafter ADL RESPONSE].
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mestic violence and that sexual assaults do not reflect gender-bias
sufficient to constitute hate crime. The VAWA civil rights propo-
sal, in contrast, declares gender-motivated crimes of violence to be
bias crimes and provides a federal civil rights remedy for women
to bring claims.267
IV. Proposed Federal Legislation: Title M of the Violence Against
Women Act
No federal legislation has been enacted specifically to address
deprivation of civil rights through gender-motivated violence
outside of employment. The 101st268 and 102nd Congresses at-
tempted to do just that through the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA). The 102nd Congress introduced S. 15269 (1991 Senate
VAWA) and H.R. 1502270 (1991 House VAWA), but failed to enact
the law. The 103rd Congress introduced S. 11 on January 26, 1993
(Senate VAWA)271 and H.R. 1133 on February 24, 1993 (House
VAWA).272 Title III may be cited as the "Civil Rights Remedies for
Gender-Motivated Violence Act."273 Although Congress intended
to protect women from violence on the streets and in the home by
proposing the VAWA, changes should be made before it is passed
by the 103rd Congress to reflect the needs of battered women and
to provide a meaningful civil rights cause of action to address vio-
lence against women.
A VAWA A Federal Substantive Right to be Free From
Gender-Motivated Crimes of Violence
Congress introduced the VAWA in recognition that what has
been considered private criminal activity between individuals -
such as rape or wife abuse - often, in fact, constitutes a pattern of
civil rights abuses on the streets and in the homes of America.
"[C]rimes motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes
267. See infra § IV.
268. See Violence Against Women Act, S. 2754, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [here-
inafter 1990 Senate VAWA]; H.R. 5468, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990) [hereinafter 1990
House VAWA].
269. Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. 15, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 Senate VAWA].
270. Violence Against Women Act of 1991, H.R. 1502, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 House VAWA]. On September 24, 1992, in the last month of
the Congress, the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice reported out
the Subcommittee Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 1502, which
failed to include the civil rights section because that committee did not have juris-
diction over it.
271. S. 11, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [Senate VAWA].
272. H.R. 1133, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [House VAWA].
273. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 301.
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in violation of the victim's right to be free from discrimination on
the basis of gender."274 State and federal criminal laws fail to pro-
tect adequately "against the bias element of gender crimes, which
separates these crimes from acts of random violence" and fail to
"provide victims the opportunity to vindicate their interests."275
New legislation is necessary since civil rights remedies exist for vi-
olent discrimination because of race, religion or political beliefs276
and for gender-motivated "crimes committed in the workplace, but
not for gender crimes committed on the street or in the home."277
"It is the fundamental purpose of title III of the Violence Against
Women Act to correct that imbalance by providing these victims
with an effective antidiscrimination remedy for violently ex-
pressed prejudice."278
Congress' power to enact Title III of the VAWA arises from
many sources including the Commerce Clause because the legisla-
tion addresses the national costs of violence against women, and
the Fourteenth Amendment because it promotes the equality of
women.279 In addition, Title III protects the rights and immunities
of national citizenship and promotes the Thirteenth Amendment's
moral imperatives of freedom from involuntary servitude.28 o Pas-
sage of legislation that creates a federal civil rights remedy may
help eradicate gender-motivated violence. Such a goal, however,
may not be achieved by the existing legislative proposal.
The analysis in this section depends to a large extent on the
experience and scholarship of rape prosecution and Title VII hos-
tile environment sexual harassment claims. The comparison is
helpful because language of the VAWA approximates Title VII and
because violence against women at work, on the streets and in the
home share many characteristics. Lessons should be learned from
others who have litigated similar claims.
B. The VAWA Proposed Standards
1. The Federal Right and Cause of Action
The VAWA bills would create a new substantive federal right
274. Id. at § 302(a)(1); House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(a)(1).
275. See, Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(a)(3); House VAWA, supra note
272, at § 301(a)(3).
276. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 42.
277. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(a)(2); House VAWA, supra note 272,
at § 301(a)(2).
278. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 42.
279. Prepared testimony of Professors Cass Sunstein and Burt Neuborne, sub-
mitted to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Apr. 9, 1991 (on




to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender and pro-
vide a federal cause of action for plaintiffs who are victims of such
crimes. Title III, § 302(b) of the Senate VAWA provides, "All per-
sons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection
(d))."281 The distinctive aspect of this right is that by proving a
gender-motivated crime of violence was committed against her, a
plaintiff establishes that she has been deprived of her civil rights.
No further demonstration of a separate deprivation of rights, privi-
leges or immunities is necessary. The proposed legislation expands
claimants' actionable rights by creating one.
The Senate VAWA establishes a cause of action to enforce the
newly recognized federal right at § 302(c):
A person (including a person who acts under color of any stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who
commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus de-
prives another of the right declared in subsection (b) shall be
liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declara-
tory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.282
The language of § 302(c) clearly provides a cause of action for
a plaintiff who can prove that a "crime of violence" was committed
and that it was "motivated by gender." The VAWA does not re-
quire a prior criminal complaint, prosecution or conviction to es-
tablish the elements of a cause of action.2a3 The Senate VAWA
language suggests that a "crime of violence motivated by gender"
is not only a per se violation of the federal right recognized and
actionable under this section, but the only type of deprivation ac-
tionable pursuant to this section. In contrast to prior versions of
this section,28 4 the 103rd Senate clearly indicates that plaintiffs
281. Senate VAWA, supra note 271. The 1991 version of the Senate bill left open
some questions about the need to prove underlying rights. Senate VAWA, supra
note 271, at § 301(b) provides, "All persons within the United States shall have the
same rights, privileges and immunities in every State as is enjoyed by all other per-
sons to be free from crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender, as defined
in subsection (d)." House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(b) provides, "[A]ll indi-
viduals within the United States, and the Special Maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States, shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by the victim's gender."
282. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(c).
283. See id. at § 302(e)(2); House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(d)(2).
284. 1991 Senate VAWA, supra note 269, at § 301(c) provided.
Any person, including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of
the rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws as enumerated in subsection (b) shall be liable to the party in-
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need not demonstrate an underlying, separate deprivation of
rights, privileges or immunities 285 that occurred as a consequence
of the crime.
The cause of action section of the House VAWA articulates
this more clearly but substantially creates the same cause of action
as the Senate VAWA. The House VAWA reads: "Any person ...
who deprives an individual of the right secured by subsection (b)
shall be liable to the individual injured .... "2 8 6 The House VAWA
explicitly enumerates the scope of the VAWA civil rights remedy
as congruous with the newly recognized VAWA federal right set
forth in subsection (b).287 Properly construed, the House and Sen-
ate VAWA bills establish the same right and cause of action with
slightly different language.
The Title III remedy is available to men as well as women
whose civil rights are violated on the basis of gender. The lan-
guage of the statute is gender-neutral. In civil rights cases brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, whites have sought relief from depri-
vation of their civil rights as a result of association with blacks.28 8
This relief is in keeping with the racial character of the rights be-
ing protected,289 and would suggest that men who support the
rights of women and are targeted as the victim of a crime of vio-
lence because of that support would have an actionable claim
under Title III if they plead the civil rights deprivation with
particularity.290
The relief available for successful Title III claimants includes
"compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as the court may deem appropriate." 291
jured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, injunctive and declaratory relief, or such other relief as the court
may deem appropriate.
285. Compare id. with House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(c).
286. House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(c).
287. Id.
288. See Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989)
(Q 1981 claim allowed on the basis of white attorney's allegations of discrimination
due to his association with blacks); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439,
1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (white employee may maintain § 1981 action on the basis of
allegations that he was terminated for assisting a black employee).
289. See Beyond Black and White, supra note 223, at 824 n.11 (citing, inter alia,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 287 ( 1981 covers white plain-
tiffs because of the "racial character of the rights being protected")).
290. But cf. Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572-573 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting a
§ 1981 cause of action the for retaliation for support of political causes favored by
minorities).
291. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(c). See also House VAWA, supra
note 272, at § 301(c).
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The Senate VAWA provides for attorneys fees,2 9 2 pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988,293 to promote use of the Title III remedy. The
House appears to have dropped the attorneys fees provision of the
VAWA, which seriously impairs the ability of potential litigants to
bring claims.294 The House should amend the VAWA to provide
for payment of attorneys fees in order to encourage enforcement
of the VAWA right and to insure that Title III claimants have the
same protection as claimants who file under other federal civil
rights laws. The VAWA does not limit damages for claimants who
demonstrate injury arising from crimes of violence motivated by
gender.295
The special and general damages and civil rights harms aris-
ing from gender-motivated violence will reflect the context in
which the claims arise. Compensation should include, inter alia:
past and future medical and non-medical care, treatment and serv-
ices; temporary and permanent disability and disfigurement, in-
cluding psychological impairment; damaged property; past and
future lost wages and earning capacity; past and future pain and
suffering and emotional distress. Claimants could seek general
damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, including the stigma of
victimization and the shattering of identity, confidence and image.
Wife abuse also threatens confidence in intimate relations and
trust of others altogether. Some battered women may suffer from
post traumatic stress disorder 296 or other psychological injuries. A
survivor's ability to engage in work place and community activities
may be impeded by injuries, psychological trauma and fear of re-
taliation for assertions of independence.297
Although the terms of the House and Senate VAWA bills pro-
292. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 303.
293. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.
294. Past versions of the House VAWA included attorneys fees provisions. See
1991 House VAWA, supra note 270, at § 302.
295. In contrast, Title VII prevents damage awards in the event of a successful
"same-decision" defense. See supra § IV.B.3.c.i. (Title VII disparate treatment,
same-decision defense). See also Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction, and
Legislative Response: The 1989 Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of
1990, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475, 533-34 (1990) [hereinafter Reconstruction,
Deconstruction] (citing Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-
Motive Title VII Action A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 318
(1982)). Further, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 102(b)(3), drastically caps the
damage award for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconven-
ience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses" -
by restricting damages on the basis of the respondent's number of employees.
296. AmERicAN PsYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-




vide remedies for many crimes of violence against women, there is
a risk that other provisions of the VAWA and its legislative history
will restrict the scope of its application to paradigm cases unreflec-
tive of the reality of battered women. Such a result may do more
harm than good. The language of the VAWA should be tailored to
achieve the purpose of eradicating gender-motivated violence in
the home as well as in the street and to avoid unnecessary judicial
limitations. The judiciary should allow for broad recovery for bat-
tered women's civil rights deprivations. Limits to the civil rights
remedy, as applied to domestic violence, should arise organically
from the context of wife abuse itself.
Two aspects of the VAWA bill deserve particular attention
and concern for their potentially limiting effects: the definition of
the term "crime of violence" and the interpretation of "gender mo-
tivation." These features of the VAWA will require judicial inter-
pretation. Although the terms may be construed broadly, they
may work in tandem to provide access for only a subset of the indi-
viduals victimized by gender-motivated crime and may send the
wrong message to women that their experience of civil rights dep-
rivation is not meaningful or legally cognizable.
2. The Term "Crime of Violence"
a. Definition of "Crime of Violence": 18 U.S.C. § 16 and
Its Interpretation
The statutory definition of "crime of violence" can be ana-
lyzed by reviewing the legislative history of Title III of the VAWA
and by considering how the term has been judicially interpreted in
other contexts.
The Senate VAWA defines a "crime of violence" by reference
to the definition at 18 U.S.C. § 16.298 This definition broadly de-
scribes offenses that have "as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another... or any other offense that is a felony and, by its na-
ture, involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in
the course of commiting one offense,"2 99 whether or not those acts
298. See Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(d)(2). This section provides:
(2) the term 'crime of violence' means an act or series of acts that
would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described
in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, whether or not these acts
have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction
and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime,
territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
299. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1991) defines "crimes of violence" as follows:
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have resulted in actual charges or prosecution. 300
The plain language of the Senate VAWA, defining crimes of
violence as those which include, as an element, the "use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force," should be con-
strued to cover many types of violence battered women
experience. The definition requires evaluation of state or federal
statutes to determine whether the particular crime includes an el-
ement of force. Because the federal remedy is not limited to any
particular crime of violence, the definition would be flexible,
although nationally inconsistent, due to state criminal law varia-
tions. Crimes of violence are not always categorized as felonies, so
misdemeanor crimes involving the use of force against the person
also qualify as crimes of violence pursuant to the Senate VAWA. A
plain reading of the definition promises relief for crimes com-
monly associated with domestic violence - assault and battery,
rape, kidnapping and homicide.301
The House also defined "crime of violence" by reference to
section 16 of title 18, U.S.C., but limited the civil cause of action
pursuant to Title III to felonies.302 This may jeopardize some wo-
men s use of the remedy, especially in the context of domestic vio-
lence, where prosecutors bring misdemeanor charges for most
crimes.3 03 However, where a lesser offense applies simply because
of the relationship between the parties, the civil rights action
would be available if the crime of violence would constitute a fel-
ony if it were between strangers.3 04 This provision, necessary if a
The term "crime of violence" means -
(a) an offense that has as an element of use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of an-
other, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, in-
volves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or prop-
erty of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
300. See Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(e)(2).
301. See supra § H(D)(1) (criminal remedies).
302. House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(e)(2)(A):
The term crime of violence means -
(A) a State or Federal offense that -
(i) is of a kind described in section 16 of title 18, United States
Code; and
(ii) may be punished by a maximum term of imprisonment ex-
ceeding one year; or
(B) any action taken that would constitute such offense but for the
relationship between the person who takes such action and the indi-
vidual against whom such action is taken; whether or not such offense
or such action results in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction
303. See infa notes 332-340 and accompanying text.
304. House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(e)(2)(B).
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felony crime provision is included in Title III, addresses the gender
bias inherent in some state laws.
Judicial interpretation of the term of art "crime of violence"
is complicated, however, by the fact that it has been incorporated
and developed in the context of criminal sentencing legislation and
case law. The term "crime of violence" and its definition found at
18 U.S.C. § 16 were incorporated in the Career Offender Statute,305 .
pursuant to which comprehensive sentencing guidelines and com-
mentary on the "crime of violence" provision were promulgated.3 08
The Sentencing Commission subsequently amended its guide-
lines3 07 to eliminate any reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16 and redefined
the term in a more inclusive fashion.308 Thus, the current sentenc-
ing guidelines have no binding effect on the interpretation of the
VAWA. However, courts may look to this case law in an effort to
interpret "crime of violence." This examination demonstrates that
a term's interpretation for one purpose may not serve another.
Congress should elaborate on the contours of the term and provide
more specific guidance to trial courts and potential battered wo-
men claimants.
The current United States Sentencing Guidelines permit in-
creased sentences if, inter alia, the defendant is convicted of a
crime of violence.3 09 For purposes of the career offender statute,
"crime of violence" is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) as follows:
any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year that - (i) has an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise in-
volves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.3 10
The original 18 U.S.C. § 16 "crime of violence" was interpreted in
the career offender context to require demonstration of a crime
which actually or potentially involved intentional use of force.311 ,
Yet, the latter prong of the current Sentencing Commission in-
305. Although the statute, at 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), did not include the definition'
explicitly, the legislative history confirms this definition was meant to appl r
throughout the comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, of which it was part.,
United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 864 (3rd Cir. 1992).
306. See United States v. Coble, 756 F. Supp. 470, 471 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
307. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANuAL APPEN-
DIX C 110-11 (Nov. 1991) (text of amendment 268, including revisions from the ear-
lier version of U.S.S.G. § 4BI.2(I)), cited in Parson, 955 F.2d at 865. See also United
States v. Wright, 968 F.2d 1167 (11th Cir. 1992).
308. See Coble, 756 F. Supp. at 471.
309. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1).
310. 18 U.S.C. App. § 4B1.2(1) (1992).
311. Parson, 955 F.2d at 860.
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quiry, which deviates from 18 U.S.C. § 16, asks only for potential
risk of physical injury; no specific intent would be required in
some cases and reckless endangerment might qualify as a "crime
of violence."3' 12 Pursuant to the VAWA definition as originally in-
terpreted in the career offender context, battered women would
still have to prove intent to use force in order to demonstrate com-
mission of a "crime of violence."
The Sentencing Commission's definition of "crime of vio-
lence" also represents incorporation of aspects of a 1986 "violent
felony" definition found in a sentence enhancement provision at 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).3 13 "Violent felony"31 4 has a meaning in-
dependent of "crimes of violence," however, and should not be ap-
plied in VAWA jurisprudence unless it is incorporated explicitly by
Congress.
The sentencing guidelines require a determination of
whether a defendant has committed past crimes of violence. The
Sentencing Commission has suggested a three-tiered approach to
proof. Although this suggested approach is not judicially bind-
ing,31 5 it has been adopted by some circuits and should be consid-
ered for the model of proof it offers VAWA civil rights claimants.
Clearly, sentencing proceedings do not recognize the same proce-
dural protections accorded defendants during trial. This compari-
son suggests only that plaintiffs should be allowed alternative
ways of setting forth a prima facie case. Defendants still should
have all the protections of the judicial process including their right
to rebut and challenge the plaintiff's prima facie case.
312. As the Third Circuit noted in a plea to the Commission to change the guide-
lines, "crimes such as drunk driving and child neglect present a serious risk of
physical harm to a victim and therefore qualify as predicate 'crimes of violence' for
purposes of the career offender Guideline." Id. at 874. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16
(1991), supra note 299.
313. See id. at 868-71.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 739 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1990). In Mathis,
the D.C. court discussed the term violent felony as defined at § 924(e)(2)(B), and
affirmed that it means
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that - (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or other-
wise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
Id. at 16. In deciding whether an offense is a "violent felony" pursuant to
§ 924(e)(1), a "court must examine the statute of the offense and determine
whether it has 'as an element' the use of force; the court should not examine the
actual conduct underlying the offense." Id. at 17 (citing United States v. Head-
speth, 852 F.2d 753, 756 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996,
1005-06 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988)).
315. United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989).
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First, the Sentencing Guidelines application note sets forth
per se "crimes of violence": "murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion,
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling."3 1 6
The application note explicitly includes an attempt to commit such
an offense as a "crime of violence." 317 In addition, the application
note defines two other categories of offenses as included in the
term of art, "crimes of violence."318 The first of these definition-
ally includes an element of force. "[Wlhere... that offense has an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use, of physical
force against the person of another," 19 it is a crime of violence.
The last prong differs from the 18 U.S.C. § 16 definition and allows
courts to engage in a fact-based analysis of the actual offense to de-
termine whether "the conduct set forth in the count of which the
defendant was convicted included use of explosives (including any
explosive material or destructive device) or, by its nature,
presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 20
The application note "reveals the Sentencing Commission's intent
to establish three independent ways by which the government may
prove that a defendant's past conviction was for a 'crime of
violence.' "321
In practice, the guidelines have been interpreted to include
many offenses as crimes of violence. Burglary of private resi-
dences has been held to be a "crime of violence" since burglary
creates a substantial risk that physical force will be used.3 22 Simi-
larly, pointing a firearm at a person has been held to be a crime of
violence in South Carolina because it is punishable by imprison-
ment of more than one year, constitutes a felony and poses a sub-
stantial risk that force will be used even if it was not actually
used.323 Threats in letters and over the telephone against the life
of the President have been held to be crimes of violence,3 2 4 as has
316. U.S.S.G., 18 U.S.C. App. § 4B1, Application Note 2 (1992), quoted in Parson,
955 F.2d at 871 (listing per se crimes of violence).
317. U.S.S.G., 18 U.S.C. App. § 4B1, Application Note 1 (1992).
318. See Parson, 955 F.2d at 871 (quoting Sentencing Guideline Application Note
2).
319. U.S.S.G., 18 U.S.C. App. § 4B1, Application Note 2 (1992).
320. Id.
321. Parson, 955 F.2d at 871 (citing United States v. John, 936 F.2d 764, 767 (3d
Cir. 1991)).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Davis, 881 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1989).
323. United States v. Thompson, 891 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1989), reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, (Jan. 30, 1990) cert. denied, 495 U.S. 922 (1990).
324. See United States v. McCaleb, 908 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1990) (violation of 18
U.S.C. § 871 is crime of violence); United States v. Poff, 723 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ind.
1989). In Poff, a woman was convicted of threatening the President in letters and
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the mailing of a threatening letter despite the writer's imprison-
ment and contemporaneous inability to act on the threat.3 25 Of-
fenses categorized as assault and battery also should be included as
crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 and the VAWA.
Lesser use of force has been held to constitute a crime of vio-
lence for purposes of sentencing. Sandwiching a target of a pick-
pocket in a crowded public bus has been suggested, in dicta, to
constitute "force."326 The defendant used force where his role was
"to bump up against the victim, i.e. to use 'physical force against
the person of another' in order to distract her."327 "'Force' simply
means 'power made operative against resistance; exertion.' "328
This definition of force should not require a focus on the plaintiff's
resistance to define a crime of violence. Instead, it is crucial that
the violent behavior itself be the target of the law's prohibition
and that a low threshold of force constitute a "crime of violence"
for purposes of VAWA claims.
Despite the apparent broad interpretation of "crime of vio-
lence" in the Sentencing Guideline context, there is reason to be
concerned that judicial construction of the "crimes of violence" el-
ement of the VAWA civil rights cause of action may serve to limit
the types of crimes that will be actionable. Limitations may arise
from the legislative history of the VAWA and gender bias in the
courts as experienced by victims of rape who have brought forth
similar claims and have faced significant hurdles in the demonstra-
tion of "force." In particular, the language of Title 18 resembles
language in some state rape statutes that require proof of force be-
yond nonconsensual sex.3 2 9
The Senate Judiciary Committee anticipated the risk that
VAWA limitations would arise as a result of misunderstandings of
the pervasiveness and severity of domestic violence. It acknowl-
edged the immensity of the domestic violence situation in its re-
port to the full Senate to counter assumptions that domestic
violence is just a "trivial squabble, a push or a shove." 330 This and
other legislative history of the VAWA suggests that the Judiciary
in telephone threats and was sentenced for "crimes of violence" because each of the
pertinent crimes had as an element the "threatened use of physical force against
person or property of another" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
325. United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1990).
326. See Mathis, 739 F. Supp. at 17 (citing Hooks v. United States, 373 A.2d 909
(D.C. App. 1977)).
327. Id. at 18.
328. Id. (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 513 (1981)).
329. See Willis, supra note 57, at 2213.
330. VAWA Report 1990, supra note 9, at 38.
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Committee intends a broad interpretation of the term "crime of vi-
olence," which would cover the majority of incidents of domestic
violence.
In fact, one-third of all such (domestic violence) incidents, if
reported, would be classified as felony rape, robbery, or aggra-
vated assault; the remaining two-thirds involve bodily injury at
least as serious as the injury inflicted in 90 percent of all rob-
beries and aggravated assaults. Far worse, family violence may
account for a significant number of murders in this country;
last year, one-third of all women murdered in America were
murdered by present or former husbands or boyfriends.331
With this characterization, the Senate Judiciary Committee
acknowledges that most wife abuse qualifies as crimes of violence
actionable in the civil courts pursuant to the VAWA if it is moti-
vated by gender. Contrasting statements indicate, however, that
"[t]he cause of action provided under Title III is strictly limited to
violent felonies 'motivated by gender."' 3 32  And the House
amended its cause of action to include only violent felony crimes
or misdemeanor crimes where the same action between people in
different relationship to one another would constitute a felony.
333
If Title III of the VAWA were to allow civil rights claims only
by victims of felonious crimes, much of the pattern domestic vio-
lence - assault and battery - that women face might not be cov-
ered by the VAWA.334 Typically, domestic assaults are classified by
prosecutors as misdemeanors.33 5 The felony requirement would
exacerbate a significant problem resulting from linking the exist-
ence of a federal civil right remedy to state and federal criminal
law: individual federal civil rights will be consistent as to the fed-
eral crimes, but will vary depending upon state statutory elements
and classifications of crime and discretionary ranking of felonies
and misdemeanors. Linkages to state law may replicate the diffi-
culties battered women have had with police and prosecutorial
non-enforcement of domestic violence crimes and the fact that the
331. Id.
332. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). It should be noted that this language apparently
was intended to compare the VAWA claim, which requires proof of discriminatory
motivation, from "random assaults and beatings" which, some argue, might be read
to create a general federal tort law. Id. The "motivated by gender" restriction does
prevent this legislation from becoming a federal tort law. Furthermore, preoccupa-
tion with placing limits on the remedy should be abandoned for an embrace of the
civil rights action as a tool to end wife abuse. Placing restrictions on its use to cover
only "felonious" violence does not serve the remedial purpose of the legislation. It
should be clear to Senator Biden and the Senate Judiciary Committee that repeated
assaults and beatings of wives should be considered as anything but "random."
333. See supra notes 302 and 304.
334. See generally supra § II.D.1. (criminal remedies).
335. Women and Violence, supra note 13 (testimony of Sarah M. Buel).
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severity of punishment accorded perpetrators of wife abuse has
been traditionally less than that accorded to defendants who as-
sault strangers. The House VAWA addresses this issue by theoreti-
cally making such gender-motivated crimes actionable,33 6 but the
practical effect of the extra step - the need to determine what
crimes would constitute felonies if between strangers - may add
uncertainty where it need not exist. Congress should use the Title
III civil rights statute to eradicate violence against women, not
limit it unnecessarily to exclude some battered women.
Interpretation that limits the scope of the VAWA to "feloni-
ous" crime also runs contrary to the term of art "crime of vio-
lence" as it is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, although the one year
prison term limit that defines the felony has been incorporated in
the sentencing guidelines. Further, restriction to felonious crime
is not necessary to prevent over use of the remedy. Private law-
suits are not practicable unless the defendant has income or assets
with which to pay a judgment. This places a practical limit on the
number of claims that will be brought. Further, the Judiciary
Committee has placed alternative limits on the application of the
cause of action by requiring proof of gender motivation. "In order
for a cause of action to arise under title III, the plaintiff must
prove that the crime of violence -whether an assault, a kidnap-
ping, or a rape - was motivated by gender."337 In the preceding
quote, "assault," levels of which constitute misdemeanor crime, is
clearly listed as an actionable civil rights violation.
Most importantly, imposing a felony crime floor for a civil
rights cause of action would dilute the essence of the right to be
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender. Violent attacks
because of gender cause civil rights injuries that are far deeper,
and carry broader significance, than the physical manifestations of
those attacks. Indeed, it is the unique civil rights injury to the vic-
tim and the reverberations of violence directed by animus beyond
that individual to other members of the class that makes this legis-
lation necessary. Limitations on civil rights based on the extent of
injury, the intent of the actor to injure and the means used338
serve to perpetuate violence motivated by gender. Like courts that
allowed wife abuse provided the implement of abuse was the size
of the man's thumb or less, 339 the felony crime restriction provides
336. See supra note 304.
337. VAWA Report 1990, supra note 9, at 49.
338. See supra note 132 (degree of assault).
339. See supra note 87 (Rule of Thumb).
1992]
Law and Inequality
a similar severity limitation to gender-motivated violence without
addressing the essence of the problem.
There should be no floor restriction on the level of crimes of
violence actionable pursuant to Title III. "The only remedy title
III provides is for violent crimes motivated by gender discrimina-
tion."3 40 Violent crimes should be interpreted synonymously with
"crimes of violence" as set forth and defined by the statute
through reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16.
b. Unnecessary Limitations: The "Crime of Violence"
Requirement
The creation of a federal substantive civil right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender promises a powerful
remedy to survivors of wife abuse. However, the VAWA's required
proof of gender-motivated "crimes of violence," regardless of the
felony requirement, in and of itself places an unnecessary burden
on plaintiffs who bring civil claims for sex-based deprivations of
their civil rights. The requirement that all civil rights deprivations
motivated by gender should be limited to occasions of "crimes"
demonstrates congressional refusal to promote equal rights for wo-
men more generally. At a minimum, Congress should broaden the
scope of the remedy to cover acts of violence, regardless of
whether all of the required criminal elements are present.
Imposition of the "crime of violence" requirement may limit
actionable gender-based discrimination claims by battered women.
Higher standards of proof, imported from criminal laws, may be
applied in civil gender-based discrimination trials using the "crime
of violence" designation 34 1 than would be applied in a civil rights
action using an "acts" of violence standard. A Title III claimant
will have to prove that a "crime of violence" motivated by gender
was committed against her to establish a prima facie civil rights
case. Although the Senate Judiciary Committee built a portion of
the VAWA, Title II, on the philosophy that "spouse abuse must be
treated just as seriously as any other violent crime,"3 42 the judicial
impulse may be to limit the category of "crimes of violence" ac-
tionable by battered women in the civil context. In contrast, Cali-
fornia's civil rights law does not limit civil claims to a criminal law
standard but recognizes a "right to be free from any violence, or
intimidation by threat of violence... because of sex."3 43 Congress
340. VAWA Report 1990, supra note 9, at 49.
341. Willis, supra note 57, at 2214.
342. VAWA Report 1990, supra note 9, at 39.
343. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51.7 (1992).
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should state explicitly that proof of acts of violence motivated by
gender, including crimes of violence defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16, sus-
tain a prima facie Title III claim.
3. The Term "Motivated by Gender"
a. The Statutory Definition
The Senate VAWA limits the scope of the civil rights cause of
action to those plaintiffs who can prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the crime committed against them was "motivated
by gender." The Senate VAWA provides the following definition:
"(1) the term 'crime of violence motivated by gender' means any
crime of violence... committed because of gender or on the basis
of gender."344 Thus, a "crime of violence motivated by gender" or
a "crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis
of gender" are restatements of the same burden of proof that falls
on the complainant.3 45
The burden of proving motivation is included in the Senate
VAWA as a mechanism to ensure limitation of the use of the rem-
edy to instances of bias crime. By the Senate VAWA's explicit
terms at § 302(e)(1), claimants are not entitled to a "cause of action
under subsection (c) for random acts of violence unrelated to gen-
der or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of
the evidence, to be motivated by gender as defined in subsection
(d)."34 6 The proof of motivation is to be determined from the "to-
tality of the circumstances" surrounding the event.34 7 The Senate
VAWA places no limitations on the context in which plaintiffs can
bring suit, but the comments in the legislative history suggest that
battered women are not the paradigm case.
In comparison, the definition of "crime of violence motivated
by the victim's gender," contained in the House VAWA provides a
general approach like the Senate VAWA cause of action and an al-
ternative way of proving a Title III cause of action for sex
crimes.3 48 "Crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender"
are delineated as "(A) a crime of violence that is rape (excluding
conduct that is characterized as rape solely by virtue of the ages of
the participants), sexual assault, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual
contact; or (B) any other crime of violence committed because of
344. See Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(d)(1).
345. See VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50-51.
346. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(e)(1) (emphasis added).
347. VAWA Report 1990, supra note 9.
348. House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(e)(1).
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gender, or on the basis of gender, of the victim."349 The language
in the House VAWA ends the ambiguity about some of the types of
crimes that would qualify a victim to bring a civil rights cause of
action under this section.3 5 0 Furthermore, it eliminates the need
to prove the gender motivation of sex crimes. The explicit
enumeration of sex crimes, however, represents only one category
of gender-motivated crimes and may discourage some battered wo-
men from seeking civil rights relief.
The House VAWA does provide a remedy for "any other
crime of violence committed because of gender, or on the basis of
gender, of the victim."3 51 This clause, set off from the first cate-
gory of crimes in a different section separated by an "or," should
be interpreted to avoid redundancy and to delineate another cate-
gory of crimes not included in the first. This additional set of
crimes should include most crimes associated with domestic vio-
lence. To make this definition easier to apply to domestic situa-
tions where sex crimes are not a component of the violence,
however, the House VAWA's Title III explicitly should include a
third section that presumes gender motivation where assault and
other violent crimes are committed in the context of battering
relationships.352
b. Legislative History
Despite the neutrality of the Senate VAWA's burden of proof
and standard of persuasion, and in contrast to the conscious por-
trayal of domestic violence as a serious crime in the legislative his-
tory of the VAWA, the Senate Judiciary Committee and Senator
Biden, its Chair, have issued comments on the Senate VAWA gen-
der motivation clause35 3 which call into question the applicability
349. Id.
350. The term "motivated by gender" was defined differently in the original 1990
House VAWA.
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means any crime
of violence, as defined in this section, including rape, sexual assault,
sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, or any other crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender.
1990 House VAWA, supm note 268, at § (d). By clearly separating the sections, the
House VAWA's delineation of sex crimes as crimes of violence motivated by the vic-
tim's gender and others where motivation must be proven serves to expand the
practical usefulness of the remedy for victims of sex crimes.
351. See supm note 349 and accompanying text.
352. See infra notes 483-493.
353. Although a VAWA that establishes alternative burdens of proof of a crime of
violence motivated by the victim's gender is preferrable, it is important to analyze
the Senate VAWA's definition of "gender-motivated crime" for two reasons. First,
the Senate VAWA has been subject to extensive hearings and its Title III has under-
gone amendment from a version substantially similar to the 1991 House VAWA. See
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of the remedy to some situations of domestic violence. In state-
ments by the Senate Judiciary Committee, there appears to be a
misunderstanding of the systematic nature of domestic violence in
which physical abuse characteristically comprises only one ele-
ment of a cycle of control tied to broader systems of male
dominance. 354
[O]ne of the most serious misunderstanding of title III
has concerned its scope. For example, some have wrongly sug-
gested that it will cover random muggings or beatings in the
home or elsewhere. This argument is incorrect and is belied
by the text of the proposed statute: this is a discrimination
statute, not a felony protection bill.355
It is unclear what the committee means by "random... beatings
in the home" and this statement leads advocates to wonder
whether the Senator intends all "beatings in the home" to be ex-
cluded from the scope of the application of Title III.
Without resolving the ambiguity of this statement, the Com-
mittee legitimately distinguishes Title III from a federal divorce
law but acknowledges that married claimants could, in theory, sue
under this law356 for violent crimes motivated by gender. This is a
discrimination law, however, and filing a claim should not extend
federal pendant jurisdiction over state divorce, alimony or custody
claims.357 Yet, to assure the critics that it will not be an over-used
provision or a federal divorce law, the Senate Judiciary Committee
overstates the point by indicating that Title III "does not cover
random beatings in the home or elsewhere."358
Senator Biden personally downplays the extension of Title III
to typical wife abuse. To squelch the fear that the VAWA will be
used in excess, and to counter the estimate that it will impose a
cost of $43.5 million and 450 staff years to the federal courts,35 9
Senator Biden responded:
Title III does not cover everyday domestic violence cases ....
[It] expressly bars any cause of action for a random crime, in-
cluding crimes motivated by personal animosity .... IThe ju-
dicial impact statement of the Administrative Office of the
Courts is based on. *. a reading of the statute that includes
VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at § 2 (Legislative History of the VAWA), § 5, Ti-
tle III (Section by Section Analysis). Second, the latter independent clause of the
House VAWA is the same as the main clause of the Senate's version.
354. See supra § II.B.
355. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 48.
356. Id.
357. House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(d)(3). See also VAWA Report 1991,
supra note 8, at 48.
358. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 48.
359. See id. at 69.
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random crimes and domestic violence cases. Since those cases
cannot be brought under title III, the judicial impact statement
is obviously inaccurate. 360
Despite Senator Biden's statement, some battered women still
could demonstrate the gender motivation of the domestic abuse
levelled against them to distinguish it from "random violence" not
covered by Title III.
These statements of the Senate Committee and its chair are
shocking reminders that "everyday domestic violence" still can be
viewed as something other than discrimination against women and
an inherent building block of women's subordination. Despite the
testimony submitted before it, these statements add to the diffi-
culty of battered women by somehow distinguishing violence they
face from a domestic partner, someone with whom they have inti-
mate relations, from violence inflicted by those whom they may
encounter outside of the family. Such distinctions do not belong in
legislation that purports to address violence against women by pro-
viding a civil rights remedy.
In contrast, the VAWA legislative history includes statements
that support the concept that no one should have the privilege, es-
pecially by marriage, to infringe upon the civil rights of another.
The literal terms of the VAWA cause of action have a broad scope,
not in any way limited by marriage. Marriage does not translate
violence against women, an "assault on a commonly shared ideal of
equality,"361 into personal animosity. As is clear from the patterns
of violence against women, marriage is an institution which medi-
ates between violent social enforcement of male domination and
family relations.362
Most importantly, in the context of committee testimony and
discussion of wife abuse, Chairman Biden agreed with the state-
ment of Dr. Browne that the legislation is important because it
makes a louder statement that wife abuse "is criminal, that in this
country this is not accepted, nor will it be tolerated, in fact."363
Mr. Biden said, "[t]hat is why, ... I made it a civil rights offense, in
addition .... The ultimate sanction, beyond a prison term, that
can be applied in this society is to say that you violated the civil
rights of someone else."364
The 103rd Congress explicitly should expand upon support
for Title III claims brought by battered women. Indeed, based on
360. Id. at 69-70.
361. Id. at 49.
362. See supra § II.B.2.




the gender-role enforcing aspects of wife abuse and its effect in
systematically controlling and degrading women as a group, re-
peated wife abuse365 should be presumed to be a gender-motivated
act of violence. Review of similar civil rights laws should assure
Congress and the Executive Branch that Title III's burden of proof
and standards of persuasion, in addition to the financial limitations
inherent in bringing private law suits, practically will restrict ac-
cess and not swamp the federal courts with new claims.
c. Title VI. Guidance to Proof
The VAWA's gender motivation standard, because of gender
or on the basis of gender, will be interpreted like similar motiva-
tion standards set forth in Title VII and other federal discrimina-
tion law. "Proof of 'gender-motivation' under Title III should
proceed in the same ways proof of race or sex discrimination pro-
ceeds under other civil rights laws."366 Discriminatory motive is
concerned with the question of whether the defendant's action or
choice of victim was affected by the victim's membership in a pro-
tected group. Some federal discrimination causes of action require
proof of actual discriminatory intent;367 other federal discrimina-
tion provisions, such as Title VII disparate impact and hostile envi-
ronment claims, allow for demonstration of discriminatory
motivation without proof of the defendant's actual intent to dis-
criminate. Because VAWA Title III is linked to Title VII for inter-
pretation, proof of gender-motivation is required but proof of the
defendant's discriminatory intent should not be.
Legislative history of the VAWA bill requires proof of "gen-
der-motivation" like that required in Title VII claims because the
"definition of gender-motivated crime is based on Title VII."368
The Senate Judiciary Committee's report of the VAWA provides
that the
definition of gender motivated crime is based on title VII,
which prohibits discrimination in employment 'because... of
sex.' 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. Hence, title III defines crime motivated
by gender to be crimes committed 'because ... of gender.' The
365. For definitions of battering, see supra note 3.
366. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50.
367. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1992).
368. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50. A hostile 1990 amendment to the
VAWA would have required proof that the defendant's conduct was "overwhelm-
ingly" motivated by gender. The "term 'overwhelmingly' was eliminated in the
version of the bill introduced in the 102nd Congress because there is no counterpart
to such language in any other civil rights remedy" and it "would pose an unneces-
sary and harmful burden on women, creating a 'special disability that nobody else
has' and 'feed[ing] into precisely the sorts of biases that the law is trying to elimi-
nate.'" Id. at 51 (citing testimony of Professors Cass Sunstein and Burt Neuborne).
1992]
Law and Inequality
phraseology 'motivated by,' 'because of,' 'on the basis of' or
'based on' sex or gender is used interchangeably in case law
discussions of title VII. This body of case law will provide sub-
stantial guidance to the trier of fact in assessing whether the
requisite discrimination was present.369
The VAWA also draws a direct parallel to Title VII by acknowledg-
ing the existence of a civil rights remedy for gender crimes com-
mitted in the workplace and lack of a remedy for crimes
committed on the street or in the home.370 However, Title VII has
evolved into multiple causes of action, each of which entails differ-
ent burdens of proof. Thus, the proof of motivation pursuant to
the VAWA still requires significant judicial interpretation.
Evaluation of the successes and limitations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides a valuable lens
through which to inform the content of the civil rights portion of
the proposed VAWA. The VAWA creates a federal cause of action
for discrimination "on the basis of ... sex" for endemically wide-
spread incidents of sexualized domination in the home much as Ti-
tle VII does in the workplace.3 71 In addition, both Title VII and
the VAWA purport to regulate gender relations, discrimination and
violence in what were once considered "private realms": employ-
ment, where freedom of contract reigns subject to common law ex-
ceptions and specific wage and hour, labor and discrimination
legislation; and the family.
A review of the content of Title VII, the judicial interpreta-
tion of the burdens of proof and the alternative jurisprudence of
civil rights remedies that take account of victim perspective in the
presentation of a prima facie case should inform the 103rd Con-
gress' consideration of Title III of the VAWA and the way courts
should interpret the civil rights section once it has passed.
Title VII jurisprudence is multifaceted, and interpretation of
"on the basis of... sex" depends largely on the type of Title VII
claim that one finds most comparable to battered women's claims.
An analysis of disparate treatment, disparate impact and hostile
environment/sexual harassment jurisprudence demonstrates that
all three theories add some support and precedent for the concep-
tualization of battered women's civil rights claims. The hostile en-
vironment/sexual harassment case law provides the analogy best
suited for comparison with the battering context. The practical
difficulties women face in enforcing their Title VII claims, espe-
369. Id.
370. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(a)(2).
371. For an excellent survey of the prevalence and experience of sexual harass-
ment, see GUTEK, supra note 9.
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cially those of sexual harassment, should inform the Title III civil
rights cause of action to facilitate the accomplishment of the law's
underlying objective to provide an effective antidiscrimination
remedy for "gender-motivated crime."3 72
i. Disparate Treatment Claims
When an employer treats an employee less favorably than
others because of her sex, she can bring a claim for disparate treat-
ment pursuant to Title VII. To uphold a Title VII disparate treat-
ment claim, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory motive or
discriminatory intent.373 Liability is predicated not on the actions
of the defendant, but on the underlying discriminatory intent
which must often be inferred from those actions.3 74
To prove disparate treatment, a Title VII plaintiff has the
burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
her employer intentionally engaged in an action, or a pattern and
practice of discrimination, because of sex.3 7 5 -Unlike systemic dis-
parate impact discrimination cases where violations may be sup-
ported by statistical evidence demonstrative of discrimination
within the appropriate employee pool, 376 individual disparate
treatment claims often must rely on particularized evidence be-
cause there is no evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination
against other employees to support their claims.
The burden of demonstrating a discriminatory motive may be
difficult for battered women, but it is less of a burden than proving
discriminatory intent. Pursuant to Title III, a claimant must show
by a "preponderance of the evidence" 377 that she is a victim of a
"gender motivated" crime of violence. This should not require
proof of intent.
If one were to apply a disparate treatment analysis to Title
III claims, and impose the intent burden, the abuser's treatment of
the victim of domestic violence, often the only target of the
372. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 42.
373. One commentator suggests that "discriminatory treatment" and "inten-
tional discrimination" have been linked in Title VII jurisprudence due to sloppy ap-
plication of the "intent" concept which arises from the failure to distinguish the
concept of "motive" from "intent." In fact, the language of Title VII, its legislative
history, judicial analysis and policy rationale all suggest that discriminatory motive
should be the controlling theory for disparate treatment cases. See Welch, supra
note 257.
374. See Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Dispa-
rate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1107, 1114 (1991).
375. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-3 (1992). See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981), cited in Sullivan, supra note 374, at 1116.
376. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
377. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 51.
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abuser's violence, compared to his treatment of all other individu-
als in society, might demonstrate disparate treatment of her and
intent to discriminate on the basis of gender. In some cases, the
defendant may have abused previous domestic partners or may
have been convicted for violent crimes against other women. This
might provide evidence of a pattern and practice of targeting wo-
men domestic partners, or women in general, as victims of
violence.
Where there is no pattern and practice, or relevant group
with which to compare treatment, the proffering of circumstantial
evidence to prove discriminatory intent becomes of paramount im-
portance in disparate treatment cases. Similarly, when considering
a Title III claim, a court shall consider the "totality of the circum-
stances' surrounding the event"3 78 to make the determination of
gender motivation.
In the Title VII hiring context, plaintiffs can draw an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent from the employer's conduct. A
plaintiff can make a prima facie case of disparate treatment be-
cause of sex by demonstrating that she: 1) belongs to a protected
class; 2) applied for and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applications; 3) was rejected; and, 4) the em-
ployer hired someone less qualified or continued to seek
applications from individuals with the complainant's qualifica-
tions.3 79 As these factors must be altered in other employment
contexts,38 0 so could such a prima facie case be adapted to the par-
ticular situations involving wife abuse claims brought pursuant to
Title III if proof of discriminatory intent were required.
The pervasiveness of violence against women, 38 1 and the his-
tory38 2 and function of wife abuse in maintaining gendered power
relations,383 should provide evidence of gender motivation or in-
tent in Title III actions brought by battered women. Acts of vio-
lence and psychological abuse that enforce traditional gender roles
of female subordination and male dominance or an abuser's prefer-
ence of gender roles should be further evidence. Finally, claimants
could demonstrate absence of other motives or provocation, as well
as special characteristics of the crime,38 4 to show gender motiva-
378. Id. at 50.
379. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
380. See id. at n.13.
381. See supra § IM.A
382. See supra § II.C.2.
383. See supra § II.B.
384. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50 n.72 (citing BIAS MOTIvATED HATE
CRIME, supra note 175).
[Vol. 11:1
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES
tion. Examples of such characteristics may include: targeting of
the survivor's sexual organs or effects, use of gender-specific words
during the violent act, or attacking to reassert control at a point
where the woman has attempted a separation to reassert
control.385
Since plaintiffs are entitled, by Title III, to prove '%ias" from
"circumstantial evidence,"38 6 if courts impose a burden of proving
intent to discriminate, they also should create a burden shifting
scheme. A battered woman plaintiff would prove a prima facie Ti-
tle III claim if she demonstrates that: 1) she was a member of a
protected class in a battering relationship;38 7 2) she was a victim or
survivor of an act or "crime of violence;" 3) and the act or "crime
of violence" did or was likely to:388 a) control her thoughts, beliefs
or actions or punish her for resisting the perpetrator's control; or,
b) cause her to modify her behaviors, duties, attitudes or roles to
avoid further violence. The rationale that underlies the accept-
ance of inferential proof of discriminatory intent in disparate
treatment claims should also apply in situations of domestic vio-
lence. Meeting the prima facie burden established by McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green38 9 establishes an inference of discrimina-
tory intent from an employer's actions. It
raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if not otherwise explained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors.... And
we are willing to presume this largely because we know from
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons ....
Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's ac-
tions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we gener-
ally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on
an impermissible consideration such as race.390
Although the presumption that actions are based on reason in
the domestic context is less developed than the presumption that
business decisions are based upon "rational" or "profit maximiz-
ing" purposes, discriminatory considerations and purposes are no
less present, and perhaps are more pervasive, in the domestic con-
385. See supra notes 55-56.
386. VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50.
387. Again, for definitions of battering, see supra note 3.
388. This construction is designed to allow for two conceptions of targets of do-
mestic violence - those who conceive of themselves as "victims" detrimentally af-
fected and debilitated by the abuse - and those who consider themselves
"survivors" of abuse designed to place them in servility.
389. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
390. Funco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978), cited in Sullivan,
supra note 374, at 1115.
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text than they are at work.3 91 Therefore, if a discriminatory intent
must be demonstrated, meeting a prima facie case should be suffi-
cient to shift the burden of proof of intent to discriminate in the
Title III context.
Once a Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff has raised an
inference and presumption of discrimination, the defendant may
place into evidence a nondiscriminatory reason for the employ-
ment action to avoid a directed verdict.392 The risk of non-persua-
sion remains on the plaintiff, who can prevail by the strength of
the inference of her prima facie case 393 or by demonstration that
the defendant's "legitimate reasons" are merely pretextual.394
As applied to the domestic violence context, explanation
often accompanies a defendant's use of force against the plaintiff.
Abusers punish women because they "burned the toast" or failed
to prepare rice properly. Perhaps a battered woman was held ac-
countable for a young child's incessant crying. Perhaps she to-
talled the car.395 A defendant could argue that he did not hit the
plaintiff for any discriminatory purpose and has no interest in her
subordination, he hit her because she burnt the toast. This argu-
ment demonstrates the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent
in the absence of intent derived from a prima facie case. Because
391. First, the notion of "reason," broadly construed, implicates not just an indi-
vidual's conscious process of rational analysis or ratiocination, it includes the socie-
tal norms, political and legal rewards and sanctions, systemic prejudice and gender-
based expectations that frame and provide context for those decisions. Discrimina-
tory actions that reinforce the subordination of women are far from "arbitrary,"
they fulfill a systemic and historical structure of dominance and power which cuts
along gender lines. Thus, "unexplainable actions" that reinforce the subordination
of women could be legally presumed motivated "by sex" because they serve that
purpose.
Second, the same individuals play dominant and controlling roles in both work
and family contexts. For "rational" actors, it is appropriate to presume that mental
capacities and considerations are not largely altered by environment. However,
one's sense of entitlement, moral obligations, social expectations and risks of pun-
ishment in different contexts may alter behavior. Although some men may be in-
discriminately abusive to employees, their wives and strangers on the street, it is
more likely that the sophisticate might perceive the entitlement to control only re-
garding domestic relations or might act selectively in the workplace toward
targeted employees. In either context, the victim of the violence should have access
to justice for deprivation of her civil rights. In both contexts, the violent acts may
be obscured from the underlying purpose to discriminate or control.
392. See Texas Dept of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
393. See Sullivan, supra note 374, at 1159-60.
394. See Reconstruction, Deconstruction, supra note 295, at 528 n.318. See also
Duffy v. Whelling Pittsburgh Steel Co., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1984), cert de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984) ("[A] showing that a proffered justification is pretextial
is itself equivalent to finding that the employer intentionally discriminated."), cited
in Sullivan, supra note 374, at 1117.
395. See, BROWNE, supra note 3, at 54-62 (1987) (discussion of the inception of
typical wife abuse).
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abusers are known intimately by their victims and the violence ap-
pears particularized, Title III plaintiffs will have to overcome the
impulse to presume violence toward them is personal animosity
and not gender-motivated action. This can best be done by setting
forth a broad prima facie expectation of proof.
In the absence of a recognized scheme to infer gender dis-
crimination, and where there is another articulable motive for
abuse, proof of the repeated use of violence against a battered wo-
man should be sufficient to show that the defendant's "reasons"
are really "excuses" for his violence and, as such, are pretextual.
With the exception of self defense, there are no legitimate reasons
for a person to use force against another.398
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 97 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed mixed-motive cases "in which an employer's decision
seems to have been motivated by both lawful and unlawful consid-
erations."39 8 The plurality held that the plaintiff only "retains the
burden of persuasion on the issue whether gender played a part in
the employment decision."3 99
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress clarified Title VII to
read that "an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that.., sex.., was a motivat-
ing factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice." 400 Congress provided a guide to in-
terpreting the causation requirement of Title VII. Decisions made
"because of... sex" need not be shown to be the sole, or "but for,"
cause of the final employment decision.40 ' Such a construction of
"mixed motive" should also be applied in the domestic violence
context where the intimacy of the partners will lead to many so-
called "causes" for actions between them.
In Title VII, the employer is then afforded an affirmative
"same decision" defense. The Title VII disparate treatment plain-
tiff is entitled to "declaratory relief, injunctive relief.., and attor-
ney's fees and costs" 40 2 but is not entitled to damages or orders
"requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
396. See Women and Violence, supra note 13, at 106 (statement of Senator
Biden).
397. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
398. Reconstruction, Deconstruction, supra note 295, at 527.
399. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, quoted in Sullivan, supra note 374, at
1126.
400. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (as amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, at § 107).
401. 137 CONG. REc. S 15,472, S 15,476 (1991).




payment"4 03 if the defendant can demonstrate that it "would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivat-
ing factor."404
In domestic violence situations, a defendant could argue that
he would have taken the "same action" without considering the
gender of the plaintiff. For example, a defendant could demon-
strate that he engaged in the same acts and is indiscriminately vio-
lent towards anyone who crosses his path - male or female.
Rampant, indiscriminate violence is not motivated by gender.
Where courts apply the Title VII standard to Title III claims, a
plaintiff could rebut this defense by demonstrating, within the to-
tality of the circumstances, all actions that raise the defendant's vi-
olence towards her to a discriminatory level or show that the
defendant's so-called "indiscriminate violence" was accompanied
by sexist language, took place to sanction her deviation from his
control or traditional gender roles or was sexual in nature. How-
ever persuasive the "indiscriminate violence defense" might be,
often there will be gender discrimination that is demonstrably "a
motivating factor" for the act.
Fundamentally, repeated wife abuse is motivated by gender
when considered in the context of the economic, social and legal
history of its use. The disparate treatment model, which focuses
only on an individual action and its immediate target, largely
misses the relevant gender role enforcement that battering per-
forms. Thus, the hostile environment Title VII model may better
capture the inherent gender motivation of wife abuse by viewing
actions in their context.
ii. Disparate Impact Claims
Disparate impact claims can be used to challenge facially neu-
tral decisions that have a disparate impact on a protected group.
Title VII's "disparate impact" concept generally informs Title III
of the VAWA insofar as most domestic violence disparately impacts
women, it is crime targeted on the basis of gender and a federal
civil rights action is necessary to eliminate the disparity.
Disparate impact claims have a distinct advantage to dispa-
rate treatment claims in that they have been free from the re-
quirement of proof of intentional discrimination since the 1971
403. Id. The Title VII remedial scheme fails to value certain non-financial dis-
crimination harms in some cases and dramatically caps others. See supra notes 259
and 260.
404. Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, at § 107 (A)).
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U.S. Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.405 In
enacting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress recog-
nized that "overt or covert, discriminatory selection devices, inten-
tional or unintentional, generally prevail throughout the major
part of the white economic community. Deliberate procedures op-
erate together with built-in administrative processes through
which non-white applicants are automatically excluded from job
opportunities."4 06 Requiring proof of discriminatory intent would
not serve to eradicate the discrimination so prevalent in private
employment. By eliminating the intent requirement, Title VII's
procedural rules were designed to ease presentation of a plaintiff's
prima facie case through the use of quantitative data regarding the
impact to the relevant pool of applicants or employees and testi-
mony depicting the discriminatory effects of policies.4 07
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly adopts the disparate
impact analysis and burden of proof enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs,408 and overturns the Supreme Court's 1989 hold-
ing in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.4O9 A complainant dem-
onstrates disparate impact if she shows that the respondent "uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of ... sex ... and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in ques-
tion and consistent with business necessity... ,"410 or if she dem-
onstrates the existence of an "alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment prac-
tice."411 Compensatory or puniti\e damages are not available to
victims of Title VII disparate impact discrimination, so plaintiffs
who experience race discriminatioh will alternatively plead under
405. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 335 n.15 (since Griggs, employer's intent has been irrelevant in disparate im-
pact cases.)
406. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark),
cited in Lively & Plass, supra note 230, at 1323.
407. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-06 (discussing allocation of burdens
of proof in racial discrimination cases), cited in Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STANFORD L. REV. 813, 817 (1991).
408. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1992) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, at
§ 105(a)).
409. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
410. Civil Rights Act of 1991, at § 105 (a).
411. Id. at § 105 (a) and (c). The "alternative employment practice standard" of
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), is to apply. Plaintiffs can pre-
vail if they "persuade the fact finder that other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate [hir-
ing] interests; by so demonstrating, [plaintiffs] would prove the defendants were us-
ing their tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." 137 CoNG. REC. S 15,472,
15,476 (analysis of Civil Rights Act of 1991 introduced by Sen. Dole).
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Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.412 Victims of disparate gender im-
pact have no such alternative.
Courts could allow admission of statistical evidence of domes-
tic violence in the Title III plaintiff's case to demonstrate the sys-
temic nature of domestic violence targeted against women as
evidence that such violence is motivated "because of sex."413 It is
unclear, however, how the Title VII "disparate impact" approach
would be used to evaluate the defendant's actual behavior. In
keeping with Title VII law, if courts hold that statistics are rele-
vant only if limited to the immediate pool of the abuser's prior
contacts and not the population at large, rarely will there be a case
that could generate statistically meaningful evidence. Although
there may be occasional serial abusers, plaintiffs generally could
demonstrate only a string of abused partners to demonstrate a pol-
icy of disparate, violent treatment toward women over time.
Often, in the domestic violence context, there is no demonstrable
"policy" or practice by which the defendant operates, there is no
"other," no pool of women and no male domestic partner with
whom a battered woman could compare herself to demonstrate the
detrimental effects of the defendant's behavior toward her because
of her sex. Thus, the other avenues of Title VII proof of gender
motivation hold more promise for Title III litigants than disparate
impact theory.
iii. Hostile Environment Claims and Sexual Harassment
Catharine MacKinnon first argued that sexual harassment,
"the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of
a relationship of unequal power," should be actionable as sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.414 The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC") issued guidelines preventing, in three
circumstances, harassment on the basis of sex or "[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature."415
412. Nothing in the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is to be construed to
limit the scope of, or the relief available under, § 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42
U.S.C. § 1981) (1992).
413. See supra § II.A.
414. MAcKINNON, supra note 43, at 1, cited in Estrich, supra note 407, at 818.
415. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990)
The circumstances under which this definition constitute sexual har-
assment are those in which: 1.) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's em-
ployment, 2.) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individ-
ual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual; or, 3.) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasona-
[Vol. 11:1
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,416 the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized lower courts'417 extension of Title VII to include
a cause of action for "hostile environment" claims of sexual har-
assment. The Court directed lower courts to look to the EEOC for
guidance when interpreting hostile environment claims of sexual
harassment.418 Hostile environment harassment has been defined
by the EEOC as "sexual misconduct" "whether or not it is directly
linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where
'such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.' "419 Although "Title
VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,"420 for a
plaintiff to sustain a claim, the harassment "must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment." 42 1
Although some courts have considered the actual intent of
the employer or co-worker alongside a "reasonable person" or
"reasonable woman" standard to evaluate the pervasiveness of
harassment, 42 2 the strength of Title VII hostile environment juris-
prudence has been the abandonment of the proof of intent require-
ment. Title VII unambiguously
classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when
harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile
working environment... because Title VII is not a fault-based
tort scheme. 'Title VII is aimed at the consequences or effects
of an employment practice and not at the.., motivation' of co-
workers or employers.423
In situations where there is sexualized institutional domi-
nance, such as within violent families, courts and Congress should
recognize that intent-based standards are inadequate to address
bly interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id., cited in Estrich, supra note 407, at 818.
416. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
417. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (quot-
ing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981)); Budy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cited in Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1989).
418. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d. 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
419. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3), quoted in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
420. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
421. Id. at 67.
422. Abrams, supra note 417, at 1202.
423. Ellison, 924 F.2d 872 (consciously adopting a "reasonable woman" standard)
(quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (the




the more pervasive, subtle forms of discrimination and subordina-
tion that prevent women's full participation in society. As in em-
ployment, where "[rjeliance on the intent of the employer misses
the crucial point that even an employer who regards such ex-
changes as harmless 'business as usual' can create an environment
that is nightmarishly oppressive to his female employees,"4 24 so
should the courts treat the concept of "motivation" embodied in
the Title III cause of action as not requiring proof of intent to dis-
criminate but proof of the discriminatory act. As with hostile
work environment claims, courts should hold that violence moti-
vated by sex can constitute a hostile domestic environment in vio-
lation of Title III. Courts should impose a standard that violent
conduct by a domestic partner that has the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual's work, family or social
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive do-
mestic environment constitutes a crime of violence motivated by
gender.
A woman suffering from sexual harassment or a hostile work
environment may make a claim of employment discrimination "be-
cause.., of sex" by demonstrating her subordination and vulnera-
bility through sexual objectification in the workplace evidenced by
abusive language, unwanted touching, pressures to engage in sex-
ual activity, rape and economic coercion through sanctions im-
posed for her failure to cooperate with the employer or co-
worker's demands. A woman in an abusive relationship could sim-
ilarly demonstrate the perpetrator's efforts to control her
thoughts, beliefs and actions and deprive her of her civil rights as
evidenced by abusive language, physical violence, rape and eco-
nomic deprivation. Hostile environment Title VII claims raise is-
sues closely related to the situation in which battered women find
themselves.
The Supreme Court's recognition in Meritor that a workplace
can be systemically hostile marked a significant step in women's
efforts to address the coercive aspects of social, economic and legal
structures. Since such a move can be made by Congress to end vio-
lence against women at home, the lessons of Title VII should be
applied to the Title III effort to eradicate violence against women
so that the same problems are not recreated in a new setting.
424. Abrams, supra note 417, at 1202.
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C. VAWA Anticipated Problems and Proposed Changes to
Remedy the Deprivation of Women's Civil Rights
by Battering.
1. Anticipating the Problems
Doctrinal judicial restrictions on women's sexual harassment
claims, including the "unwelcomeness," "on the basis of sex," and
severity requirements, greatly limit Title VII relief.425 Similarly,
it is not enough to examine the statutory terms of the VAWA; it is
important to anticipate how courts may use such terms to limit
women's access to justice in order to prevent such incursions on
women's rights in the Title III context.
a. The Term "Motivated by Gender"
In Susan Estrich's work on sexual harassment,42 6 she found
that the gender motivation requirement in Title VII, the "on the
basis of sex" requirement, has been interpreted in two general
ways. Courts first took an "equality" perspective in which the sex-
ual aspects of harassment were ignored. The relevant question
was whether coercion or pressure was disparately targeted toward
women. Then, the reverse was true and the sexual aspect of har-
assment became virtually all important; the relevant question be-
came whether the coercion involved sex itself. Battered women
would be at a disadvantage if either approach were adopted in Ti-
tle III because neither captures the common experience and full
dimension of gender-motivated violence.
In the first approach to Title VII, courts ignored the sexual
core of violent workplace behavior and treated the violations as
they would treat different wage and conditions claims, as "differ-
ential treatment" on the basis of gender.4 2 7 Courts identified gen-
der discrimination through a comparison of employers' treatment
of women and men. "When conditions are imposed on a person
that would not be imposed but for her being a woman, that is sex
discrimination regardless of the nature of the offensive condi-
tions."42 8 The differential treatment analysis relegates the issues
of sexuality to the sidelines and "[t]he sole issue becomes whether
the coercion, whatever form it takes, would have been imposed on
425. See generally Estrich, supra note 407, at 827, 845; Abrams, supra note 417,
at 1202. This section draws from these works on sexual harassment and rape law
doctrine in anticipation of similar issues arising under Title HI.
426. See Estrich, supra note 407.
427. See id. at 819-20. See also supra § IV.B.3.c.i.
428. Estrich, supra note 407, at 819.
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a man."429 In the context of a battering relationship, there is usu-
ally no "other" with whom a battered woman can compare her
treatment.43 0 Yet the context of wife abuse, at the intersecting
planes of the struggle for power and control and violence against
women, renders battering very much about subordination on the
basis of sex.43 1
The apparently "neutral" differential treatment framework
also ignores the underlying inequality of women in society and the
use of violence to enforce that structure. Sexual harassment in the
workplace and violence in the home involve both gender and
sex, 43 2 yet the "equality/difference" disparate treatment approach
does not provide a meaningful analysis of either dynamic.
If applied to violence in the context of a domestic relation-
ship, the disparate treatment analysis would treat "sex" as secon-
dary to a "but for" comparison of the way the defendant batters
his wife versus other women or men. Such an inquiry would evis-
cerate the very power of this remedy to draw broader social con-
nections between battering behavior and the social, legal and
economic structures that support it.
Further, by ignoring the power objectives served by male vio-
lence against women, the disparate treatment approach suggests
that all people victimized by violence share a comparable experi-
ence. Although there may be similarities, a woman's experience of
abuse and subordination results at least in part from the different
social meanings that adhere to physical and sexual violence di-
rected toward women as compared to men. Male violence against
women reinforces women's experience of fear, objectification, sub-
ordination and perpetual vulnerability to violation; it fulfills domi-
nant male role expectations. Where a woman has been assaulted
or abused in the past, she may have a psychological response to the
abuse and the message of insubordination it sends to her. In com-
parison, violence towards heterosexual men by male strangers usu-
429. Id. at 820.
430. See supra § IV.B.3.c.i.
431. See supra § ll.B.2.
432. What makes sexual harassment more offensive, more debilitating,
and more dehumanizing to its victims than other forms of discrimina-
tion is precisely the fact that it is sexual. Not only are men exercising
power over women, but they are operating in a realm which is still
judged according to a gender double standard, itself a reflection of the
extent to which sexuality is used to penalize women.... Mhese cases
are such a disaster in doctrinal terms precisely because, as with rape,
they involve sex and sexuality.
Estrich, supra note 407, at 820.
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ally is irrelevant to sexual considerations. 433 Situations in which
violence occurs must be analyzed by their particular factual cir-
cunstances434 and subcultural meanings. 435
If applied to Title III, disparate treatment analysis also would
ignore the centrality of the use of violence in the struggle for
power and control in battering relationships. A disparate treat-
ment comparison of an abuser's treatment of his wife and other
men may lead to an "indiscriminate violence" defense at best436
and, at worst, may result in a claimant's failure to set forth her
claim because there is often no "other" target with whom to com-
pare the defendant's actions. Instead of focusing on a "but for sex"
comparison, the gender motivation inquiry should address the par-
ticularized way in which an abuser coerces and controls his wife
and the social function of gender role enforcement that violence
performs.
The second trend in Title VII sexual harassment case law
demonstrates a conflation of "because of sex" with sex itself and a
minimization of other types of harassment.437 A focus on sex acts
alone misses the more pervasive gender-motivated acts of violence
against women. Such a pattern should be guarded against in the
VAWA Title III domestic violence context.
Although an employer's workplace propositions to have sex
with a worker of the opposite sex have generally been treated as
gender-based, "some courts have held that worksite conditions -
foul language, obscene cartoons, and aphysical gestures short of
sex or their demand for it - are not always based on sex."438 In-
deed, "[w]hile the test is often stated, in legal terms, as whether
the harassment is 'equally offensive' to both sexes, it is often ap-
plied in practice as a question of whether the action is itself sex-
ual."43 9 This narrow "based-on-sex" formulation presumes that
433. It should be noted that gay men are frequently the targets of "gay-bashing"
which, too, is a violent tool to punish deviation from expected gender roles.
434. For instance, violence by female partners towards men most often takes
place during separation where women are most at risk and must protect their lives
with extraordinary means, including killing in self defense. Some female/male bat-
tering may represent an effort by a woman to break such gender models. See Ma-
honey, supra note 3.
435. Some lesbian battering may fulfill gender-role enforcement within the sub-
culture of the lesbian community. The particular circumstances and pressures of
that community would determine the way in which to interpret the use of violence
to control another and whether such violence is motivated by gender.
436. See supra § IV.B.3.c.i.
437. See Estrich, supra note 407, at 841.
438. Id.
439. Id. Estrich cites the examples of Wendorf v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 47 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,316, at 53,795 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (boss's behavior,
perhaps "unpleasant to the plaintiff," failed to constitute sexual harassment be-
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non-sexual acts are directed at all persons and are, by definition,
non-offensive and that sexual acts are directed only at women and
are offensive.44 0 Such a narrow formulation disregards the more
insidious forms of harassment of women and the gendered ele-
ments of power in the workplace that stigmatize women and result
in their subordination.
In addition, the definition of "sexual" tends to be narrow,
"based on a man's view of a man's acts,"44 1 without consideration
of the perspective of the female employee who may be dependant
upon her male boss for economic security and may interpret physi-
cal contact and sexually explicit language as more threatening and
demeaning than would a male in her position.442
In the context of VAWA Title III claims, conflation of "based
on sex" with sex itself would diminish the significance of tech-
niques of control, including violence, that are used to maintain
gendered power differentials in some heterosexual relationships.
Some battered women face sexual pressures and rape as part of
the pattern of control and violence; others are spared violent sex
acts for different tools of domination and control.443 Although all
the violence acted out toward a domestic partner may not have the
same obvious sexual characteristics as rape, many of these acts are
violent assertions of power over women because they are
women.4"
Where a defendant manifests violence in sexual conduct, that
conduct alone should satisfy the Title III element of gender-based
animus, but it should not be considered the only evidence of gen-
der motivation. Indeed, to construe "rape" or other sex crimes as
the only crimes committed because of gender is to confuse the
means with the motivation or effect of violently expressed discrim-
ination. It is the gender motivation, effect and civil rights injury
resulting from epidemic violence against women that prompts the
need for the VAWA Title III civil rights remedy.
The risk that gender-motivated crimes of violence will be col-
lapsed into the category of sex crimes is significant for three rea-
sons. First, the category of "sex crimes" is but a subset of the
universe of potentially gender-motivated crimes. To equate sex
cause "this behavior ... was directed at both male and female workers and was
clearly not sexual in nature"); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438,
1441-42 (S.D.W.Va. 1985) (sexual harassment must be directed at a female and play
"upon the stereotypical role of the female as a sexual object" to be actionable).
440. See Estrich, supra note 407, at 841.
441. Id.
442. Id at 842.
443. See supra § II.B.
444. See supra §§ II.A. and B.
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crimes with gender-motivated crimes is to misunderstand the con-
tinuum of violence against women.
Second, women's experience of prosecuting sex crimes dem-
onstrates that those who know their sexual assailants face severe
difficulties in the criminal justice system. In the context of domes-
tic violence, proof of sexual violence will likely raise the same dif-
ficulties women face in rape prosecutions.
In rape law, stranger rape routinely has been contrasted with
"date rape" - a false dichotomy the 1991 Senate VAWA recognized
and attempted to remedy445 "Real rape" cases, such as when a
"woman (is) raped by a stranger, or better yet, by two strangers
jumping from the bushes and brandishing weapons," are consid-
ered serious criminal offenses and are likely to result in prosecu-
tion and significant jail sentences.44 6 For "real rapes," courts
notably excuse substantive requirements of proof of resistance and
relax procedural requirements of prompt complaint or expecta-
tions that the victim procure evidence corroborating her testi-
mony.44 7 Although acquaintance rape meets the legal definition of
rape - "sexual intercourse, by force or threat of force, against the
will and without consent of the victim"s448 - some courts' treat-
ment of the victims is very different.
[W]hen the man is a friend, neighbor, or co-worker; or when
the force consists of words and hands instead of guns and
knives . .. few of these cases follow the legal route of "real
rape" cases .... [M]ost such cases are never reported by their
victims, most that are reported do not lead to prosecution and
conviction, and those that do result in successful prosecutions
are disproportionately likely to result in either reversal on ap-
peal or suspension of sentence.4 49
Third, there are indications in the legislative history of VAWA
that the conflation of gender motivation and sex itself already has
begun. The Judiciary Committee's report of the VAWA bill in-
cludes a comparison of a racially motivated attack and a gender-
motivated crime to demonstrate the mechanics of inference of mo-
tivation from circumstantial evidence, the "totality of the circum-
445. 1991 Senate VAWA, supra note 269, at § 402 (acquaintance sexual assault on
campuses is widespread; one in seven college women have been raped and over half
of the victims know their attackers) and § 403 (providing grants for campus rape
education and prevention).
446. Estrich, supra note 407, at 813.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 814 (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape
Reform Legislation, 6 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 170 (1980)).
449. Estrich, supra note 407, at 814 (summarizing her findings and conclusions
previously published in SusAN EsTRIcH, REAL RAPE 15-26 (1987)).
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stances" surrounding the event.45 0 In this discussion, the prima
facie case the Committee sets forth provides an "extreme" exam-
ple of a bias crime, yet the very inclusion of it provides insight into
the imagination of those who are drafting the legislation. The par-
agraph bears quoting in full:
Consider the case of a serial rapist who violates his victims as
he hurls misogynist slurs. The victim's lawyers would prove
exactly the same type of 'circumstances' that the lawyer in the
'race' case proved: that the victim was of one sex (female) and
the attacker a different sex (male); that the attacker did not
kidnap and rape men, but had a long history of attacking wo-
men; and that the attacker shouted anti-woman epithets dur-
ing the assault. Again, the jury might not be convinced by any
one of these circumstances individually - but all together
show gender bias.4 51
Although this example addresses a set of facts that would clearly
give rise to a Title III cause of action, the challenge is to address
situations where the gender motivation is more subtle.
To avoid the pitfalls of the differential treatment interpreta-
tion of gender motivation, and the conflation of the "based-on-sex"
standard with sex itself, Congress should reconsider the mechanics
of proof in Title III as it applies to battered women, much as the
House VAWA drafters have done for sex crimes.452
b. Battering Cycles and the "Crime of Violence"
Congress and courts should acknowledge that a wide variety
of force and threats of force directed toward battered women con-
stitute deprivation of civil rights. Violence in the context of bat-
tering relationships is particularized and draws little from case law
established in other contexts. Indeed, the pattern and cycle of vio-
lence453 documented in situations of wife abuse is one of repeated
targeting of, and retaliation against, a single victim. Separation as-
sault is similarly characteristic of gender-motivated violence in the
context of battering relationships.454 This contrasts with the para-
digm criminal model of one-time, stranger-on-stranger violence.
Physical violence is commonly understood as a single tech-
nique within an abuser's broader effort to effectuate control over
his domestic partner.45 5 Where there is sporadic use of physical vi-
olence to maintain control in a relationship, every threat may not
450. See VAWA Report 1991, supra note 8, at 50.
451. Id.
452. See supra notes 348-52 and accompanying text.
453. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
455. Power Wheel, supra note 46.
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carry the punch, but the punch is implicit in every threat. Assault
is within the definition of crimes of violence contemplated by the
VAWA.
To prove a "crime of violence" in the career-offender context,
courts require demonstration of intent to use force.4 56 If this re-
quirement were imposed on Title III claims, battered women
claimants who sustained a pattern of abuse from their husbands
might have difficulty if the recent incidents of violence include
threats alone. Abusers may purport that they did not actually in-
tend to follow through with their threats, that "I'm going to kill
you" is a figure of speech, that "choking slightly is like caressing
strongly," or that they temporarily "lost control." Where violence
has occurred before and the tendons of power are strong, threats
are sufficient weapons to maintain an ominous aura of control.
Yet the actual use of force or attempted use of force may have pre-
ceded these threats by a significant time period. Therefore, Con-
gress should explicitly find that demonstration of intent to use
force is not required, only proof of acts or threats of violence are
necessary.
By focusing on gender-motivated "crimes," applications of Ti-
tle III may underestimate the complexity of domestic violence and
the subtle techniques which result in civil rights deprivations in
abusive relationships. The full battering cycle includes periods
during which there is no act of violence, only veiled threats - sub-
tle to the extent that the battered woman understands the signals
but neighbors, and a jury, may have difficulty understanding the
coded communications that have evolved to mean "obey." 457 Con-
gress and the courts should recognize the relevance of evidence of
power and control in a violent relationship to enable a battered
woman to substantiate her civil rights claim and prove the full ex-
tent of her damages.
c. Evidentiary Issues
Although there is no prerequisite that a claimant bring prior
456. See Parson, 955 F.2d at 866 ("Use of physical force is an intentional act, and
therefore ... requires specific intent to use force.") (dicta).
457. The domestic context promotes different types of violence because it is inti-
mate and the parties know the others' capabilities toward violence. A man may
threaten to kill his mother-in-law as part of a pattern of coercion against his wife.
This threat of violence toward a third party in some circumstances could provide a
basis for a civil rights cause of action. If he threatens to commit suicide and leave
the partner and kids with no economic support, this could provide evidence of a
pattern of coercion. What to a stranger may seem a threat, may in some situations
be a certain and coercive promise.
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criminal charges,458 proof of the "crime of violence" element of a
Title III civil rights case where no criminal prosecution preceded it
may be complicated. Where proof of a crime of violence is not dif-
ficult, broad admissibility of evidence of past violence by an abuser
may be important in establishing damages.
A claimant should be allowed to introduce evidence of under-
lying circumstances and patterns of violent behavior to demon-
strate the existence of "an offense that has as an element, the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." 459 Due to the
cyclical nature of domestic violence, it is important that battered
women claimants be allowed to introduce evidence that traces
back in time in order to establish the extent of damages and the
existence of a threat of violence. The "totality of the circum-
stances" test adopted by the VAWA should include such evidence.
In the context of a battered woman's claim, it is crucial that
the situation itself and the case as presented determine the tempo-
ral and substantive boundaries of relevant and admissible evi-
dence. For justice to be served, courts should err on the side of
admission of evidence that implicates the defendant in prior vio-
lent behaviors or similar patterns of violence to that alleged by the
plaintiff regardless of the time that has passed between the vio-
lence and the court action. The defendant's proclivity to act with
violence toward others is relevant to proof of his capacity to act vi-
olently towards the plaintiff.
The domestic violence context also should inform the admis-
sibility of evidence regarding victim credibility. Congressional and
judicial recognition of the possibility of retribution and increased
victimization of battered women who seek separation from situa-
tions of domestic violence 46 0 should prevent adoption of require-
ments of "prompt complaint" and "corroboration" which arise in
rape law and are present in Title VII actions. In practice, the op-
posite has been the case. Studies indicate that greater corrobora-
tion of physical injuries is required by judges in domestic violence
cases than in other serious crimes.46 ' More generally, the issue of
credibility emerges in the "tendency to doubt the testimony of do-
mestic violence victims and to 'blame' them for their predicament"
which hampers the court's ability to protect the victims and has a
"chilling effect on victims' willingness to seek relief."4 62
Title VII courts presume the relevance of "factors such as the
458. See House VAWA, supra note 272 at § 301(d)(2).
459. See supra note 299.
460. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
461. See MASSAcmuSmrrs GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 13, at 89.
462. Id. at 80.
[Vol. 11:1
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES
presence of corroboration and the freshness of the woman's com-
plaint" in evaluating the credibility of victims' claims and treat
them as "neutral indicia of credibility rather than as cards categor-
ically stacked against women."463 In fact, these so-called neutral
Title VII standards of credibility belie the experiences of women
who often are humiliated and fearful when faced with sexual har-
assment. One study demonstrated that while 53% of women re-
port having experienced sexual harassment, only 21% actually
complained about it to another person.464 Similarly, battered wo-
men frequently do not show anyone their bruises,465 battering usu-
ally occurs in private where there are no corroborating witnesses
and few women report the abuse.4 66
The fact that the corroboration rule continues to be embraced
unembarrassedly in sexual harassment cases, long after it has
at least been formally rejected in rape cases, raises the ques-
tion of whether it serves, here as there, its more traditional
and deservingly vilified purpose: not as a neutral guide to
truth, but as a mechanism reflecting the disfavored status of
sexual complaints and complainants.4 67
Informed by the sexual harassment experience, Congress
should institute a one-way evidentiary rule in Title III law to allow
evidence of corroboration - witnesses, pictures of bruises, doctors'
reports, sperm - as persuasive when present, but irrelevant when
such extraordinary evidence is not available. 468
In addition to relevancy, a second evidentiary concern arising
under Title III is the extent to which opinion and reputation evi-
dence, which focuses on the victim's "provocation" and past sexual
behavior rather than the defendant's alleged violent action and its
gender motivation, will be admissible. In the development of Title
VII, some courts "have structured the relevancy rules in sexual
harassment cases to frame the credibility question as a one-way
ratchet against women."469 Such a phenomenon should be antici-
pated and avoided in Title III. But even imposition of symmetry in
evidentiary rules affecting the parties would obfuscate the central
nature of the victims' claims against their aggressors - the acts of
violence or threats of violence - and mix it with the claimant's
proclivities, personal behaviors and effects.
Just as Title VII evidence of the boss' past sexual relations
463. Estrich, supra note 407, at 848.
464. Id. at 851 (citing GuTEK, supra note 9, at 46, 54.)
465. See DEL MARTIN, BA rERE WIVES 2 (1983).
466. See SCHECHTEi, supra note 1, at 26.
467. Estrich, supra note 407, at 851.
468. See id. (recommending this for sexual harassment cases).
469. Id. at 848.
1992]
Law and Inequality
with other employees is admissible even if the incidents are al-
leged to be "voluntary" because they set a tone in the workplace
that sexual acquiescence has consequences, 470 so should an
abuser's past violence against other partners or rapes of other wo-
men be admissible because they demonstrate a tendency to use vi-
olence in similar contexts. So-called "symmetrical" admission of
evidence of a wife's relations with other men will not provide in-
formation relevant to the inquiry of the existence of wife abuse.
Admission of such evidence may, instead, reinforce women's expe-
rience of powerlessness to confront violence because they may fear
a court proceeding in which their lives will be unfairly scrutinized
and evidence of male and female sexual activity will be received in
vastly different ways by the jury.471
To avoid the problem of opinion and reputation evidence cut-
ting unfairly against woman claimants, Title I, Subtitle E of the
VAWA provides new evidentiary rules in some civil cases. The sec-
tion amends the Federal Rules of Evidence by adding a new sec-
tion: "[I]n a civil case in which a defendant is accused of actionable
sexual misconduct, reputation or opinion evidence of the plaintiff's
past sexual behavior is not admissible."472 Cases involving "action-
able sexual misconduct" include "sex harassment or sex discrimi-
nation claims brought pursuant to title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)) and gender bias claims brought pursu-
ant to title III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993."473
Pursuant to the VAWA, however, all evidence of a plaintiff's
past sexual behavior is not excluded. "[E]vidence of a plaintiff's
past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence
may be admissible if - (1) it is admitted in accordance with proce-
dures" requiring the defendant to make a specific, timely written
motion to offer evidence accompanied by a written offer of proof
upon which a court will hold a hearing to determine whether the
evidence is relevant, that it is not excluded by other evidentiary
rules,474 and that "(2) the probative value of such evidence out-
weighs the danger of unfair prejudice." 475 To procedurally protect
plaintiffs, this section requires the court to consider, in its order
admitting the evidence; "the chain of reasoning leading to its find-
ing of relevance; and.., why the probative value of the evidence
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice given the potential of the
470. Id. at 849.
471. Id.
472. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 152(a).
473. Id. at § 152(d).
474. Id. at §§ 152(b)(1), (c)(1) and (2).
475. Id. at §§ 152(b)(2) and (c)(3).
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evidence to humiliate and embarrass the alleged victim and to re-
sult in unfair or biased jury inferences."4 76
This provision is necessary to protect women who bring civil
rights claims for domestic violence, but it may not go far enough.
Many judges who preside over rape trials devalue similar provi-
sions of rape shield laws, weigh the probative value of admission of
evidence against the prejudicial effect of it, and admit evidence of
the victim's sexual activities with other men.477 Generally, such
evidence is irrelevant to the alleged act of rape by the defendant.
To improve this rape-shield system, Susan Estrich suggests a lim-
ited symmetry to
draw lines between sex and aggression which make evidence
of the latter admissible, even if the line between the two is an
artificial one. [She wants] to know if the man has been prose-
cuted or sued for rape elsewhere, or arrested for domestic as-
sault, and [wants] to know even if the cost of knowing is also
asking whether the woman has ever complained of rape.478
Such a rule should hold in the civil rights action for gender-moti-
vated acts or crimes of violence. Evidence of a battered woman's
prior legal actions to address violence sustained by other men and
the outcome of those claims may be relevant to ensure that claim-
ants do not engage in false accusations.
Finally, the question of expert witnesses must be addressed
by courts in the Title III context. In criminal prosecutions, bat-
tered women's self defense claims have been supported by expert
testimony to provide a background on battering and its effects, the
so-called "battered woman syndrome." In this way, courts and ju-
ries learn about the context and effect of the abuse, torture and
shock that battered women experience. 47 9 Such testimony is also
needed in civil rights actions in which prejudice and innocent
preconceptions may serve to distort the evidence before the jury.
Title VII courts often judge the motivations of women on the basis
of stereotypes "which punish real women for both their strengths
and their weaknesses, and leave unchallenged the most traditional
'scorned woman' explanations for why women complain of harass-
476. Id. at § 152(c)(3).
477. See Estrich, supra note 407, at 849 (citing State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212,
1216 (1988) (Souter, J.) ("evidence of public displays of general interest in sexual
activity can be taken to indicate a contemporaneous receptiveness to sexual ad-
vances")); Kathleen Winters, United States v. Shaw: What Constitutes an "Injury"
Under the Federal Rape-Shield Statute?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947 (1989); Andrew Z.
Soshnick, The Rape Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection Amidst Oscillating
Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J. CRim. L. & CRBIINOLOGY 644 (1987)).
478. Estrich, supra note 407, at 850.
479. See generally Schneider, supra note 124.
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ment."48 0 As Estrich notes,
women who are considered by courts or co-workers to be 'out-
spoken' or 'assertive' are expected to be outspoken or assertive
about the sexual wrongs of their bosses. The fact that such as-
sertiveness might bring embarrassment, or even dismissal, is
routinely ignored, as is the fact that women in these cases are
always relatively powerless.4 8
In Title III actions, as in battered women's self defense
claims, expert testimony on the phenomenon of domestic violence,
the patterns and tools of power and control, the typicality of sepa-
ration assault, and the psychological effects of battering should be
available to prove the existence of threats of use of force and
demonstrate the impact of domestic violence in assessing damages.
Such testimony may counter the prejudice that arises against wo-
men who challenge violence and harassment in other contexts.
2. Alternatives: Radical Essentialization and Radical
Subjectivity
To eliminate violence against women in the home, and in
light of the uncertainties of proof of a battered woman's Title III
claim, Congress and the courts should augment the VAWA with al-
ternative approaches to proof of a prima facie case. Ideally, Title
III would allow for three alternative ways of proving a prima facie
case, electable by the plaintiff and arguable in the alternative, to
enforce the substantive right to be free from gender-motivated acts
or crimes of violence. The first, the radical essentialization ap-
proach, would set forth "per se violations" of Title III in an effort
to preclude violence in the home,48 2 much like the House VAWA
480. Estrich, supra note 407, at 848.
481. Id. at 851.
482. Legislative establishment of per se violations of Title III provides normative
bounds of prohibited gender-motivated behavior and allows a plaintiff to make a
prima facie case by demonstrating that the prohibited acts occurred. In the context
of a battering relationship, the knowledge that hitting, punching, restraining, or
threatening another constitutes behavior actionable pursuant to the VAWA would
send a clear message that abusers should refrain from using violence.
The risk of establishing per se violations of a civil rights law, of course, is that
static categories might not represent the true dimension of domestic violence and
may thwart women's use of the remedy if the behavior they complain of is different
than that codified. In addition, the understanding of battering and the women's
movement's social change needs may change over time, change which would not be
reflected in static categories. However, given the educational function of federal
civil rights laws, there is value in marking certain behavior as legally out of bounds.
Such per se violations will support judicial enforcement of Title III of the VAWA
and can be amended to reflect the changes in battering behavior, new understand-
ings of wife abuse and the changing needs of the battered women's community that
may develop as a result of the adoption of the VAWA. Furthermore, the negative
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does for sex crimes.483 The second should be a more traditional
civil rights approach such as that already proposed by the Sen-
ate484 and House VAWA.485 The third, the radical subjectivity ap-
proach, would incorporate an individualized, victim-perspective
standard.486 The House VAWA and the Sentencing Commission's
three-tiered approach of proving past crimes of violence for sen-
tencing purposes should serve as models for amendments to the
Title III civil rights cause of action.
Violence against women is severe and warrants a section of
the VAWA that sets forth per se crimes of violence motivated by
gender. This approach categorizes violent battering behavior as
unlawful and outside the norms of society. To prove a prima facie
Title III case with this approach, a battered woman claimant
should have to demonstrate that per se "acts of violence" had been
committed against her within the context of an abusive relation-
ship,487 or as separation assault for leaving such a relationship.488
aspects of static categories are easily overcome by providing alternative ways of
proving a Title III violation.
483. See House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(d)(1)(A).
484. Senate VAWA, supra note 271, at § 302(c).
485. House VAWA, supra note 272, at § 301(d)(1)(B).
486. An individualized approach permits the trier of fact to consider "particular
circumstances and perceptions under which a battered woman operates." Schnei-
der, supra note 81, at 647. Individualization requires "a full consideration of indi-
vidual differences and capacities." Id. at 639. This approach could be used to
determine whether a woman was the victim of a threat of use of force motivated by
sex and whether, on that basis, the defendant should be held liable for a civil rights
violation.
With an individualized approach, proof of the existence of a threat and the rea-
sonableness of that perception must be judged from the individual's own perspec-
tive with consideration of the full circumstances. See id. at 640. The victim-
oriented standard of proof may limit the gender bias that often exists in the appli-
cation of "objective" standards. See supra note 138. See also Schneider, supra note
124, at 201, 219; Estrich, supra note 407, at 830-31. Generalized stereotypes can be
overcome and the law can equalize the position of male and female actors by recog-
nizing their differences. Schneider, supra note 81, at 640.
The language of "reasonableness" muffles the voice of the individual claimant
by suggesting that an imaginary position of neutrality best explains her particular
circumstances and perspective. "In their concern to avoid the social and moral irre-
sponsibility of the first voice, legal thinkers have veered in the opposite direction,
toward the safety of the second voice, which speaks from the position of 'objectiv-
ity' rather than 'subjectivity,' 'neutrality' rather than 'bias."' Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 583 (1990).
By so doing, the language obscures the power of the law, the reality that "legal in-
terpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others." Id.
(quoting Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)).
To successfully accomplish individuation in practice, evidence revealing a wo-
man's perceptions and perspectives arising from past contacts must be admissible in
lay testimony, augmented by expert testimony. Schneider, supra note 81, at 64446.
487. See supra note 3.
488. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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The acts of violence should cover the broad spectrum of battering
behavior - hitting, punching, slapping, kicking, pulling hair, bit-
ing, and burning another, or threatening such behavior, use or
threat of use of weapons, coercive sex and sexual acts, forced re-
striction of movement and intentional deprivation of basic needs
such as food, water and medical care. Because battering behavior
enforces power and control in heterosexual relationships consis-
tent with the batterer's gender role expectations and in concert
with the dominant social structure,4 8 9 a battered woman who dem-
onstrates these acts of violence should also have established a
prima facie case of gender motivation. The gender motivation of
battering has as strong a foundation, based on the history and con-
text of the violence, 490 as the presumption of gender motivation
for rape, based on the sex inherent in the crime itself.
The second means of proof in this amended VAWA would be
that established by the existing VAWA: proof of commission of a
gender-motivated crime which has, as an element, the actual, at-
tempted, or threatened use of physical force against a person.
491
In this general category, there should be a rebuttable presumption
of gender motivation where a woman can establish that the violent
crime took place in the context of a battering relationship, or in
leaving an abusive relationship. The defendant could then rebut
proof of the acts or motivation. In response, the plaintiff could in-
troduce specific evidence of gender motivation. Finally, the radical
subjectivity approach would allow a battered claimant to proffer
evidence of the batterer's conduct and/or her response to deter-
mine whether that conduct "presented a serious potential risk of
physical injury"492 to the claimant. If the immediate conduct did
not amount to an act of violence enumerated as a per se violation,
the claimant should be permitted to admit evidence and expert
witness testimony to demonstrate that the gender-motivated con-
duct created, in the totality of the circumstances judged from her
perspective, a threat of physical injury which would elevate the ac-
tion to a violation of the VAWA civil rights statute. This is a vic-
tim-oriented, highly individualized approach.493 The claimant
489. See supra note 57.
490. See supra § II.B.
491. See supra § IV.B.2.
492. See supra notes 319-20, and accompanying text (U.S.S.G., 18 U.S.C. App.
§ 4B1, Application Note 2 (1992)). This proposal is based on the amended sentenc-
ing guidelines and not on 18 U.S.C. § 16.
493. Kathy Abrams suggests a useful three-staged, victim-oriented approach to-
ward sexual harassment adjudication which could be adopted in the VAWA context.
The prima facie "victim perspective" case in Title III, like that suggested for Title
VII, would focus on the subjective response of the plaintiff to the behavior of the
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could show that she had become fearful of the violator and had
modified her behavior to avoid further abuse. She could demon-
strate the serious potential risk by proof of cycles of violence, past
injury and threats. If she could demonstrate that she was battered
in this way, gender motivation should be a rebuttable presumption.
If not, the claimant also would have to prove gender motivation.
Congressional approval of these alternative mechanisms of
proof would clarify the application of the VAWA civil rights rem-
edy as applied to wife abuse and allow battered women to articu-
late their experiences while seeking justice for deprivation of their
civil rights. Regardless of Congressional approval of the specific
amendments, some battered women will be able to establish that
they have been targets of crimes of violence motivated by gender
as set forth in the existing Title III proposal.
V. Implications of a Civil Rights Remedy for the Battered Women's
Movement
The use of civil rights remedies by battered women raises
many theoretical and strategic issues for the battered women's
movement. The first concerns "rights" theory and the fear that a
reified "rights" discourse will constrain the battered women's
abuser. The plaintiff's description of the defendant's violent behavior and threats
of use of force, the feelings of coercion or devaluation it produced and the gender
roles it enforced would establish the plaintiff's prima facie case. See Abrams,
supr note 417, at 1209. The burden would then shift to the defendant who would
bear the burden of non-persuasion. The defendant would be allowed an opportu-
nity to answer the claim that he committed a crime of violence motivated by gender
by threatening the use of force. He could demonstrate that he didn't do it, that the
plaintiff's reactions were idiosyncratic or pretextual, or that the alleged behavior
was not likely to enforce gender roles or his dominance nor violate his wife's integ-
rity. See ici at 1210-11. To evaluate the defendant's rebuttal, the court could apply
the "totality of the circumstances" test, as required by the VAWA, and consider fac-
tors probative of gender motivation, including: the nature of the conduct; the fre-
quency of violent conduct; the extent to which that behavior reinforces the
defendant's view of plaintiff's appropriate gender roles; the language or terms used
during the violent act that indicate gender motivation; sex crimes or the targeting
of sexual organs or effects; whether the defendant has a history of violence
targeted at women; and, the cycle of abuse.
If the defendant sustains his burden of non-persuasion, the plaintiff would
have an opportunity to make a rebuttal showing that her "idiosyncrasy" was know-
ingly exploited on the basis of her special sensitivity. See Abrams, supra note 417,
at 1214. For example, if a woman is atypically sensitive to violence or threats of
use of force because of prior history of abuse and is exposed to such conduct by a
domestic partner aware of her history, she can argue that such treatment is coer-
cive, intended to place her in a subordinate position and evidence of gender motiva-
tion. The advantage of the victim-perspective proposal, the "radical subjectivity"
approach, is that it does not require women to meet an imaginary "reasonable per-
son" or "reasonable woman" standard; rather, this approach confronts directly an
indvidual's particularized experiences.
Law and Inequality
movement instead of fulfilling the potential that the "dynamic in-
terrelationship of rights and politics"494 will advance the political
development of the movement.
The second critique of the civil rights remedy as applied to
domestic relations centers on the practical limitation of the rem-
edy to heterosexual victims of battery. Such a focus may perpetu-
ate popular images of battered women that reflect heterosexual
norms at the expense of lesbian experience and insight. The prac-
tical application of the civil rights remedy by battered women liti-
gants and its relative value as a legal tool also may be questioned,
as well as the implications of what some may claim is a paternalis-
tic remedy. Finally, those who agree that the battered women's
movement should affirm the power of survivors of wife abuse may
fear the articulation of "victim" language at a civil rights trial. De-
spite these concerns, introduction of the civil rights remedy is
likely to play an important educative function in the articulation
of women's experiences, promote liberating and powerful images
of battered women and serve individual women in their search for
justice. On balance, civil rights remedies should be embraced and
used by battered women.
A. Rights and Politics - Struggles for Dignity
Articulation of rights concepts is a familiar and powerful ele-
ment of American political and legal discourse.495 "Rights" evoke
powerful images of entitlement and worthiness of individual and
group claims. Rights demands often serve as critical interventions
against aspects of inequality, exclusion, discrimination and vio-
lence perpetuated by the dominant power structure. Rights theory
in the women's movement has played a part in political efforts to
gain women's suffrage, legalized abortion, access to universities
and employment, protection against discriminatory treatment and
remedies against sexual harassment and domestic violence. Each
of these efforts has had transformative effects on the social struc-
ture, but none have fully reached their emancipatory and trans-
formative potential. The structure of gendered power and violence
against women remains.
Some commentators condemn the notion of the "rights" con-
cept itself. Individual rights often are treated as naturalized, re-
494. Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 590 (1986).
495. The "civil," "women's," "welfare," "animal," "consumer," "human," "envi-
ronmental," and "voting" rights movements all suggest the broad evocative power
of the concept of rights.
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ified concepts that form the neutral categories of a liberal state;
this treatment obscures and distorts "the reality of the social con-
struction of rights and duties."496 Use of reified rights theory
serves to validate the concepts and structures of the liberal state
without challenging the core.497 The "excessive preoccupation
with 'rights consciousness' tends in the long run to reinforce alien-
ation and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights inherently
affirms that the source of social power resides in the State rather
than in the people themselves."498
This critique highlights, as well, the practical danger of the
unknown outcome of rights theory. Reliance on the state to pro-
tect individuals appears to result in the forfeiture of alternative
mechanisms of articulating values and commitments arrived at
through collective discourse and enforced by community means.
Further, it may be seen as paternalistic for women to seek help of
the state in a struggle for emancipation. Rights theory can work
for emancipatory purposes, but often it serves to reinforce the sta-
tus quo.
For most of American constitutional history, rights theories
have been associated with protection of property against a
more just distribution of wealth and privilege. Even as an
emancipatory conception of rights has emerged during the past
half century, theories of rights have continued to represent a
double-edged sword because of their lack of grounding in any
substantive theory of social justice or the 'good society.' 499
The "individual" orientation of rights theory, the assertion
that citizens have rights and duties toward one another and liber-
ties against the state, also reaffirms the dichotomy between the
public and the private. Like other classical legal concepts, this dis-
tinction is a dilemma for women. The right to privacy has been at
the core of the emancipatory recognition of important constitu-
tional rights for women, including a woman's right to control her
own reproduction5 0 0 and family rights.501 Yet, the public/private
496. Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 403-04 (1988).
497. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis,
63 TEx. L. REV. 387 (1984).
498. Schneider, supra note 494, at 611.
499. See Horwitz, supra note 496, at 393.
500. See, ag., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Family
and parental rights are closely linked to rights of privacy. See Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right "to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children").
501. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). '"The Meyer-Pierce-Yoder 'pa-
rental' right and the privacy right, while dealt with separately in this opinion, may
be no more than verbal variations of a single constitutional right." Id. at 178 n.15.
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distinction also traditionally has worked to hinder the claims of
women and has been one cornerstone of women's vulnerability to
wife abuse.
In contrast to the state's "hands-off" posture against inter-
vention in the family to protect the disempowered, the U.S.
Supreme Court has allowed intrusion into the most private experi-
ence of lovers, their sexual activity, by enforcing state laws against
sodomy.502 Furthermore, the Reagan/Bush appointed judiciary
makes civil rights litigation at the federal level predictably diffi-
cult and possibly damaging to women. There is legitimate fear
among feminists that initiating rights claims within the family
may result in intrusion upon valued aspects of privacy, and ulti-
mately, may place women at further risk of private and public
subordination.
Despite the risks of civil rights litigation, rights advocacy
within the context of the women's movement should not be aban-
doned - especially where women's lives are at risk. Establishing
civil rights protection against violence motivated by gender is not
paternalistic, but an essential aspect of securing equality and a tool
for strong challenges to a structure of male dominance. Debate
over the choice of which rights to articulate and how to inform and
enforce those rights is the more important political question than
whether rights concepts should be articulated at all.50 3 Where
there is fear of lack of success of federal civil rights claims, there
should be strategic enforcement of the remedy in some state
courts until the federal judiciary demonstrates a greater openness
to civil rights seekers.
In recognition of the dynamic interrelationship between the-
ory and practice and the vast options available for strategic use of
the civil rights law, a dialectical perspective of "rights"504 should
be adopted to evaluate the benefits of civil rights remedies for bat-
tered women. From this perspective, "rights" notions should not
be thought of or treated as static, positive law concepts, but as
tools informed by struggles for social change. The value of rights
articulation extends beyond the dimension of Supreme Court rec-
ognition of federal constitutional protection. Indeed, rights advo-
cacy broadly conceived encompasses all political efforts for social
502. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 748 U.S. 186 (1986).
503. For instance, the public/private distinction, which works against women by
perpetuating wife abuse, should be deconstructed. An alternative grounding for
abortion rights could be sought in legislation and theories other than privacy, such
as equal protection. See Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 105 (1989).
504. See Schneider, supra note 494, at 589.
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change at the grassroots, state or federal level - it is the commu-
nal articulation and debate about normative moral values and so-
cial goals that should be embodied in the laws of the state.
Articulation of battered women's "civil rights," whether
those rights stem from Congressional enactment or state constitu-
tion, is a passionate expression of the integrity of individual per-
sons and the value of women as a group. It is not a perpetuation of
victimization, but an embrace of empowerment. The notion of
"rights," as Elizabeth Schneider notes, should be contextualized
within the social movement that articulates it.
Various kinds of legal rights and entitlements may be used in
a manner that helps to develop social movement, which in
turn leads to expanded opportunities for a more humane soci-
ety, or they may be used to help frustrate social movement by
legitimizing existing relationships. The meaning of a right or
entitlement depends upon the way in which it intertwines
with social movement.5 05
Schneider further contends that "[t]he women's movement's
experience with rights shows how rights emerge from political
struggle. The legal formulation of the rights grew out of, and re-
flected, feminist experience and vision which culminated in a polit-
ical demand for power."506  Like the women's movement
generally, battered women's coalitions have developed the under-
lying power and resources to make a real difference for many sur-
vivors of wife abuse. This experience provides a context for
furtherance of the goal of ending violence against women. The
political and legal articulation of civil rights demands is an effec-
tive tool to promote this advancement which lies in the hands of
increasingly empowered women.
Late 19th- and early 20th-Century battering resisters recog-
nized that "the language of absolute 'rights' is only one legitimate
approach to self-defense; in a patriarchal system there were
neither institutions nor concepts defending absolute rights, but
rather custom and bargaining." 507 Women's construction of the
notion of a right or entitlement to protection evolved when women
'had some reasonable expectation that they could win - other-
wise strategies other than head-on confrontation with a husband's
prerogatives were more effective."5 08
Women's invention of a right not to be beaten came from a di-
alectic between changing social possibilities and aspirations.
When women's best hope was husbands' kindness, because
505. Id. at 612 n.102.
506. Id. at 648.
507. GORDON, supra note 28, at 256.
508. Id. at 258.
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they were economically dependent on marriage, they did not
protect violations of their individual rights but rested their
case on their importance as mothers. As women's possibilities
expanded to include wage-earning, remarriage after divorce,
birth limitation, and aid to single mothers, their best hopes es-
calated to include escape from marital violence altogether.509
As previously discussed, since the mid-1970s, feminists have
developed support groups, newsletters, legal resource centers, shel-
ters, and personal safety mechanisms to assist directly survivors of
wife abuse and to challenge violence against women.51 0 In addi-
tion, battered women's growing political clout in legislatures across
the nation has resulted in abuse prevention legislation which al-
lows women to obtain civil orders of protection.5 11 Domestic rela-
tions laws have been modified to recognize the special status of
battered mothers and create presumptions on their behalf during
temporary custody proceedings. 512 These efforts articulate the bat-
tered women's needs for safety and legal protection. They imply a
"right" to be free from violence, but they do not articulate that
right directly or provide a civil cause of action whereby women can
obtain damages for batterers' violations of their integrity.
The power of the battered women's movement is still rela-
tively weak, however, and exists largely in opposition to the domi-
nant male power structure. Shelters are notoriously underfunded;
women are battered and raped in increasing numbers. Despite leg-
islative "victories" in the struggle to erode male dominance, each
has had a backlash. For example, upon a woman's complaint for a
protective order, mutual restraining orders are commonly issued
which put women in greater danger.513 "Learned helplessness"
has been turned against women in custody battlessl4 and women
have been blamed for failure to protect their children51 5 against
509. Id.
510. See generally SCHECHTER, supra note 1.
511. See § II.D.2.
512. See, e.g., MAss. GaN. L. ch. 31 (1992).
513. See Finn, supra note 147, at 51. Mutual restraining orders fail to identify
the abuser as the individual to be restrained from abusing the wife but order both
parties to refrain from interfering with the liberty of the other or harming the
other. Therefore, if a woman who was issued a "mutual" restraining order calls the
police for protection, the police are likely to be confused when they arrive about
who is dangerous and may choose to mediate the dispute or arrest both parties.
Neither resolution serves to protect the battered woman.
514. For a comprehensive and practice-oriented treatment of this subject, see
Naomi Calm, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VANi. L. REv. 1041 (1991).
515. "Wife beaters abused children in 70% of the families in which children were
present" and women's use of help-sources is higher where child abuse is present
than where it is absent which "constitutes strong evidence of the wife's efforts to
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the ravages of their fathers.51 6 The structure of power and domi-
nance is not changed by individual, isolated victories. The battered
women's movement must, by now, be conditioned to the need for
continual advocacy and struggle to prevent the appropriation of
emancipatory tools by those who would further women's
oppression.
A realistic assessment of judicial, legislative and social treat-
ment of women's rights claims, while sobering, does not require
abandonment of civil rights efforts or any other kind of legal strat-
egy. Instead, women's legal claims and strategies, and the timing
with which they are deployed, should be informed by the needs of
the movement and predictions of the way the dominant frame-
work will treat such claims.5 17 If positive lessons can be learned
from feminists' efforts to pass anti-pornography ordinances,5 18
state and federal civil rights legislation prohibiting violence against
women and well-publicized litigation of battered women's civil
rights claims is likely to provoke controversy and serve many posi-
tive educational functions. Considering the dynamic interrelation-
ship of rights and politics, civil rights discourse is an appropriate
mechanism to advance the political development of the battered
women's movement. There are at least seven positive effects bat-
tered women's civil rights theory will have in forwarding the goals
of the women's movement.
First, civil rights discourse directly links violence against bat-
tered women to the historical and legal context of that violence.
The battered women's movement successfully has positioned the
building blocks of individual protection for many. To continue to
make societal and structural changes, we must directly focus on
the invidiousness of violence against women and transform the
dominant law, culture, economic structure and individual behavior
that perpetuate the harm. In the big picture, a civil rights remedy
promotes safety.
Current cultural understandings of "civil rights" have been
protect her children." Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife
Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMNIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 162, 164.
516. See State v. Wiliquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (finding woman's failure
to act in allowing abusive father to remain in custody of child a causal factor in ex-
posing children to maltreatment for purposes of child abuse statute).
517. The VAWA and other civil rights legislation should be considered in terms
of existing jurisprudence. Battered women's advocates should lobby Congress to
amend the VAWA's standards of proof so that real women can articulate their real
experience, pain and injury.
518. See Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism and the Constitu-
tion: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987);
Frug, supra note 42, at 1067 (characterizing the ordinance campaign as a "dazzling
success and an appalling disaster").
1992]
Law and Inequality
shaped by legal definitions and the history of the civil rights move-
ment. The notion of protected class status for women evokes a his-
tory of harm, domination and exclusion of women as a group from
the white, male power structure. The battered women's move-
ment would gain by continued articulation of the history of dis-
crimination. Civil rights claims would link the dominant social
structure to the struggle for power and control in heterosexual re-
lationships, the "private violence" of wife abuse, and show how
abuse is one cornerstone of women's subordination. These link-
ages are essential to challenging the misconception that "random"
wife abuse exists.
Second, civil rights claims would project positive images of
survivors of wife abuse as powerful agents and valuable members
of the community who deserve, like all people, to be free from vio-
lence. A battered woman who directly exposes and challenges her
treatment, sexualized subordination and the history and social
structures which promote violence against women works also to
challenge the stereotype of battered women as victims.519
Although victim identification may resonate with many people's
life experiences as well as the core of the western Judeo-Christian
moral tradition, civil rights deprivations also conjure up normative
impulses promoting the integrity of human life and the inviability
of spirit. These impulses counteract debilitating stereotypes of vic-
timization and promote an image of battered women engaged in a
collective struggle for empowerment. This is important because an
interactive relationship exists between general cultural assump-
tions about battered women and the substantive law, methods of
litigation and legal images of the same. "Serious harm to women
results from the ways in which law and culture distort our
experience." 520
Third, civil rights litigation of battered women's claims would
expose, as context for each case, the pervasiveness and commonal-
ity of battering. Popular images of battered women currently are
sensationalized, individualized and essentialized so that the vast
majority of women who are abused do not feel they fit the popular
stereotype. As such, society denies the pervasiveness of wife
abuse. Despite the commonality of domestic violence,52 1 the popu-
lar image of domestic violence is that it is rare and aberrant. 522
This radical discrepancy between the "mysterious" character
519. The civil rights remedy will serve to enhance battered women's voices and
images as survivors and advocates for justice. See supra § fl.B.
520. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 2.
521. See supra § H.A.
522. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 11.
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of domestic violence and repeatedly gathered statistics reflects
massive denial throughout society and the legal system ....
Societal denial amounts to an ideology that protects the insti-
tution of marriage by perpetuating the focus on individual vio-
lent actors, concealing both the commonality of violence in
marriage and the ways in which state and society participate in
the subordination of women. 523
Civil rights claims would shift the legal imagery to presume that
violence is a societal problem and that individual batterers gain
from systemic violence against women. This would counteract,
although it is unlikely to eliminate, the tendency of batterers and
the judicial system to "blame women for their abuse and deny or
trivialize the violence involved."524
Fourth, debate over legislation and litigation of civil rights vi-
olations would work to reformulate the characterization of what is
socially appropriate behavior. The legal remedy embodies a so-
cially transformative, normative potential. Civil rights legislation
and litigation525 would provide opportunities for community inter-
actions over norms of human relations and the development of col-
lective mechanisms to ensure mutual respect and dignity. This
collective action expands women's options for community.526
Fifth, legislative and legal advocacy efforts that focus on the
civil rights violations of battering may result in an increased and
widespread commitment to prevent violence against women at its
origin and to fund programs for helpseekers. Positive publicity,
with or without increased funding, also encourages women to
speak out and demand freedom from violence.
Sixth, contextualizing battered women's collective struggle as
a civil rights movement taps a pervasively moral chord, strikes at
the very legitimacy of our democratic government and demands
remedial action.527 Fundamental rights, guaranteed by the laws of
this great land of opportunity, systematically are denied to bat-
tered women. Articulation of the deprivation experienced by an
entire class of citizens requires reformulation of laws and policies
to eradicate the regular experiences of violence directed at women
because of their sex.
Finally, battered women's civil rights remedies serve as a ve-
hicle for individual women to obtain damages and compensation
523. Id. at 12.
524. Id. at 13.
525. Although litigation has less of an inherent communitarian component, I as-
pire to notions of lawyering whereby community strategy, support and press work
(where appropriate) forms an integral component of the litigation itself.
526. See supra § H.D.
527. See supra § H.C.1.
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for the deprivation of their civil rights. If the elements of proof
and procedure are crafted with a survivor's perspective in mind,
one litigants' expression would serve an empowering function as
she speaks for an entire community by demanding treatment with
dignity.
B. Essentialism and Legal Norms
The civil rights characterization of wife abuse - as an act on
a continuum of male violence against women, rooted in sex -
risks creation of images that essentialize gender categories and fail
to give weight to differences of race, class, sexual orientation and
different preferences for sexual pleasures.528 Promotion of theo-
ries which highlight male dominance may be wrong,5 2 9 may blur
the complexities of particular women's situations, promote the im-
age of women as victim530 and risk recreating norms which actu-
ally harm individual litigants.
The civil rights strategy benefits the heterosexual women's
community most if it exposes wife abuse as on a continuum of
male dominance and violence against women and demonstrates
that the continuum of the struggle for power and control works to
enhance that dominance through the family institution. Such an
explanation risks excluding the possibly different experiences of
minority women and the lesbian experience of battering. It risks
describing women's voices in a unitary fashion and may perpetuate
patriarchy531 by not articulating the lesbian alternative.5 32 The
528. Cf Carole Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER (Carole Vance ed., 1983) [hereinafter PLEASURE AND DAN-
GER]. Vance believes that the proponents of the anti-porn initiatives, in their essen-
tialized opposition to subordinated sex, eliminated the complexity of sexuality -
that along with pleasure there is danger. Women have been forced to conform to
social norms in restriction of their sexuality. New heterosexist norms fail to ac-
knowledge other views and perpetuate the dishonesty of the "transmutation of sex-
uality into unmitigated danger and unremitting victimization." Id.
529. See ELzAB=TH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 114-32 (1988). Dominance feminism, Spelman argues, fails to
understand the phenomenology of gender discrimination by failing to include the
perspectives of so many Black and poor women. The approach requires Black wo-
men to divide their racial selves from their gendered selves and treats gender dis-
crimination of Black women like white women "only more so" without recognizing
the special confluence of race and gender relations.
530. See Vance, supra note 528; but see supra note 519.
531. The dominance approach may marginalize lesbians and "erase" the experi-
ence of lesbians from the feminist map. It falls into the essentialist trap by promot-
ing a notion that all women are different from men and essential in this same way.
In this sense, heterosexual women are not challenged in their complicity in the in-
stitution of heterosexuality which perpetuates patriarchy and punishes, in particu-
lar, lesbians who step outside the gender boundaries. See Patricia A. Cain,
Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191
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concept may thereby fail to challenge not only the law's content,
but its tendency to privilege the abstract and unitary voice. The
normative standards in the law may, in turn, serve to thwart all
battered women who choose to undertake civil rights litigation.
These concerns should be taken seriously at a theoretical and
practical level: legal and political advocates should work to adopt
substantive and procedural rights which counteract the negative
tendencies of essentialization and increase the odds of positive out-
comes for all women. In this vein, the alternative methods of
proof of a VAWA civil rights claim should be adopted so that wo-
men's voices are amplified by engagement in civil rights litigation
and so that the law itself embodies normative requirements for
real changes in the practice of violence against women.
1. Heterosexual Norms
Where women are targeted for gender-motivated violence by
persons other than their husbands or spouses, the perceived sexual
orientation of the women may be an element of the gender motiva-
tion in some cases. "[N]egative attitudes toward lesbian and gay
people correlate strongly with traditional sexist concepts about the
appropriate roles of men and women."53 3 In this context, civil
rights remedies will benefit women in the heterosexual and les-
bian communities by providing a unique remedy for the civil rights
harm that is suffered because of heterosexual gender norms.
Promotion of a civil rights remedy for battered women, how-
ever, risks the essentialization of heterosexual norms. The exist-
ence of lesbian battering challenges the gender-motivation
explanation of male on female violence. On the surface, lesbian
battering appears to reflect the struggle for power and control in
relationships, but does not appear to be explained by the contin-
uum of male violence against women. Use of the civil rights rem-
edy by battered lesbians would require articulation of deprivations
at least in part because of gender.
Martha Mahoney articulates definitions of lesbian battering
based on the struggle for power and control.5 3 4 Lydia Walker
(1988). The social meaning of homosexuality is a denial of the "traditional belief
... that stable relations require the hierarchy and reciprocity of male/female polar-
ity." Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS.
L. REv. 187, 218.
532. Although exposure of lesbian violence may, in fact, lead some women to
think that this alternative is no safer than heterosexual relationships, it may be
that violence is significantly less common in the lesbian community, which would
suggest an alternative with a higher likelihood of safety.
533. Law, supra note 531, at 221.
534. Mahoney, supra note 3.
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states that, from her experience working with battered women'in
shelters, "the only difference in the interpersonal dynamics and
perpetration of violence in battering in lesbian couples is that les-
bian women report physically fighting back more often than wo-
men who are battered by men."535 If this characterization is
correct, there is no lesbian contradiction to the struggle for power
and control explanation of battering but an indication that physi-
cal resistance to abuse may be more prevalent where size aid
strength differentials are less extreme.
It is not clear, however, whether lesbian battering can be sit-
uated on the continuum of male dominance through violence
against women. Although men's battering of women serves to en-
force gender-norms, there is no evidence that the "butch"/"femn"
stereotype, which heterosexist society erroneously might consider
a re-creation of "male"/"female" roles within lesbian relation-
ships,53 6 correlates with the identity of the abusive (male) and
abused (female) partners in heterosexual relationships. The essen-
tialized characterization of gender-motivated civil rights depriva-
tions may be successful in the lesbian community only by
imposition of heterosexist norms and promotion of false images of
lesbians. The heterosexual community must be careful not to im-
pose its own imperialist norms.5 37
Thus, it is clear that not all battered women will have similar
immediate interests in, or direct benefits from, the use of the civil
rights remedies. 53 8 There is, however, a connection between male
dominance in society and the use of violence in the struggle for
power and control in all relationships.539 Violent attacks on lesbi-
ans because of their gender and rejection of traditional gender
roles might be actionable pursuant to the VAWA. Furthermore,
the dominant culture's pressures and stereotypes influence lesbian
intimate relationships, even if the results do not replicate hetero-
sexual practice. Lesbians acknowledge the influence of the male
dominated society on them. The lesbian community has
internalized many societal messages about women's roles. We
need to be alert, questioning and helping each other to learn
535. Lydia Walker, Battered Women's Shelters and Work with Battered Lesbi-
ans, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 59, at 76.
536. See Joan Nestle, The Fern Question, in PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note
528, at 237 (discussing the fern phenomenon and heterosexual misperceptions).
537. Id. at 235.
538. The "women's movement" notoriously has set forth the white, middle-clals,
heterosexual woman as the normative standard of the category "women;" in this
context, the individuals who are likely to benefit most directly from civil rights
remedies are heterosexual women.
539. See supra § II.B.2.
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which of these roles to accept and cherish, and which to let go.
The attention we devote as a lesbian feminist culture to sensi-
tivity, to processing problems, and to mutual emotional sup-
port, emphasizes our recognition of the value of many of the
traditional areas of women's skill.54 0
The values of solidarity and support, relative isolation from the
heterosexist culture, reluctance to being "out" in that culture, lack
of particularized community resources and the discrimination
many lesbians face when they are open about their sexual orienta-
tion perpetuates the isolation experienced by lesbian survivors of
battering. Such isolation prevents battered lesbians from seeking
assistance. American culture "teaches women to be nonassertive,
dependent on others for validation, and nurturers of their relation-
ships;" the culture supports battered lesbians in accepting blame
for the abuse, sustaining hope that it will stop and seeing no alter-
native in the greater community.54 '
Promotion of civil rights remedies for gender-motivated vio-
lence would serve lesbians targeted because of their sex. By not
articulating the experience of battered lesbians, use of the civil
rights remedies by battered women may risk battered lesbians'
further isolation and danger in this area. But by challenging gen-
der-motivated violence in heterosexual relationships, battered wo-
men challenge the construct of gendered power relations which
would have positive ramifications in the lesbian community.
2. Race Bias
Like lesbian battering, issues of race may complicate the
characterization of the battering experience as gender-motivated
violence. Different stereotypes attributed to racial groups may
lead to variance in the practical application of civil rights laws. Fi-
nally, not enough may be known about the intersection of race and
domestic violence to impose the legal standards of the mainstream
battered women's movement which has been critiqued as predomi-
nantly white.
As is clear from Jacqueline Dowd Hall's study of race, rape
and lynching in the slave and post-Reconstruction south, gender
and race relations are inherently intertwined.5 4 2 Patriarchal con-
540. Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in
NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 57, at 193.
541. Id. at 191.
542. '"The violence directed at black women illustrates the double jeopardy of
race and sex.... Black women... routinely ... served as targets of sexual as-
sault... Ihe sexual access of white men to black women was a cornerstone of
patriarchal power in the south." Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Mind That Burns In
Each Body, in POWER OF DEsm 328, 332 (Ann Snitow, et al., eds., 1983).
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trol was asserted by white men over Black women, upon whom no-
tions of promiscuity and sexual agency, "the fear and fascination of
female sexuality was projected" and communicated white men's
power over Black men through lynching.543 White women also
were constrained by the so-called "protection" against Black men's
sexual advances.4 "For this privilege (of protection) . . . she
might pay with suffering in the extreme. In any case, she would
pay with a lifetime of subjugation to the men gathered in her be-
half "545 whose own acts of rape were met as "moral lapse(s) ...
better ignored and forgotten."54 6
Just as Black men continue to draw disproportionate punish-
ment for sexual assault,547 popular stereotypes and images work
against black women in a courtroom where demonstration of dep-
rivation of rights is necessary. Left-over stereotypes of the Black
woman as a strong, powerful, sexual provocateur, and as the "ob-
ject" of property, may work against her in civil rights cases. The
Massachusetts Gender Bias Commission found such racial bias.
[R]esearch literature and media reports indicate that ethnic
and racial minorities encounter stereotypical views of the role
of violence in relationships among minority group members.
In a recent proceeding in which a male defendant was being
sentenced for assaulting a woman with whom he was residing,
the judge cited general levels of violence in the black commu-
nity as a mitigating factor in the sentencing determination.
The defendant's attorney in the case spoke about the more vio-
lent nature of relationships among blacks. Such stereotypes
serve to minimize and condone violence that would not be tol-
erated among strangers or acquaintances who are white. Ste-
reotypes relating to economic class tend to have the same
effect, even though battering is a phenomenon in all classes.54 8
Other racial and ethnic minorities might find different ste-
reotypes at work. For instance, Asian-American women, cultur-
ally mislabelled as passive and weak, may be perceived as victims
of domestic violence but may not be understood as independent,
strong agents who desire to be compensated for deprivation of
their civil rights. Further, there may be a double standard in the
543. Id. at 333. "The 'protection of white womanhood' was a pervasive fixture of
racist ideology" and "an accepted rationale for lynching" Black men. Id. at 334.
544. White women were the forbidden fruit, the untouchable property, the ulti-
mate symbol of white male power. As the vulnerable, virginal Victorian image of
white women was projected in the popular culture, rape of a white woman by a
Black man was met with lynching - a gallant retribution for the violation, pollu-
tion and humiliation of the pure Fair Maiden victim. Id at 334-35.
545. Id. at 335.
546. Id. at 339.
547. Id. at 343.
548. MASSAcHusETTs GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 13, at 90.
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evidentiary burden depending upon the operable stereotypes.
When information presented by litigants confirms sex and race
stereotypes, no independent proof may be necessary to satisfy the
judge, but when information cuts against the stereotype, judges
may demand empirical quantification or a production of
evidence.549
Without recognition of the particular reality of every group of
minority women, racial stereotypes may work to hurt those who
litigate civil rights violations under the gender motivation rubric.
Those who truly are victimized may not be perceived as such be-
cause they deviate from the white woman norm.
Battered women who actively seek recognition of their civil
rights will generate positive social influences, but they must work
as well to overcome historical prejudice and racial bias.
3. The "Perfect Case"
Reliance on legal remedies to bring justice to battered women
requires appeal to male legal norms and predominantly male
judges. As always, legal action risks results that ultimately may do
more harm than good for individual litigants and for the women's
movement of which they are part. Nevertheless, civil rights reme-
dies are an important addition to the collection of tools women can
utilize to escape the "private violence" that enforces a gendered
power structure.
Imposition of unitary descriptions, such as "gender motiva-
tion," together with the failure to articulate the reality of different
women, can translate into essentialized, prescriptive normative
standards which tend to work against women who bring claims
that differ from the judge's estimation of the norm. Battered wo-
men's civil rights strategies may run this risk, unless remedies are
crafted to ensure that individual litigants' experiences can be ar-
ticulated within the legal process.
Judicial establishment of difficult burdens and standards to
prove violations of civil rights might reduce the positive transform-
ative value of the civil rights remedy and serve to disempower in-
dividual women who seek to enforce their rights. Failure of
individual rights seekers may translate into disempowerment of
the community. Denial of battered women's civil rights claims in
the courts risks creating a situation in which battered women are
put in worse danger. If courts do not endorse battered women's
549. See Williams, supra note 23 (in EEOC v. Sears, 625 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd.. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), the court "opinion establishes a legal pre-
sumption that all women fit traditional gender stereotypes").
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civil rights claims, other battered women may deny the severity of
the violence levelled against them550 or reject the possibility of life
without violence.
Possible claims may be rejected as a result of judicial recogni-
tion of only the most extreme cases in denial of the severity and
pervasiveness of battering.55 ' Capturing the extreme cases as the
norm of the type of situation appropriate for a civil rights action
might marginalize the successful cases and ill serve women who
experience more common and regular deprivation of their civil
rights. In one act of systemic denial, Senator Biden suggested that
"random" domestic beatings would not be actionable because the
requisite "gender motivation" would be absent.552 In a similar
vein, prosecutors who have contemplated litigating gender-moti-
vated civil rights claims have avoided the common violations which
demonstrate widespread male dominance and sexualized subordi-
nation of women, and sought instead a fact scenario which appears
to be an aberration.553 To avoid losing the first gender-motivated
civil rights claim, these prosecutors risked seeking a fact scenario
which may never occur, and if it did, might solidify applications so
different from the common experience of battered women that the
remedy would never serve them.
Evidence of the "perfect case" phenomenon exists in the
VAWA legislative history and in the early experience of the Massa-
chusetts Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General's Office
considered bringing state civil rights claims on behalf of battered
women but sought the "perfect case" to initiate the use of these
remedies in the context of gender-motivated violence.554 The
550. See supra § IV.C.I.
551. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 16-18.
552. One of the central difficulties in bringing battered women's civil rights
claims is the commonality of the battering experience and the resulting individual
and social denial of the severity of the problem in American society. The cases
which are litigated will face an unstated higher burden to overcome popular as-
sumptions and profound tendencies toward denial. Those who sit in judgment
might require demonstration that the case at bar is qualitatively and quantitatively
different, more egregious, than the common violence that haunts their own experi-
ence or the experience of others they know. If jurors or judges already have deter-
mined for themselves that they must not act to stop violence of which they may be
aware, the denial of that harm will likely cloud their willingness to acknowledge
another's. That commonly experienced domestic assaults and rapes would be ac-
tionable as civil rights violations calls into question long-held notions of appropriate
roles within the family and the very structure of American society. Such pervasive-
ness may result in judicial resistance and heightened, limiting standards.
553. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
554. Until 1991, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office had contemplated,
but not filed, gender-motivated civil rights claims. Telephone interviews with




"perfect case" would involve a woman victim, a male defendant
who did not know her and had no prior relation with her, who
picked her out as a target of violence - preferably rape - and
said something derogatory toward all women as he sexually as-
saulted her.ws
An example propounded in the legislative history of the
VAWA suggests that while domestic violence is common, the ex-
treme case of an actionable claim touted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee involves a stranger jumping out of the bushes, hurling
misogynist slurs at his victim and raping her.556
The great risk of the civil rights remedy is that it may work
to prevent women from telling their own stories and impose a
rigid formula for success which requires objectification of the wo-
man as a "symbol" of all women. If this transpires, the very na-
ture of a civil rights remedy may work against women's interests
in the long term.
C. Civil Rights Remedies Should Be Used
Despite the foregoing concerns, articulation of a civil rights
remedy serves the agenda of the entire battered women's move-
ment precisely because it reveals battering as a societal problem of
male on female violence and subordination. This perspective legit-
imately ties individual violence to a cultural and historical context,
it links individual battered women to a collective movement. Such
an endorsement, however, is not meant to detract from serious
concerns about the development of the feminist coalition or the
proposed language of the VAWA.
Undercutting the dominant male power structure through
successful litigation of battered women's civil rights claims would
help to erode a system that negatively impacts lesbians as well as
heterosexual women, minority women as well as whites. The
existence of lesbian violence does not require abandonment of so-
cial reform efforts to create a nonviolent culture; nor should it re-
quire abandonment of heterosexual battered women's zealous
advocacy of civil rights claims against their abusers. The situation
may require recognition that
[w]e have all grown up in a sexist and homophobic culture.
The seeds of both victimization and violence are dormant in all
of us .... we need to recognize those seeds for what they are,
to expose them, and gently tug them from the roots of our
555. Telephone interview with Judy Beals, Public Protection Bureau, Massachu-
setts Attorney General's Office, in Boston, (May 1, 1991).
556. See supra note 451.
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psyches, as they begin to sprout, take hold, and grow.557
Indeed, lesbians may choose not to litigate claims against their
partners pursuant to civil rights statutes requiring "gender motiva-
tion," but white and minority women who do will indirectly bene-
fit the lesbian community's efforts to cultivate an environment in
which heterosexuality is not compulsory5 5 8 and in which male
dominance through violence has no place.
The civil rights approach will help to re-cast the mold of male
dominance which oppresses women as a whole. It is an important
and necessary tool which should be used, together with other strat-
egies, to deconstruct the neutral and natural appearances of the
existing structures of power which conceal a many-faced oppres-
sion. Yet, all civil rights strategists must be sobered by recognition
that use of the remedy requires reliance upon one of the most en-
trenched of all institutions of male power - the law.
The public nature of the battered women's civil rights rem-
edy, compared to other legal strategies, may best serve feminist
emancipatory goals by revealing the lack of foundation for the
public/private distinction and other constructions of classical legal
thought. Repeated, direct exposure may accelerate erosion of the
underpinnings of an exclusionary and violent system that has
withstood less direct forces of history; it may create the space
within which to develop new structures of tolerance.
As such, broad coalition goals should be adopted which are
inclusive of many voices and strategies joined together to achieve
the liberation of all subordinated people. The civil rights strategy
for battered women must embrace a broad challenge to male vio-
lence and gender norm enforcement that is sensitive to differences
between women. Battered women's experiences, as articulated by
each claimant, will assist in revealing the effects of gendered
power relations and gaining recognition of the authenticity of each
woman's struggle.
The shared commitment to removing the mask of domination
is likely to have a liberating and self-definitional effect on individ-
ual claimants.5 59 Articulation of the right to human integrity, once
counteracted and muffled by carefully metered abuse, can be cele-
557. Hammond, supra note 540, at 196-97.
558. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in
BLOOD, BREAD & POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-85 (1986) ("compulsory heterosex-
uality" is the enforcement of heterosexuality for women as a means for ensuring
male right of physical, emotional and economic access). Rich's perspective appears
to support a civil rights remedy in that she sees all women as united by a lesbian
continuum and, at one level, in solidarity.
559. See Schneider, supra note 494, at 616, for discussion of Carol Gilligan's the-
ory of moral development in relation to legal rights notions.
[Vol. 11:1
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES
brated with the exposure of and resistance to widespread and sys-
temic violence. Women are more likely to tap into this web of
potentially supportive relationships if popular images link their
experience to others. One practice goal, therefore, must be to
bring forth a broad range of early civil rights cases to demonstrate
that all women, regardless of their double and different oppres-
sion, can gain judicial relief for gender-motivated deprivations of
their civil rights.
As social actors, we should recognize a dialectic in the catego-
ries we embrace to advance our social change objectives. Although
in an ideal world all social categories would be explicitly tentative,
the political targets of particular campaigns often suggest catego-
ries and norms which, if articulated, can powerfully promote that
movement's definitive goals. The widespread violence against wo-
men in all spheres of society cries out for an intervening civil
rights strategy. In turn, the practice of articulating and litigating
civil rights claims may stem violence against women and will in-
form and change our notions of gender motivation and the cate-
gory of gender altogether.
This praxis, if tied to the collective action of a broad coalition
seeking an evolving set of emancipatory goals, should aim to make
the category of gender itself irrelevant. The world should not be
polarized by gender, and divisions among feminists now serve as
bold reminders that oppression is more complex than the single
concept "gender" could ever capture. As Mary Joe Frug noted,
"exploring, pursuing, and accepting differences among women and
differences among sexual practices is necessary to challenge the
oppression of women by sex. Only when sex means more than
male or female, only when the word 'woman' cannot be coherently
understood, will oppression by sex be fatally undermined." 60
At this stage, it is premature and dangerous to ignore the ex-
planatory power of gender discrimination and sexualized subordi-
nation as concepts for exposing and eradicating systemic violence
against women. Direct civil rights challenges need not harden into
binary gender opposition. Instead, if successfully integrated with
other strategies, civil rights victories promise to create new spaces,
systems and structures of respect for all people and to promote an
environment in which all can thrive. Free from violence.
560. See Frug, supra note 42, at 1075.
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